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Setting the Scene:  





In the decades after the Cold War, the world has witnessed a growth in international 
interventions. The number of such interventions, the number of intervening actors, the number 
of total personnel and the amounts of money spent all increased.1 A predominantly Western 
group of intervening actors (states and other organizations), have been forcing, imposing, 
compelling, teaching or offering their various forms of order, values, systems, principles, 
techniques, organizations and governance on other actors. There have been UN-sanctioned 
post-conflict peacebuilding interventions, as well as controversial military invasions conducted 
without UN approval. Despite their differences, all these interventions represent a form of 
international politics where various military and civilian organizations are deployed to engage 
people, groups and organizations in a politically tense environment. Sometimes these 
encounters with the local actors are conflictual and violent, in other instances they may be 
mutually beneficial for intervener and those intervened upon.  
To some extent these interventions are illustrative of the post-Cold War Western-dominated 
liberal international order, fuelled by optimism and universalism, as well as hegemonic power 
and military dominance. The limited success of many of the interventions may also illustrate 
the shortcomings of this Western liberal hegemonic power. Recognising this, Western states 
                                                 
1 For instance, between 1988 and 1993 alone, more UN troops and civilian personnel were deployed than in the 
previous forty years. As of September 2017, there were 16 UN Peacekeeping missions with about 110 000 
personnel. Similarly, NATO deployed troops ‘out of area’ in places such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan from the mid-1990’s on. At the same time, development aid, or official assistance budgets, 
increased from USD 2 billion in 1990 to USD 25 billion by 2015. See ‘2015 State of the Humanitarian System 
report (SOHS)’, published by ALNAP on http://www.alnap.org/. See also Michael N. Barnett, Empire of 
Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 2–3. 
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appear to have become more reluctant to engage in large, comprehensive interventions today 
than they were a decade ago. Still, the UN continues to operate several complex peace 
operations, at times with significant use of force.2 Also NATO and the USA continue to engage 
globally in various missions. In short, interventions remain to be arenas for the conduct of 
global politics, and merit attention as a phenomenon in international relations. 
Scholars have carefully and critically scrutinized many aspects of the interventions of the last 
decades, finding some successes but more often universalizing tendencies and neo-colonial 
implications.3 Interventions aimed at ‘saving strangers’4 or ‘fixing failed states’5 have been 
shown to be political endeavours. The Western promotion of such things as ‘good governance’, 
‘best practices’, ‘gender equality’ and other human rights is found to be politically sensitive, 
even if these are represented as universal values, or downplayed as merely ‘technical advice’. 
The Western use of military force in so-called humanitarian interventions, stabilization 
operations, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and similar operations, have also been 
politically contested and critically examined by academics.  
This dissertation focuses on one less researched aspect of the post-Cold War interventions, 
namely the relationship between the military and the various civilian intervening actors. This is 
an important relationship, because it is frequently claimed that success in interventions hinges 
largely on military–civilian coherence.6 For example, we often hear that ‘there is no military 
solution’: that military force alone is incapable of resolving the conflict or winning a war, but 
                                                 
2 John Karlsrud, The UN at War: Peace Operations in a New Era (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 
3 I return to these studies below, but see e.g. Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: 
Governing the World of Peoples (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after 
Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
4 Nicolas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Interventions in International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
5 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
6 Coherence is defined as ‘the quality or state of cohering: as a: systematic or logical connection or consistency, 
b: integration of diverse elements, relationships, or values’. Cohere is defined as ‘to be combined or united in a 
logical and effective way’. See Merriam-Webster Dictionary http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/cohering. In the context of this thesis, coherence will be used primarily in connection 
with attempts at getting various actors in an intervention to act consistently and in tune with each other. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 2.  
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must be coupled with political and other civilian efforts for there to be a sustainable victory or 
peace.7  
The twining of military and civilian efforts is nothing new in the history of warfare. War has 
never taken place in a political vacuum: diplomacy has always been present in parallel with the 
fighting.8 Even in cases of crushing military victories and unconditional military surrenders, 
diplomatic activity has been an integral part of the process. Nothing is decided solely on the 
battlefield. Rather, the military have generally served as a tool for politicians and diplomats to 
strengthen their negotiating position towards each other. When the enemy has been weakened 
militarily, economically and socially, the conditions of the peace agreement tend to be more 
favourable for the stronger army.9 
However, when people say that there is ‘no military solution’ to today’s interventions, they are 
not only referring to the need for a diplomatic side-track to the fighting; they are also implying 
that political and other non-military efforts should be conducted simultaneously with the 
military operations in the field. In today’s interventions, military and security efforts are 
expected to operate in conjunction with other, civilian, lines of efforts in the theatre of 
operations.10 As I will show below, this applies to forced interventions, like the US operations 
                                                 
7 See for instance: ‘No military solution to Iraq, U.S. general says’, CNN, 9 March 2007: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/03/08/iraq.petraeus/;’Sen. John Kerry: There’s “no military 
solution” for United States in Afghanistan’, The Taunton Gazette, 21 May2011: 
http://www.tauntongazette.com/article/20110521/News/305219945; ‘SPIEGEL Interview with NATO Head 
Rasmussen: “There Is No Military Solution to the Libya Conflict”’, Spiegel Online International, 13 April 2011: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-nato-head-rasmussen-there-is-no-military-
solution-to-the-libya-conflict-a-756575.html; ‘Kambale Musavuli: There is no military solution to the Crisis in 
the Congo’, Soleil de Graben, 13 April 2013: https://soleildugraben.wordpress.com/2013/04/14/kambale-
musavuli-there-is-no-military-solution-to-the-crisis-in-the-congo/; ‘UN Security Council envoys visit war-hit 
Somalia and South Sudan’, Daily Nation, 13 August 2014: http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/UN-Security-
Council-envoys-visit-war-hit-Somalia-and-South-Sudan/-/1950946/2418392/-/format/xhtml/-/bbxc9dz/-
/index.html.  
8 Tarak Barkawi, ‘Diplomacy, War and World Politics’, in Diplomacy: The Making of World Politics, eds Ole 
Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 55–79; 
Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002); John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: 
Hutchinson, 1993); Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012). 
9 See e.g. Keegan, A History of Warfare; Afflerbach and Strachan, How Fighting Ends. 
10 Soeters, Joseph L. ‘Ambidextrous Military: Coping with Contradictions of New Security Policies’, in The 




in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to UN-sanctioned peacekeeping interventions alike. 11  Such 
comprehensiveness is not entirely new: also colonial powers and other historical interventions 
sought varying degrees of civilian and military coherence. However, the military tended to 
dominate the partnership, and the objective was control, exploitation and subjugation of the 
colonies.12 In today’s interventions, the civilian actors are more numerous, and are involved in 
everything from humanitarian relief, to development projects, state administration, legislation, 
political engagement and diplomacy. Interventions may still be politically controversial, but the 
majority are sanctioned by the UN Security Council, which provides greater international 
political legitimacy than in colonial times.  
Military–civilian coherence is often referred to as a precondition for peace and stability; also 
civilian agencies, with the UN at the forefront, have since the end of the Cold War stressed the 
importance of combining hard security, human security and development: you cannot have one 
without the other, it is argued. Similarly, security vacuums must be filled with stabilizing forces; 
and political and economic vacuums must be filled with governance and resources – or so it is 
held. Such broad and comprehensive engagement simultaneously in various sectors is a shared 
recipe for most of today’s interventions.13 Concepts such as ‘comprehensive approach’ and 
‘integrated missions’ have been launched by NATO, the EU and the UN to implement these 
ambitions.14  
                                                 
11 I discuss peacekeeping further below and in Chapter 3; here we may note that the UN defines it as ‘a technique 
designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing 
agreements achieved by the peacemakers.’ See DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008), 17. 
12 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); George 
Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and 
Southwest Africa (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: 
Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); 
Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
13 Mats Berdal, Building Peace after War (London: Routledge/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009); 
Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann, Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2010); Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. 
14 NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010); European 
Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Join(2013)30: The EU’s 
Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises (Brussels: High Representative of the European Union 
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And yet, despite high ambitions among politicians and organizations, coherence among 
intervening actors has proven challenging to achieve in practice. This applies not least to the 
military–civilian dimension.15 The relationships between the intervening actors are often either 
controversial and heated, or ignorant and inconsiderate. There may not be any interest in 
building coherence or to stay in close contact with the others. Why is this so? Is it a result of 
limited resources, poor implementation or competition between actors? Or is something deeper 
and perhaps insurmountable involved? More precisely, this dissertation asks: 
• How can we theorize and analyse the challenges facing intervening actors to achieve 
military–civilian coherence in post-Cold War interventions? 
 
1.1. Delimitations of the dissertation 
Before proceeding it is necessary to set out the scope of this study. First, this dissertation is 
limited in time to the post-Cold War period, in other words from the early 1990s until 2018. 
This was when the number of interventions increased – in UN peacekeeping, in the 
humanitarian sector and among Western armed forces. The focus is primarily on interventions 
flavoured by the liberal Western discourse of peace, stability, human security and 
democratization. In this period, the West remained the dominant voice in UN diplomacy, 
peacebuilding, reconstruction, good governance and economic reform. Western-flavoured 
interventions of recent decades have all sought peace through stabilization and institution 
building, founded on such Western-modelled ‘best practices’ as democratization and good 
governance. Also African Union (AU) missions and operations may be regarded as part of this 
process, and the AU cooperates closely with the UN in several places.16 
                                                 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2013); United Nations, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions from 
the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 2006). 
15 William J. Durch, ed., Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 2006); Astri Suhrke, When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2011); Taylor B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and 
Failure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
16 Karlsrud, The UN at War. For an assessment and comparison of the AU and UN in this context, see Cedric de 
Coning, Implications of a Comprehensive or Integrated Approach for Training in United Nations and African 
Union Peace Operations (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 2009). 
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Intense combat situations where the military operate basically alone, as in the initial phases of 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, are beyond the scope of this study, because the military–
civilian interaction is smaller than in the later phases. Furthermore, non-Western interventions 
like Russian incursions into Ukraine have not been included. Russian military invasions in 
neighbouring countries have been largely limited to military means. Russia may have available 
a broad range of tools (propaganda, cyber-attacks, local rebels), and have for instance attempted 
to legitimise the annexation of Crimea through a referendum.17 But hardly any civilian agencies, 
whether Russian or international organizations, have been present in these interventions. The 
Western discourse on peace- and state-building, human security, and comprehensive approach, 
is hardly present in Russia.  
Note also that I focus on international interventions – not on countries that intervene in 
insurgencies or unruly regions within their own borders. This dissertation is a study of 
international relations – and also primarily of political relations, not international law. 
International humanitarian law is briefly discussed in Chapter 4 and a few other places, but it 
is not a central element of the present study.  
The problems in focus are the challenges related to coherence between military and civilian 
actors in these interventions. Not that this is the only or necessarily most important reason why 
interventions often face challenges. My aim is not to assess challenges in interventions per se, 
but to narrow in on one dimension or component often singled out by political leaders as 
important for mission success. In many cases, interventions may struggle because of factors 
like far too few resources (troops, people, money, equipment); too broad and unrealistic 
mandates; political resistance or foot-dragging; second agendas; competition for donor funds; 
or incompetent leadership.  
For instance, an often-used way of estimating success in interventions is to examine the 
recurrence of violence. The statistics on recurrence of violence after civil wars are contested 
among scholars, with estimates varying between 50% and 20%. 18  However, whatever the 
                                                 
17 Jakob Hedenskog and Carolina Vendil Pallin, eds, Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 
2013 (Stockholm: Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 2013); Niklas Granholm, Johannes Malminen and 
Gudrun Persson, eds, A Rude Awakening: Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine (Stockholm: 
Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 2014); Ulrik Franke, War by Non-Military Means. Understanding 
Russian Information Warfare (Stockholm: Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 2015). 
18 Paul Collier, ed. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World 
Bank / Oxford University Press, 2003); Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset, ‘What’s in a Figure? Estimating 
Recurrence of Civil War’, International Peacekeeping 14, no. 2 (2007), 195–203; Barbara F. Walter, Conflict 
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correct recurrence rate happens to be, the form and shape of the external intervention will 
necessarily be only one of several factors affecting recidivism. Common explanatory factors 
are the economic situation in the conflict area, or the nature of the peace settlement.19 It will 
always be difficult to single out – in quantitative figures – what impact the intervening actors 
have on the recurrence of violence, although several studies have pointed to errors made by the 
intervening actors which have destabilized the situation. Examples include premature elections, 
and limited local knowledge or understanding of the conflict.20 In addition, there may be factors 
outside the intervention itself, in global politics and power relations, which negatively affect 
the stability in an area of intervention. All the same, there have been few – if any – studies that 
directly indicate inadequate coherence among intervening actors as the reason for renewed 
violence after civil wars. The correlation here remains uncertain. 
I am not going to claim that future interventions are likely to be more successful if the 
shortcomings discussed here could somehow be fixed. I choose to focus on the military–civilian 
dimension of interventions because of the attention this has attracted on political and strategic 
levels in Western capitals, as well as in the UN, the EU and NATO. Furthermore, by examining, 
comprehensively and comparatively, all the intervening actors in an intervention, military as 
well as civilian, we can get a better grasp on how interventions evolve – without, however, 
claiming that it is an exhaustive analysis of their successes and failures. The theorizing and 




                                                 
Relapse and the Sustainability of Peace, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper (San Diego, CA: 
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, 2010). 
 
19 Roy Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993’, American Political 
Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995), 681–90; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, 
Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004), 563–95. 
20 Paris, At War’s End; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies 
Go to War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local 
Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); 
Berdal, Building Peace after War. 
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2. Background and Context – Coherence in Interventions 
 
2.1. New wars and new responses 
The pervasive demand for civil–military coherence in interventions has emerged partly as a 
result of the perceived nature of wars and conflicts in the post-Cold War-world. In recent 
theorizing on war, terms like ‘war amongst the people’,21 ‘5th generation warfare’,22 ‘small 
wars’,23 ‘new wars’,24 and ‘hybrid war’25 are applied to describe the nature of warfare today. 
US military doctrine draws a distinction between ‘traditional warfare’ and ‘irregular warfare’,26 
where the former is state-to-state warfare and the latter encapsulates all the above-mentioned 
‘new’ forms of warfare. A characteristic often highlighted is the blurring of the traditional 
distinction between combatants and civilians, criminals, terrorists and warriors, battlefields and 
civilian resident areas, and ultimately between war and peace.27 There is – as always in military 
theorizing – discussion of whether what we are seeing in today’s wars is something ‘new’ or 
merely re-articulations of well-known concepts, but it is widely agreed that many of these wars 
represent a challenge to conventionally organized and equipped armed forces.28 There is also 
an accompanying debate over the driving force behind wars, civil wars in particular – whether 
                                                 
21 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2007). 
22 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004). 
23 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
24 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 3rd edn. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2012). 
25 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute 
for Policy Studies, 2007); U.S. Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations, Army Doctrine Publication 
(ADP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011); Williamson Murray and Peter R. 
Mansoor, Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
26 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Department 
of Defence, 2013), 1-6.1-7. 
27 Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, eds., The Changing Character of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011); G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
28 See Kaldor, New and Old Wars, for an argument in favour of the ‘newness’, and for a counter-argument, for 
instance Mats Berdal, ‘The “New War” Thesis Revisited’, in The Changing Character of War, Strachan and 
Scheipers, eds., 109–33. 
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it is ‘greed’, or ‘grievances’, or something else.29 I refrain from entering into that debate here, 
as it is less relevant to this study. The important point in this context is rather that all these 
discussions about the nature of today’s wars have triggered new thinking about how best to 
respond to them, how to counter these – new or old – forms of warfare. New academic terms 
such as ‘policing wars’30 have appeared, and a host of military doctrinal concepts such as 
‘stability operations’31, ‘peace enforcement’32, ‘irregular warfare’33, ‘counter-insurgency’34 and 
‘counter-unconventional warfare’35 have emerged or been updated, particularly in the USA. 
These concepts largely share the view that such wars cannot be won by military means alone. 
There are no decisive victories, only degrees of intensity of conflict. Armies involved in such 
wars must rely on other factors and actors – the police, the judiciary, strategic communications, 
economic development and general political governance – to be able to accomplish their 
mission.  
Similar reasoning can be found in the UN. From the 1990s on it was argued – and commonly 
recognized – that there is a link between poverty, weak states, violence and security. This 
‘security–development nexus’ holds that there can be no development without security and no 
security without development in fragile societies.36 A tandem effort is required. In consequence, 
UN agencies developed broad and comprehensive approaches to security. Seminal reports, like 
the 1992 ‘Agenda for Peace’, argued that the end of the Cold War represented an opportunity 
                                                 
29 Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’. 
30 Caroline Holmqvist, Policing Wars: On Military Intervention in the Twenty-First Century (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
31 U.S. Army, The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual, FM 3-07 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2009). 
32 Pugh, Michael, ‘Peace Enforcement’, in Sam Daws and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., The Oxford Handbook on the 
United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 370–386. 
33 ‘Irregular warfare’ may describe both the nature of the threat and the response of own forces. See Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 1. 
34 U.S.Army/MarineCorps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publication No. 3-33 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007); NATO, Allied Joint 
Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), AJP 3.4.4 (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 2011); British 
Army, British Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency, Vol. 1 Part 10 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2009). 
35 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Counter-Unconventional Warfare. White Paper (Fort Bragg, NC: 
USASOC, 2014). 
36 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. 
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for a wide UN approach to achieve sustainable peace.37 With the 1994 Human Development 
Report, the United Nations Development Programme brought attention to human security. 
Security is about individuals as much as about states, it was argued, and to achieve peace people 
need both freedom from fear and freedom from want. Human security therefore implies both 
physical security and economic security, food security, health security etc.38 In 2001 the UN 
Security Council reaffirmed ‘that the quest for peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and 
determined approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts, including their economic and 
social dimensions’.39 Following this, UN peacekeeping became more ‘robust’ than before, 
begun intervening more often and in earlier stages of conflict, and engaged broadly in conflict 
resolution, negotiations and a whole range of post-conflict peace-building measures and 
institution building.40  
The comprehensive approach to security is clearly evident with international organizations like 
the UN, the EU and NATO, each of which has developed specific approaches aimed at fostering 
greater coherence – internally and with each other.41 The UN stands out as having developed 
perhaps the most sophisticated system to date: the ‘integrated approach’. According to the UN, 
‘integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN 
operations in post-conflict situations’.42 Similarly, the EU’s European Global Strategy, adopted 
in 2016, stresses the importance of ‘unity in action by implementing together coherent 
policies’.43 A Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises was developed by the 
                                                 
37 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report of the 
Secretary-General, a/47/277 - S/24111 (New York: United Nations, 1992). 
38 United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994). 
39 Security Council addresses comprehensive approach to peace-building, Press Release SC/7014, 20 February 
2001, available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7014.doc.htm  
40 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2010). 
41 For the latter, see e.g. Joachim A. Koops, Peace Operations Partnerships: Assessing Cooperation Mechanisms 
between Secretariats (Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), 2012). 
42 United Nations, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions from the Secretary-General, paragraph 4. 
43 See European Union Global Strategy, https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, p. 17.  
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EU High Representative in 2013.44 Lastly, in NATO’s 2006 Riga Summit declaration and all 
subsequent summit declarations, there is explicit reference to the importance of a 
comprehensive approach for responding to the challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere.45 As 
stated in the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept: ‘a comprehensive political, civilian and military 
approach is necessary for effective crisis management.’46 NATO as a military alliance stresses 
that it favours a broad, comprehensive approach with other actors, recognizing that it relies on 
civilian capacities to achieve security.47  
In short, therefore, since the end of the Cold War, wars have widely been seen in the West as 
being qualitatively different from most previous wars, and this has resulted in new thinking 
about how to best respond to them. The increase in both the number of interventions and the 
resources put into them has also exacerbated discussions about efficiency, effectiveness and 
end results. Military–civilian coherence and various forms of comprehensive approaches have 
in this context often been regarded as part of the solution. In the next chapter I discuss more 
closely the various constellations and degrees of cooperation and collaboration between the 
intervening actors, but throughout this dissertation I will consider them all as attempts at 
achieving coherence.  
 
2.2. The intervening actors 
The conglomerate of intervening actors in recent interventions is what distinguishes these the 
most from colonial possessions or traditional conquest of land in historical warfare. The military 
actors can be everything from occupying forces to unarmed observers; the civilians may 
represent a host of countries, organizations and corporations. If we are to analyse interventions, 
this diversity needs to be detangled and structured.  
                                                 
44 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Join(2013)30: The 
EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises (Brussels: High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2013). 
45 See Riga Summit Declaration, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm. All NATO summit 
declarations can be found at http://www.nato.int.  
 
46 NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 19. 
47 I return to these efforts of the UN, the EU and NATO in Chapter 2. 
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Firstly, the military actors may be from one country, or they may be an ad hoc coalition of 
states. Or they can represent a formal alliance (NATO). Furthermore, they may be deployed 
under the umbrella of other regional organizations, such as the EU, the African Union (AU) or 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Troops deployed by these 
organizations often have a mandate from the UN, authorizing them to restore or keep a fragile 
peace. And of course the UN itself deploy troops in numerous interventions. In April 2018 there 
were about 90,000 troops from 124 troop-contributing nations in the UN system, deployed in 
14 peacekeeping operations globally.48  
If we are to understand the relationship between ‘the military’ and the various civilian actors in 
an intervention, we need to be able to differentiate the military’s different mandates, training, 
military doctrines and role-perceptions. These variations naturally impact significantly on how 
the military intervening actors behave and relate to other actors – locals as well as civilian 
interveners.49 In some cases, the military represent a highly politicized force, as, for instance, 
when engaging in support of one of the belligerents in a local conflict. At other times an armed 
force may seek to be as politically impartial as possible, typically in a traditional peacekeeping 
setting. I return to this in Chapter 3; the important point here is that an analysis of an intervention 
will have to take these variations into account. 
However, the armed forces do share something. They all have the capacity and mandate to 
apply force – in one form or the other – to implement their mandate.50 Armed forces distinguish 
themselves from civilians in numerous other ways as well: by heavy weaponry, military 
vehicles, uniforms and fortified camps. Furthermore, they are often deployed as military units 
(battle groups, battalions, brigades, etc.) that were formed prior to deployment, giving them 
time to train and prepare together. This is in contrast to many civilian organizations that take 
shape in the field when deploying, with individuals being seconded from supporting nations or 
hired directly. Furthermore, as I argue in Chapter 3, there are also certain striking similarities 
across presumably different military approaches and doctrines. Thus, we can safely separate 
                                                 
48 See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data and 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/pk_factsheet_04_18_eng.pdf 
49 Soeters, ‘Ambidextrous Military’. 
50 With the exception of missions with unarmed military observer and advisors. 
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‘the military’ as a separate set of actors from the civilian interveners, while recognizing the 
nuances and differences between the various military actors.  
Secondly, the category ‘civilians’ needs to be opened up similarly. The only thing they seem to 
share is that they are not military. Civilian intervening actors in an intervention may range from 
international police (occasionally mandated to use force), to UN peacebuilding missions, 
international diplomats, UN and regional agencies, national development agencies, non-
governmental development actors, and humanitarian actors. Lumping all these together is not 
very fruitful. Depending on the intervention in question, various actors may be more relevant, 
or less so. For instance, UN Police in Kosovo and East Timor had an executive mandate: they 
could apprehend people and bring them to justice, which gave them a far more significant role 
and influence in the intervention than the traditional training and monitoring missions in other 
UN Police interventions.51 Furthermore, in many interventions the UN plays a leading role on 
the civilian side, in peacebuilding and democratization – but also international finance 
institutions, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), may be important. 
In other cases, embassies, diplomats or special envoys representing global or regional powers 
may be crucial to how an intervention evolves.  
One way of distinguishing among civilian actors is to separate those with a political mandate 
from those without such a mandate: in other words, separating the humanitarian actors from the 
rest (see Figure 1). This has some merit, as humanitarians often are present in a country long 
before the rest arrive – as in Afghanistan during Taliban rule prior to the US intervention. They 
are present in an area independently of the specific outcome of a conflict (a ceasefire, peace 
accords) that often allow the other civilians to enter the area. Humanitarians are not necessarily 
mandated by UN Security Council Resolutions. Furthermore, they themselves take pride in 
being neutral, independent and impartial. 52  These are deep-rooted principles of their 
humanitarian identity, dating back to the 19th century. This, they argue, provides them with 
better access to the victims among all parties in a conflict, and is also – crucially – their best 
security guarantee. If, they go on to explain, these principles are violated and they are perceived 
                                                 
51 Kari Margrethe Osland, Much Ado About Nothing? The Impact of International Assistance to Post-Conflict 
Police Reform in Afghanistan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and South Sudan. PhD Thesis. (Oslo: 
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo, 2014). 




to be parties to a conflict, they no longer operate in the field. Nonetheless, this ideal has been 
challenged, as neutrality often becomes an untenable objective in practice. I return to this in 
Chapters 4 and 6, but the bottom line here is that the humanitarians are nevertheless likely to 
be the most distinguishable group of civilians in most interventions. Therefore it can be 
assumed that study of the relationship between the military and civilian actors will generally 
require specific analytical attention to the military-humanitarian dimension, so I have devoted 
Chapter 4 to this question.  
 
Figure 1: A simple way of defining the main actors in an intervention. Civilian actors are in blue, but 




How to group or organize for analysis the other civilians, labelled ‘political civilians’ in Figure 
1, will depend largely on the case and the research question in focus. We may, for instance, 
envisage an analytical separation between, on the one hand, the diplomatic and politically 
engaged actors; and the bureaucrats, technical advisers and development actors on the other. 
International police could also be a separate category in many cases. What unites the ‘political 
civilians’ is that they often represent a political body, a state or an organization (the UN, EU, 







the society, build institutions, redistribute wealth, create a justice system, and so forth. However, 
also non-governmental development agencies may be categorized as ‘political civilians’, if their 
activities are political. Capacity building in local communities may appear to be a relatively 
mundane or non-political activity, but that is usually not the case. For instance, building schools 
for girls, strengthening local governance, and drilling wells may all have huge political impact 
locally. Some people benefit (girls, authorities, villages), while others may lose relative wealth 
and influence – there are many examples of unintended political side-effects of development 
programmes. In short therefore, ‘political civilians’ are all actors that have a political impact on 
the intervention and the local environment, even if many technocrats, development workers and 
peacebuilders are sometimes unaware of this political influence.  
To simplify, I employ the term ‘military–civilian relations’ throughout the dissertation, 
acknowledging that it is a crude simplification, as discussed above. In the more specific and 
nuanced discussions, I will of course split the intervening actors into different categories as 
required.  
 
2.3. The practical challenges of achieving coherence 
Despite the widespread praise for coherence and cooperation, most interventions face conflicts 
between military, humanitarian and political civilian actors. Lack of coherence among 
international (and local) actors has at times resulted in inter-agency rivalry, actors working at 
cross-purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort, and sub-optimal economies of 
scale, among other things. This lack of coherence is one factor often cited as contributing to the 
poor success rate and low sustainability of international peace and stability operations. For 
instance, as stated in the 2005 UN Report on Integrated Missions: ‘While there is a tendency to 
blame the limited success rate on lack of resources, it is equally possible that the main problem 
is more related to a lack of coherent application of the resources already available.’53 
The humanitarians in particular have generally refused to become directly connected with 
integrated missions or comprehensive approaches – for fear of being politicized, as mentioned 
above and discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.54 But also other civilian actors may find it difficult to 
                                                 
53 Espen Barth Eide et al., Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. 
Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group (New York: UN ECHA, 2005), 5. 
54 Victoria Metcalfe, Alison Giffen and Samir Elhawary, UN Integration and Humanitarian Space: An 
Independent Study Commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group (London: Humanitarian Policy Group 
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cooperate with the military – or indeed with each other. The lack of coherence within and among 
the humanitarian relief, development, political and security communities has been well 
documented in evaluation reports and studies.55 These studies have consistently found that the 
most interventions undertaken to date have lacked coherence, and that this has undermined their 
sustainability and ability to achieve their strategic objectives. For example, the Joint Utstein 
Study of Peacebuilding, which analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway in the 1990s, identified lack of coherence at 
the strategic level – what it termed a ‘strategic deficit’ – as the most significant obstacle to 
sustainable peacebuilding. 56  This study found that more than 55% of the programmes it 
evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy. Sub-optimal results are also evident 
on the ground: deteriorating security situations, political setbacks or humanitarian crises are not 
uncommon.57  
Obviously, some of the challenges now facing the military and civilian actors in the field stem 
from historical developments dating back much further than modern-day interventions. The 
Western tradition of a sharp divide between the armed forces and the civilian population has 
grown out of the professionalization of the military and the democratization of the West. The 
role of the armed forces evolved over the centuries, from being the armies of ruling monarchs 
to protectors of the republic and of liberal democracy.58 War-fighting helped to forge the states 
                                                 
(HPG), 2011); Stephen Cornish, ‘No Room for Humanitarianism in 3D Policies: Have Forcible Humanitarian 
Interventions and Integrated Approaches Lost Their Way?’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10, no. 1 
(2007), 1–48. 
55 Amongst others: Nicola Dahrendorf, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case of Change (London: Conflict, 
Security and Development Group, International Policy Institute, King’s College, 2003); Marc Sommers, The 
Dynamics of Coordination, Occasional Paper #40 (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for 
International Studies, 2000); Antonio Donini, The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, 
Mozambique and Rwanda, Occasional Series #22 (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for 
International Studies, 1996); Sue Lautze, Bruce D. Jones and Mark Duffield, Strategic Humanitarian 
Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996–1997 (New York: Policy, Information and Advocacy Division, 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, 1998); Cedric de Coning, ‘Civil–Military 
Coordination and Complex Peacebuilding Systems’, in Civil–Military Cooperations in Post-Conflict Operations, 
ed. Christopher Ankersen (London: Routledge, 2008), 52–74. 
 
56 Dan Smith, ‘Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together: Overview Report 
of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding’ (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). 
 
57 Suhrke, When More Is Less; Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo; Berdal, Building Peace after War; Mats 
R. Berdal and Astri Suhrke, The Peace in Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding (London: Routledge, 
2012). 
58 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957). 
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of Europe – and in the process the armed forces gradually became oriented towards external 
threats and enemies, not domestic ones.59 In this context, civilian control over the armed forces 
and its strict de-politicization has been regarded as a bulwark against coups d’état. By having 
a military corps which is loyal, obedient and under civilian oversight, liberal democracy can be 
defended against threats from the (presumably) anarchical society outside the borders of the 
state.60 The Clausewitzian ideal of the ‘technical’ and ‘depoliticized’ solider who executes 
whatever orders he gets from his political masters is part of this line of thinking, an ethos still 
present in Western armed forces today. The military shall not interfere in politics. On the other 
hand, the military have developed their own professionalization rules, procedures and symbols 
that keep them duly separated from civilian population.61 Any political interference in the 
conduct or operations of war (or ‘war by committee’) is denounced by military leaders. This is 
a principle still present in many Western militaries, and is still taught in most military academies. 
Soldiering and politics are separate professions.62 Although concepts and doctrines for civil–
military cooperation (CIMIC) have been adopted, they have never gained much influence in 
military units. They have usually come as an add-on to existing military command structures, 
aimed at supporting the military commander’s mission, not cooperation on equal footing 63  
Thus, it is hardly surprising that armed forces find it challenging to engage with civilian actors, 
let alone develop some level of coherence with them in a field of operations. That being said, 
in practice the demarcation line between the military and political spheres has never been clear-
                                                 
59 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 
1992). 
60 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977); Jens 
Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
61 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 
1960); Huntington, The Soldier and the State. 
62 There are nonetheless debates about how vocal a military officer should be in public policy debates. See e.g. 
Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2003); Peter D. Feaver, 'The Right to Be Right: Civil–Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision', 
International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 87-125. 
63 See for instance: NATO CIMIC Doctrine (AJP-3.4.9(A)), available at http://www.cimic-
coe.org/products/conceptual-design/nato-cimic/nato-cimic-doctrine-ajp-3-4-9a/; Christopher Ankersen, Civil–
Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2008). 
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cut, and is becoming less and less so.64 If today’s conflicts and operational environments are 
changing, if unconventional wars have become the norm, we might expect to see some 
development and evolution within the armed forces as well. Although some armed forces have 
taken initiatives to strengthen their own understanding of the civilian terrain of operations 
(through ‘Human Terrain Teams’, political intelligence, etc.), the focus has been on enhancing 
the military operation, not at building coherence with civilian actors.  
Hence, the fact that civilians and military have kept apart historically cannot fully explain why 
this continues to be the case – or why some of the historical hurdles have not been overcome 
despite new circumstances and new operational needs. Understanding the origin of a 
phenomenon is not necessarily sufficient to make sense if its continued existence.  
A next question then is if this has been addressed in international relations (IR) theory. Can 
extant theorizing of interventions provide help in understanding the challenges of coherence?  
 
3. Theories of Interventions 
 
Starting with the term ‘intervention’ itself, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ‘intervene’ 
as ‘to become involved in something (such as a conflict) in order to have an influence on what 
happens’.65 The etymological root is the Latin verb intervenire, which, according to Thomas G. 
Otte, has three different meanings: to step between; to confront or hinder; and to interfere in 
order to hinder or mediate.66 All three meanings indicate that intervention entails an interruption 
of normal relations and that it is of a temporary nature. An intervention is a deviation from the 
norm of non-intervention in the international system, as well as from normal behaviour among 
or between the states in question.67 It is an act more than a condition, in distinction to occupation 
                                                 
64 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003). 
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or colonial possession, which are usually intended as less temporary nature. Most scholars in 
the field of IR also regard interventions as acts undertaken against the will of an existing 
political and legal authority, a violation of a state’s territorial sovereignty. Christian Reus-Smit 
however, argues that intervention may also take place in other dimensions than the territorial 
one, and describes international intervention as ‘the transgression of a unit’s realm of 
jurisdiction, conducted by other units in the system’.68 For instance, some might argue that 
international financial institutions (like the IMF), have been intervening in the financial sphere 
of sovereign states, without physically entering the territory. Such interventions may also come 
in response to a call for assistance from a state facing severe financial difficulties. However, 
also territorial intervention may be voluntary in this sense: a state may call for international 
assistance to quell an insurgency or stop a civil war. To insist that, in order to be defined as an 
intervention, an action must necessarily be against the will of the state in question is therefore 
not very fruitful. The UN Security Council has mandated most international interventions over 
the last decades, and omitting all those cases out of the analysis would not make sense, at least 
in this dissertation. Intervention will therefore be described as international military and civilian 
deployment in a country or a place where there is, or has been, violent conflict.  
 
3.1. Theories of the rationale for interventions 
An early attempt to theorize interventions in IR was made by James N. Rosenau in 1969. In 
‘Intervention as a Scientific Concept’, he argues that most previous writings on interventions 
lack scientific scrutiny.69 They do not test hypotheses or explore ‘factors that foster, precipitate, 
sustain, channel, constrain, and/or curb intervention(s)’.70 To remedy this, Rosenau outlines the 
basic elements of a scientific theory of intervention. He identifies two characteristics associated 
with interventionary behaviour: that it is convention-breaking (represents a sharp break with 
existing forms) and authority-oriented (is directed at changing or preserving political authority 
in target society).71 He then asks: ‘under what conditions [is] a nation or an international 
                                                 
68 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Concept of Intervention’, Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (2013): 1058. 
69James N. Rosenau, ‘Intervention as a Scientific Concept’. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13, no. 2 (1969): 
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70 Ibid., 150. 
71 Ibid., 161. 
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organization likely to be ready to break with the prevailing mode of conduct and attempt to alter 
or preserve the structure of authority in another society?’, and proposes five variables (societal, 
individual, bureaucratic, governmental, and systemic), arguing that individual and bureaucratic 
variables matter the most, given the right systemic or international preconditions .72  
In 1974 R. J. Vincent defined intervention as ‘that activity undertaken by a state, a group of 
states, or an international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of 
another state (…) it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state’.73 Similarly, Hedley 
Bull in 1984 defined interventions as ‘dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside party 
or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an independent 
political community’, adding that interventions are ‘generally believed to be legally and morally 
wrong’ due to respect for sovereignty.74 In the same volume Stanley Hoffmann restricted the 
concept of intervention to an ‘act which tries to affect not the external activities, but the 
domestic affairs of a state’.75 He also discusses the classical liberal dilemma of protecting 
universal human rights versus respecting sovereign space, as well as the challenges related to 
imposing liberty upon others, debated ever since John Stuart Mill.76 These recurrent themes in 
the academic, legal and political debate have been thoroughly analysed in Michael Walzer’s 
modern classic Just and Unjust Wars from 1977.77 
Most of these writings are somewhat flavoured by the Cold War, when interventions were rare 
and usually very controversial. UN-sanctioned interventions were uncommon and typically 
came with limited peacekeeping or observation mandates.78 Therefore, they all take for granted 
that interventions will primarily be military. Later definitions are sometimes broader and may 
address economic, social and political interventions, when for instance in connection with 
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development aid.79 Here, however, I confine myself to interventions with a military dimension. 
Interestingly, early theorizing clearly recognized the importance of the political objectives of 
interventions (authority–oriented, in Rosenau’s terminology): the aim of an intervention is to 
preserve or alter the political affairs of the target territory. Unfortunately, later theories have 
paid less attention to this political aspect of interventions, and have focussed more on the moral 
and legal factors that prohibit or allow interventions. Although Rosenau seeks to avoid the 
legalistic debates by focusing on probability of interventions, his primary concern is with the 
process leading up to an intervention, not the intervention itself. The same applies to all theories 
discussed here. Also more recent work, such as Martha Finnemore’s The Purpose of 
Intervention (2003), is limited in this regard. She examines military intervention ‘as a window 
onto the changing character of international society – the purpose to which its members will 
use force, the ends they value.’80 Finnemore claims that it is the purpose or motivation for 
interventions that changes historically, not the pattern of intervention per se. However, as the 
title shows, her analysis is confined to the ‘purpose’ of an intervention, not its conduct or effects. 
The politics of interventions thus remains under-theorized.  
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent rapid increase in interventions came greater 
academic interest in the questions of legality and foundations of interventions. In particular the 
matter of humanitarian intervention was widely debated in academic and policy circles.81 
Questions addressed by early scholars, such as Hoffmann and Walzer, were at the forefront. 
When does the international community have not only a right but indeed an obligation to 
interfere – for instance, to prevent genocide or other humanitarian catastrophes? In fact, these 
are old debates. As argued by Stephen Krasner and others, intervention was seen as compatible 
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with sovereignty even before the establishment of the Westphalian system.82 Intervention for 
the protection of religious minorities was legally mandated, at the expense of central 
sovereignty, back in the 16th and 17th centuries.83 Furthermore, international treaties, like the 
1815 Vienna Settlement, have legitimized intervention to support governments, not only 
oppressed minorities.84  
Taken together, theories of interventions are mainly concerned with moral, legal and political 
considerations prior to the act of intervening. Crucially, early theories note the political nature 
of intervention, a point less evident in the debates about humanitarian intervention. This is 
probably because the primary focus is ‘saving lives’, but also because humanitarian legitimation 
of an intervention would be undermined if the interveners also had a political agenda.85 As a 
result, the political aspects and consequences of interventions have been largely overlooked 
also in the academic literature. Despite these nuances, most IR theories of intervention appear 
to be addressing the prelude to the actual intervention, and not the intervention itself.   
 
3.2. Theories about interventions 
In what has been published on interventions (and not the run-up to them), most works tend to 
be case-specific or narrow in scope, and with limited theoretical ambitions. For example, there 
are several books on the Western interventions in Iraq and in Afghanistan, but they tend to 
restrict the analysis to the specific case only. Theoretical terms like ‘liberal peacebuilding’, 
‘essentialization’, ‘Islamic modernism’ may be applied, but rarely in a systematic manner.86 
                                                 
82 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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85 On this, see also Nicolas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers. 
86 On Iraq, see for instance Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: 
Random House, 2009); Rory Stewart, The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in 
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The same applies to studies of most of today’s interventions.87 Some studies have taken a 
regional or comparative approach, but also these tend to be primarily empirically oriented.88 
Numerous publications on specific programmes, activities or events also follow in the wake of 
most interventions – typically donor evaluations of development programmes, 89  and 
journalistic analyses of success, failure or corrupted activities,90 with a few deeper academic 
studies on specific topics or areas .91 Less common are attempts to understand the phenomenon 
of interventions more generally. Scholarly work on interventions has been less concerned with 
generalizations and theorizing, and more with the empirical cases at hand. There are, 
nonetheless, some important exceptions, which I discuss in the following.  
Where analysis of the military dimension of an intervention is concerned, Taylor B. Seybolt’s 
Humanitarian Military Intervention offers a good starting point.92 This comparative study of 
17 military operations in six conflict areas enquires into why some have been more successful 
at saving lives than others. Seybolt theorizes four types of humanitarian military interventions, 
and also extrapolates four important generic tasks an intervener must heed, for greater 
likelihood of success in saving lives. Military strategy, he argues, is a key factor in determining 
success or failure, provided that the political objective of the intervention has been defined. Is 
it, for example, more effective to focus on the victims, or on the perpetrators, if one is tasked 
with protecting civilians? The findings are generalized into a set of generic guidelines for those 
contemplating an intervention, such as ‘the causes of death and displacement’, ‘best way to 
                                                 
87 UN peacekeeping and -building have been analysed and theorized, but most case studies of interventions have 
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Journal of International Peacekeeping and Journal of Peacebuilding and Development regularly publish studies 
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implement an intervention’, ‘own capabilities’ and ‘military and political risks.’ Hence, while 
offering an excellent analytical model, Seybolt’s theorizing is nonetheless policy-oriented and 
‘problem solving’.93  But first and foremost it is limited in scope: it seeks to identify the 
conditions under which military humanitarian intervention can save lives – the broader political 
considerations of an intervention are deliberately left out of the equation. The relationship 
between military and civilian actors is not absent from his analysis, but it is not a main element. 
Furthermore, the victims and the perpetrators of the violence tend to be objectified in the 
analysis – presented as challenges to the intervening military, but without much agency. After 
all, Seybolt’s focus is on saving lives, not on finding political solutions. Seybolt is not alone: 
there are numerous studies measuring the effect or results of military interventions in civil wars, 
often through quantitative approaches.94 Most share the same limitations as Seybolt when it 
comes to relevance for this particular dissertation.  
Another work with emphasis on the military dimension of an intervention is The Politics of 
Military Occupation by Peter M.R. Stirk.95  He analyses military occupation as a form of 
government (as opposed to merely administration), thus bringing the focus back to politics, 
authority and legitimacy. This is partly a legal and normative discussion, but it also indicates 
some crucial practical dilemmas. Military occupiers have historically been ill-prepared, under-
resourced and fragmented. They may undermine domestic institutions and the political potential 
of those occupied, thereby complicating regime transformation or later transition of power.96 
These are important insights, many of which are relevant in theorizing other forms of foreign 
governance, including UN-sanctioned governance as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor and 
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Kosovo.97 Stirk’s analysis brings attention back to the politics of an intervention following the 
initial phase. It is nonetheless limited in scope, as it focuses on military governance. It does not 
examine the relationship between the occupational authority and other actors in the field, nor 
does it aim to offer an analytical model for theorizing occupational governance. 
An interesting recent approach to theorizing interventions employs the concept of 
‘assemblage’.98 Inspired by the theorizing of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guittari,99 scholars have 
applied assemblage ‘to signal equal concern for discourses (political, legal, ethical), practices 
and materialisms’.100 Assemblage is defined as ‘a grouping of heterogeneous elements that, at 
some point, displays a kind of collective synergy and consistency’. 101  In the context of 
interventions, this can draw attention to the ‘broad ensemble of institutions, agents, practices, 
knowledges, and relationships that mark contemporary forms of international intervention’.102 
‘Assemblage’ is a looser and more ad hoc concept than for instance ‘structures’, but it includes 
technology and other non-human components. Some have defined ‘assemblage’ as a descriptive, 
rather than an analytical term; and the combination of a rather open-ended approach and the 
absence of a clear epistemology may make it a relatively ‘anodyne analytical tool’.103 Still, 
several scholars have used it to analyse important aspects of interventions – in particular the 
linkages between several sectors, such as policing and warfare. It can help demonstrate, for 
instance, how ‘failures and contradictions inherent in modern interventions (…) are typically 
represented as merely superficial and thus rectifiable (rather than fundamental), 
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deficiencies’.104 This approach to theorizing interventions is still under development, but may 
prove fruitful for studying constellations other than policing and warfare as well.  
The largest strand of literature on interventions focuses on UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, 
emerging primarily from the 1990s following the surge in such missions. Most interventions 
since that time have differed from military occupations because they have a UN mandate and 
are thus formally endorsed by the host nation. Following the logic of many IR definitions, these 
missions do not count as ‘proper’ interventions, since they do not take place against the will of 
the state in question. However, as mentioned, I will treat them as interventions here – partly 
following Reus-Smit’s broader conceptualization of intervention as something more than a 
question of sovereignty, partly because the question of forceful entry or not is of less relevance 
to the research question in this dissertation. As shown above, the military–civilian dimension 
is present in most cases, so it would be unfortunate to exclude UN peacekeeping from this study 
because of definitional limitations. 
Today’s UN peacekeeping and -building missions tend to be broad and comprehensive, seeking 
to deal with the causes of war in a sustainable way. The UN therefore often plays a supportive 
role in such areas as disarming and demobilization, security sector reform, democratization, 
judicial reform, economic reform, development assistance, and others. There have been 
numerous studies of the effectiveness, efficiency, and ethical standards of UN troops and staff, 
vested interests, and relations between the military and civilian parts of the UN family.105   
However, much of this literature is empirical and case-specific, or of little theoretical relevance 
beyond the UN system. One exception is the growing body of literature that questions the liberal 
foundations underpinning most peacebuilding missions. In particular this involves critique of 
‘liberal peacebuilding’ – the assumption that the remedy for war-torn societies is liberalization 
through democratization and marketization.106 For instance, international financial institutions 
                                                 
104 Holmqvist, Bachmann and Bell, ‘Assemblage of War: Police’, 5. 
105 See for example, James Dobbins et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building – from the Congo to Iraq (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building 
Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Lise Morjé Howard, 
UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Bellamy and Williams, 
Understanding Peacekeeping; Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending 
Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Berdal, Building 
Peace after War.  
106 The original ‘democratic peace’ theory of Michael Doyle stressed that democracies are less prone to go to war 
against each other, but it never ruled out democracies waging war against non-democracies. However, the liberal 
 27 
 
like the World Bank and the IMF have built their reform packages on relatively specific Western 
economic policy prescriptions, aptly labelled the ‘Washington consensus’.107  
Such liberal political and economic models have been the basically unstated foundation of all 
peacebuilding operations since the 1990s. Critics claim that these liberal institutions are often 
imposed too rapidly and in non-liberal ways, which is why they fail to deliver the expected 
stability. Roland Paris and others hold that in many cases these policies have actually 
destabilized the fragile peace, as through premature elections, rapid privatizations and general 
lack of local ownership of the processes.108 Yet others have argued that the templates and 
institutions introduced are uniquely Western in nature and cannot gain a foothold in other socio-
cultural environments. This ‘liberal peacebuilding’ critique seeks to unmask the universalizing 
tendencies in the peace-building strategies, and stresses the need for more indigenous peace-
making.109 The tendency to ignore the political aspects of interventions is also taken up in this 
literature. For instance, in Empire in Denial, David Chandler argues that state-building 
interventions are often cast as neutral, technical assistance, thereby failing to acknowledge the 
huge power the intervening actors have over the local polity.110  
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Many of these studies provide valuable insights into the underlying and implicit assumptions 
of most interventions and peace-building efforts. Such criticisms of the ‘givens’ in the ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’ and the often non-liberal implementations are useful, as they reveal 
inefficiencies, flaws, and the lack of cultural insight in many of the peace-building strategies 
promoted by the international community. They reveal how deeply political interventions are, 
despite their technocratic or liberal wrappings. Together they represent a theoretically informed 
and critical study of international interventions on which I will draw in several places in this 
dissertation. However, this critique may tend to the normative, and usually concentrates on the 
civilian and political actors in UN peacebuilding missions.111 Although theoretically rich, the 
liberal peacebuilding critique does not attempt to build theoretical models for interventions as 
such. Importantly, peacekeepers or other armed forces are not analysed to the same extent in 
these studies, and military–civilian interaction even less so.  
The little that has been published on military–civilian relations in interventions tends to focus 
on practical or operational challenges, with less reflection on the more fundamental issues.112 
There have been a few academic publications on military–civilian relations, but the topic is 
generally under-theorized and under-analysed.113 To understand the challenges indicated here 
we must look more closely at the military and the civilian actors involved in interventions today. 
We need to analyse systematically the civilian and military interaction – or lack thereof – in 
interventions. That is the ambition of this dissertation.  
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4. Theory and Methodology 
 
Methodology, as defined by Giovanni Sartori, is ‘a concern with the logical structure and 
procedure of scientific enquiry’.114 A first step in methodological positioning of the current 
work is to state that it is predominantly theoretical. With the exception of a few interviews 
related to Chapter 4, it involved no field visits or first-hand collection of empirical materials. 
Rather, this study seeks to develop better ways of making sense of existing empirical findings. 
It is a response to the new empirical developments noted above, as well as what I see as the 
under-theorized nature of the literature on these developments. Further, I hope my analytical 
framework can prove useful for future empirical analyses of interventions. However, this is not 
a meta-theoretical work; it does not aim at debating and assessing the various theoretical ‘isms’, 
‘schools’ or ‘paradigms’ found within the social sciences or among students of IR.115  
The term ‘theory’ has varying connotations and meanings within the social sciences. It is 
therefore necessary to discuss briefly what this study intends to deliver, and what it does not. 
What does a theoretical analytical framework entail here? Let me present some relevant 
concepts and principles to be applied in the ensuing chapters. 
In basic terms, theory can be described as ‘simplified pictures of reality’ that ‘make the world 
comprehensible by zeroing in on the most important factors’. Theories may be compared with 
maps: ‘Both aim to simplify a complex reality so we can grasp it better.’116 Or: ‘a theory is a 
picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity.’117 Or one may say that 
doing theory ‘means relating conceptual tools to empirical observations’.118 However, theories 
do more than offer simplified snapshots or maps of the world. They seek to explain or make 
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sense of things: ‘Unlike maps, (…) theories provide a causal story’; ‘theories are built on 
simplifying assumptions about which factors matter the most for explaining how the world 
works.’119 A theory of IR thus ‘has an explanatory purpose: it is supposed to help us make sense 
of world politics.’120 These views are widely shared within IR; the quotes above are deliberately 
cited from scholars with differing philosophical-scientific positions to illustrate this point.  
There are nevertheless deep divisions and debates within social sciences and academic 
communities in general about some of the key components mentioned above. Most 
controversial is perhaps the basic question of reference to ‘reality’ or ‘the world’, and the related 
question of what constitutes ‘proper science’. Does reality exist independently of our 
conceptions of it? Can science offer insights on the world that are not – to some extent – 
dependent upon existing perceptions, worldviews or theories?121  
 
4.1. Methodological positions in International Relations 
These debates also feature among students of global politics and IR. The positions have often 
been framed along fault-lines such as positivist/post-positivist, rational/reflexive, casual 
inference/descriptive inference, or explaining/understanding, to mention some.122 The crudest 
simplification holds that the positivist, rationalistic camp believes in objective truths, and that 
subject and object can be kept separate (i.e. that the researcher can maintain an objective 
distance to the phenomenon under study), and that the social sciences should build their 
scientific models on the natural sciences: quantitative data, hypothesis testing, etc. Most 
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importantly perhaps, empirical observations are regarded as the cornerstone of research. 123 In 
contrast, the post-positivist or constructivist camp builds more on the interpretive tradition in 
humanities, on ethnography history and hermeneutics.124 Here it is stressed that there are no 
objective social truths (for instance: yes, Holocaust did take place but we can never conclude 
exactly why and how), 125  and that empirical observation is not sufficient to explain and 
understand social phenomena. Rather, the researcher needs to understand why social subjects 
act the way they do. In explaining behaviour, ‘soft’ factors like values, norms and identities are 
given more emphasis than rational calculations.  
Such categorization of social science into two camps is rudimentary and may be of limited value, 
at least in meta-theoretical debates where nuances need to be explored. Furthermore, such 
categorization may eschew similarities, and create entrenched ‘camps’ with mutual straw-man 
categorizations of the others. In many cases, ‘scales of difference’ may be a better description 
than ‘camps’. ‘Rationalists’ and ‘positivists’ may, for instance, recognize that there are no 
universal social laws, that social truths are limited in time and space, and that quantitative 
methods need to be supplemented with qualitative ones. Similarly, ‘constructivists’ seek to 
build the most likely (or ‘true’) explanations, and to develop theories and methods applicable 
and relevant across a range of cases.  
A more fruitful categorization of IR scholarship offered by Patrick T. Jackson has gained 
increased attraction.126 He distinguishes four IR methodologies: neo-positivism, critical realism, 
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analyticism, and reflexivity. The four categories are based on two dimensions, with two 
categories in each. Jackson calls these dimensions wagers – or provisional commitments about 
matters of philosophical ontology. Philosophical ontology refers to the ‘conceptual and 
philosophical basis on which claims about the world are formulated in the first place: ontology 
as our “hook up” to the world’.127 This is different from scientific ontology, which is more 
frequently discussed in IR: it concerns the stuff that exists – ‘a catalogue of objects, processes 
and factors’, 128 such as states and organizations. Philosophical ontology, on the other hand, 
explicitly addresses methodology, or how we as researchers ‘hook up’ to the world. A wager 
thus specifies three things: ‘the researcher, the world to be researched and the character of the 
relationship between them’.129  
Jackson’s first philosophical ‘wager’ is the researcher’s relation to the world. Do we consider 
there to be an independent existing reality ‘out there’, existing independently of the knowledge 
of the researcher? If so, the scientific work is based on a notion of mind–world dualism. Validity 
of knowledge is based on correspondence between the empirical and theoretical claims. The 
alternative position Jackson calls mind–world monism: it maintains that the ‘world’ is 
‘endogenous to social practices of knowledge–production’.130 This is not to be confused with 
an ‘idealist’ position – that mind matters more than the physical world – but should rather be 
seen as a rejection of such a dichotomy between mind and world. In short: ‘the dualist would 
be very concerned about making statements that are correct, while the monist would be more 
interested in making statements that were useful in advancing some specific explanatory 
goal.’131 
The second ‘wager’ concerns the status of empirical knowledge. Is it possible to know things 
beyond observable facts? Can we go ‘beyond the facts and grasp the deeper processes and 
factors that generate those facts’? 132  Jackson categorizes research that claims to do so as 
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transfactualism, the most common example in IR being the claim of the existence of a ‘social 
structure’. Social structures are not unlike the grammatical rules of a language: they are not 
observable, but they determine linguistic ‘behaviour’133. The opposite position Jackson calls 
phenomenalism: it is based upon the classical empiricist tradition, but expanded beyond the 
empiricist limitation to human senses. Experience can take place with the help of equipment, 
like a microscope in natural science, or an appropriate conceptual apparatus for understanding 
social events.  
 
Table 1: Commitments in philosophical ontology and the associated methodologies 




between the knower 
and the known 
mind–world dualism neo-positivism critical realism 
mind–world monism Analyticism reflexivity 
Source: P.T. Jackson The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its 
Implications for the Study of World Politics. London: Routledge, 2011, 37. 
 
Table 1 illustrates these wagers and locates the four methodologies of IR scholarship (neo-
positivism, critical realism, analyticism and reflexivity). Neo-positivism and critical realism 
share the notion that there is an independent world ‘out there’ to be studied, and empirical facts 
from which we can assess our hypotheses and theories (mind–world dualism). However, they 
differ in their position on non-observable facts. Neo-positivists focus on hypothesis testing and 
see no point in looking for something beyond the observable world (phenomenalism); critical 
realists claim we cannot understand the world without doing exactly that (transfactualism). On 
the other hand, both analyticism and reflexivity see knowledge as interwoven with the objects 
of study, that scholars are embedded in the social world they analyse (mind–world monism). 
Analyticism rejects the sharp distinction between theory and the empirical reality as upheld by 
neo-positivism, and regards theory not as a reflection of reality but as a reality of its own. Hence, 
                                                 
133 Ibid., 90–91. 
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in this view, there is no point in testing hypotheses against ‘the world’, as the world is always 
mediated through our theoretical concepts. Instead, theory is an instrument for simplifying and 
categorizing complex empirical reality. This monism is shared by the reflexivity methodology, 
but it rejects analyticism as being restricted to the study of the potentially experience-able. 
Reflexivity explicitly includes the self-awareness of the researcher, as well as the practice of 
knowledge production and its embeddedness in power relations. These are not outside the 
researcher, as with ‘social structures’, but are often unconsciously part of terminology, 
categories and language. 
Some examples will help to clarify these four methodologies. Concerning reflexivity, much 
feminist or post-colonial scholarship here would typically be placed here, but possibly also 
studies critical of analytical categories, such as ‘refugees’, or the term ‘field’ in the context of 
interventions. Both terms come with certain assumptions with implications for social behaviour, 
such as victim, backwardness or conflict.134 Analyticism will include much of what has been 
labelled ‘constructivism’ in IR, but also, perhaps surprisingly, Kenneth Waltz’ 1979 classic 
Theory of International Politics.135 Waltz’s notion of theory involves not reflecting reality, but 
simplifying it; it is an instrumental view of theorizing.136 Neo-positivism is best exemplified 
with the approach championed by King et al.: theory testing based on a positivist heritage; 137 
while critical realism is perhaps best exemplified with Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of 
International Politics.138 However, Jackson takes care to stress that this is an ideal-type model, 
and aimed at ‘clarifying the implications of particular wagers in philosophical ontology’, rather 
than ‘classifying ways that IR research is actually done’.139 It is intended to trigger reflection 
and debate, not as a meta-sociological ordering of an academic field. 
 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 157; Oliver P. Richmond, Stefanie Kappler and Annika Björkdahl, ‘The “Field” in the Age of 
Intervention: Power, Legitimacy, and Authority Versus the “Local”’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies (2015), 23–44. 
135 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
136 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 112–13. 
137 King et al., Designing Social Inquiry. 
138 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
139 Jackson, ‘Preparing the Ground for a More Hospitable International Relations’, 376. 
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4.2.  Positioning the dissertation: Analyticism 
This dissertation fits best in the category of analyticism. Firstly, I do not regard abstract 
categories such as ‘structures’, ‘frame’, ‘culture’ or ‘identity’ as entities that actually exist 
empirically. Rather, I consider them to be part of theory, hooks that we use for explaining and 
understanding the world (phenomenalism). This is further elaborated in Chapter 5. However, 
as discussed below, I agree with the emphasis that reflexivity methodology puts on self-
awareness, and the importance of self-critical usage of words and concepts. But I find it difficult 
to claim that these somehow exist beyond the empirical world.140 Secondly, I do not think that 
theorizing is about finding a theory that matches the world accurately: I see theorizing an 
instrument to help simplify, explain or make sense of aspects of the world we are interested in 
(monism). The theoretical approach chosen here is but one of an array of possible approaches 
for studying interventions. Different research questions will generate different research models 
and approaches.  
A typical analyticist approach to scientific puzzles is to develop what Max Weber called ‘ideal-
types’, which may be described as ‘deliberate over-simplification of a complex empirical 
actuality for the purpose of highlighting certain themes or aspects that are never as clear in the 
actual world as they are in the ideal-typical description of it’.141  For Weber, theories and 
concepts are instrumental idealizations of the world, developed for pragmatic reasons to explain 
or understand something. They are not intended as accurate representations of the world – 
which a theory embedded in mind–world dualism would strive for. From this follows that it 
does not make sense to test and falsify theories if they do not match empirical reality: their 
success is based upon their utility. If they do not illuminate the research question very well, if 
they do not reveal relevant things about the object to which they are applied, they may be 
revised or rejected.142 The use of ideal-types is, ‘first and foremost, a way of organizing our 
scholarly thoughts about a specific case’.143 From this it follows that a general theory (such as 
Kenneth Waltz’ neo-realism) would need to be accompanied by a case-specific narrative 
                                                 
140 We are entering challenging philosophical terrain here. How can mind–world monism (all knowledge is 
mind-dependent) be combined with position that there are objects than transcend experience? Are they somehow 
in us without us knowing it? Jackson discusses this in detail, but I will not enter into this here. See his The 
Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, ch. 6. 
141 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 37. 
142 Ibid., 142–46. 
143 Ibid., 150. 
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adapting the general theory to the case. In this way, the ideal-type proves its worth in each 
individual case, but does not aim to be a general theory about world phenomena. Comparative 
analysis is therefore not a relevant strategy of inquiry for ideal-types, as the value of the theory 
not will hinge on broad empirics, but on its case-specific utility. Nonetheless, when developing 
the theoretical ideal-type, a broad empirical foundation may prove useful for establishing 
analytical categories and concepts.  
My development of an analytical framework in Chapter 5 is based loosely on this Weberian 
ideal-type. It aims at understanding the challenges that military and civilian actors face when 
encountering each other in expeditionary interventions. The framework will be based partly 
upon the analytical findings in the preceding chapters, partly on theoretical models developed 
for other purposes. In Chapter 6, I apply this analytical framework to the Afghanistan case – 
not to test the theory empirically, but to see if it can help with the research question. The theory 
will be fitted to the case, just as it would be adjusted and adapted for other cases. 
In the social sciences, a distinction is often drawn between casual and descriptive inference,144 
or casual and constitutive theories.145 Casual theories are typically neo-positivist and build on 
a threefold logic: a) X and Y exist independent of each other, b) that X precedes Y in time, and 
c) that but for X, Y would not have occurred. As a result, they tend to ask why-questions, like 
why did the USA intervene in Iraq? A constitutive theory, however, would focus on ‘how-
possible’ and ‘what’ questions, such as ‘how was the intervention in Iraq possible?’, ‘what is 
the European Union?’.146 As Barnett and Finnemore put it: ‘constitutive explanation does not 
allow us to offer law-like statements such as "if X happens, then Y must follow." Rather by 
providing a more complete understanding of what bureaucracy is, we can provide explanations 
of how certain kinds of bureaucratic behavior are possible, or even probable and why.’147 
Therefore, constitutive theories do not include independent and dependent variables as a neo-
positivist theory would, because they are based on the premise that nothing is ever ‘independent’ 
in the social world. Instead, constitutive theories seek to shed light on the social emergence and 
                                                 
144 King et al., Designing Social Inquiry, Chapters 2 and 3. 
145 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; ‘On Constitution and Causation in International 
Relations’, Review of International Studies 24, no. 5 (1998), 101-118. 
146 Wendt, ‘On Constitution and Causation in International Relations’, 105. 
147 Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations’, International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 701. 
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maintenance of the bandwidth of normal and accepted behaviour; or the shared perceptions and 
understandings of things; or they explore the borderlines of acceptability, alternative ways of 
looking at a phenomenon and those pushing for new approaches and new spaces for political 
action. Throughout history, mainstream taboos, normalities and borders have often been 
challenged, by for instance activist groups or liberation movements – like anti-colonialists, 
women’s liberation movements, LGBT groups or ‘black movements’. As a result, policies, 
perceptions and language have changed. But also in more mundane day-to-day politics there 
are normalities and generally accepted social truths about matters like economic developments, 
market behaviour, or – closer to the topic of this dissertation – shared views in the international 
community about the needs of refugees, the causes of civil war, the nature of an enemy, the 
traditions in a society, etc. All such shared views contribute to defining what policies and 
actions are regarded feasible, effective, or moral, for an intervening actor.  
The analyses in this dissertation can be regarded as constitutive. It follows from the analyticist 
approach and from mind–world monism. I do not develop independent and dependent variables 
to be empirically tested. My research question is ‘how’, not ‘why’.   
Within this approach I will also apply the terms ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ theorizing, but in a 
very loose sense. Inductive reasoning is typically connected with statements such as ‘all the 
swans I see are white, therefore all swans are white’. 148 A similar erroneous conclusion could 
be to say that ‘humanitarians and the armed forces are in conflict in Afghanistan, therefore they 
are always in conflict.’ Of course, nobody is arguing that this is the case. Nonetheless, there are 
many studies where the theorizing is aimed at explaining or understanding one case, and that 
particular case only. I will refer to this ‘inductive theorizing’ as well, because it constructs a 
theoretical framework tailor-made for a singular case. My point (see Chapter 5) is that this has 
limited theoretical value beyond the case in question. I aim at a similarly loosely defined 
deductive theory: to offer an analytical framework that can be applied and adapted to several 
cases. As stressed above, my framework is not intended to be universal and applicable across 
time and space. It is anchored in the post-Cold War world of comprehensive interventions, and 
is unlikely to have much validity beyond that. In line with the analyticist methodological 
approach, I will not develop hypotheses to be tested and eventually verified, as in the 
conventional meaning of the induction process. My use of the terms ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’ 
                                                 
148 Generalizing beyond what is contained in the premises is not the only problem with induction, but I will not 
discuss that here. See Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science?, ch. 4. 
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in this work is not about verifying or falsifying hypotheses, but about the role of theory more 
generally: is it applied from a case or constructed before the case study?  
 
4.3.  Reflections on reflexivity 
Certain important insights from the reflexivity position are worth discussing, also from an 
analyticist position. This relates to the societal implications of social science. Social science has 
an impact on ‘the world’: politicians and others may use, or misuse, social science to own ends. 
Note for instance how Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ and Francis Fukayama’s 
‘end of history’ have been used – and still are – in the media, public debate and among activists 
and leaders.149 Perhaps the original works have been turned into caricatures of themselves – but 
they are nonetheless employed to legitimize certain policies, positions and attitudes.150  
Most researchers – including those who apply neo-positivist methodology – recognize that this 
is part of social science: the research subject may respond to your findings and change your 
behaviour. This is perhaps the most crucial distinction between the social and the natural 
sciences. One may argue, as Bruno Latour and others have done, that the natural sciences are 
as culturally biased and subjective as the social sciences – but a key difference remains in the 
potential of response from the research subjects.151 Unlike humans, mice and stem-cells are not 
avid readers of Science; they remain completely ignorant of the researchers’ findings. In social 
science, however, this becomes a main ethical issue worth reflecting on. Some scholars respond 
by striving for maximum truth and objectivity in their work so that the (always unpredictable) 
societal response can at least be based on facts. Others say that as long as the social phenomenon 
has limitations in time and space, such objective truth can never be achieved. Furthermore, such 
claims to objectiveness and truths may have totalizing effects. Scientific knowledge promoted 
as value-neutral and objective carries considerable political weight, at the potential expense of 
equally valuable and alternative insights, perspectives or facts. Social scientists who do not 
reflect critically on their own role in this regard may end up contributing to self-fulfilling 
                                                 
149 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Samuel P. 
Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993), 22–49; and his The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).  
150 Note that Fukuyama himself has since abandoned the ‘End of History’-thesis. 
151 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1986). 
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prophesies (e.g. clashes of civilizations), legitimizing existing practices (e.g. the nuclear arms 
race) or ignoring alternative perspectives (e.g. orientalism). 
Robert W. Cox’s famous statement that theory always is ‘for someone and for some purpose’ 
is a position mirrored in much post-colonial theory, neo-Marxism, feminist writings and 
elsewhere.152 Scientific theorizing is neither neutral nor objective: it imposes prejudices, values 
and power upon the world; thus, social science is inescapably political and may reinforce 
existing structures such as colonialism or sexism.153 Further, according to Cox, theories can 
serve two purposes: to help solve problems (problem-solving theory) or to ‘stand apart from 
the prevailing order of the world and ask how that order came about’ (critical theory).154  
However, being aware of one’s own bias and historical-cultural luggage does not mean that 
social science can be equated with politics and campaigning. This is the ‘demarcation problem’ 
within the philosophy of science: how to distinguish science from other forms of knowledge, 
such as journalism? Leaning again on Patrick T. Jackson, we can say that a scientific knowledge 
claim consists of three components: it is a) systematically related to its presuppositions 
(conclusions must be logically based on premises); b) capable of public criticism within the 
scientific community (must be comprehensible and recognized as logical inference); and c) 
intended to produce worldly (as opposed to for instance religious) knowledge.155 These three 
characteristics, argues Jackson, are what distinguish a scientific endeavour from other modes 
of activity, such as politics and art. It provides a ‘tent’ big enough for most IR scholarship to fit 
inside, but is simultaneously a clear demarcation toward other forms of knowledge.156 We can 
                                                 
152 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, 128; Escobar, Encountering Development; Sandra 
Harding, Sciences from Below: Feminisms, Postcolonialities, and Modernities (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2008). 
153 Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’; Andrew Linklater, Critical Theory and World Politics: 
Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity (London: Routledge, 2007). On deconstruction in IR, see e.g. James Der 
Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989). 
154 Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’. 
155 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 193–95. See also his ‘Must International Studies 
Be a Science?’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43, no. 3 (2015), 942–65. 
156 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 195. Jackson explicitly limits his definition to IR, 
but it could probably be used in other academic fields as well.   
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therefore define social science, or IR, as a distinct endeavour, while recognizing that there are 
several theoretical paths to ‘the world’ or ‘reality’.157 
The following chapters will engage with theory to varying degrees. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are 
primarily analytical: mapping, categorizing and discussing the many challenges related to 
interventions. In Chapter 5 the focus becomes more theoretical, as discussed here, and I will 
develop an analytical framework for understanding challenges related to coherence. In Chapter 
6 I apply this framework to the case of Afghanistan, and in Chapter 7 I explore some further 
potential analytical developments of the framework.  
 
5. Outline  
 
This study begins by investigating the idea of coherence in interventions more broadly in 
Chapter 2, asking why international actors seem to find it necessary to assign such high 
importance to coherence, and why coherence has become a key ingredient for success in the 
context of international operations today. I offer a taxonomy of various forms of relationships 
between intervening actors, and of various degrees of coherence. One of the categories 
identified in the taxonomy, inter-agency coherence, will be the primary focus throughout the 
dissertation. Chapter 2 also discusses some difficulties that may limit the prospects for 
coherence. I will argue that the level of coherence achievable in one situation will not 
necessarily be achievable in the next one. As a result, our approach to studying and 
understanding the challenges related to coherence needs to be able to account for contextual 
and political variation. Chapter 2 is a significantly revised version of the article ‘Coherence and 
Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach’, written with Cedric de Coning and 
published in Journal of International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, nos. 1–2 (2011): 243–72.  
I then look closer at the military actors in Chapter 3. Their role in an intervention is generally 
a dominant one. They often have significant resources at their disposal, in terms of personnel 
and equipment. However, they differ significantly in terms of mandates, resources and doctrines: 
from conventional peacekeeping to robust counter-insurgencies. The chapter compares the 
                                                 
157 Timothy Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, ‘The End of International Relations Theory?’, European 
Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013), 402–25; Moses and Knutsen, Ways of Knowing, 288–91; 
Cecilie Basberg Neumann and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Uses of the Self: Two Ways of Thinking About Scholarly 
Situatedness and Method’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43, no. 3 (2015), 798-819. 
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peacekeeping and counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrines, noting their striking similarities. The 
UN is more of a political player now than in traditional peacekeeping, but it is usually less so 
than e.g. the US was in Iraq. The point is that these are sliding scales, not fixed positions. The 
nature of each mission will determine how political a UN or a COIN operation will be regarded 
as being, in the eyes of the host population. As a result, I argue, an understanding of the 
challenges related to achieving coherence between military and civilian actors cannot be based 
on the type of actor or mission, but must be embedded in the political context of the intervention. 
Chapter 3 is based on ‘Peacekeeping and Counterinsurgency: Two of a Kind?’ published in 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, no. 1 (2010): 49–66.  
In Chapter 4 the focus is narrowed down to the nature and intensity of the conflicts between 
military and humanitarian actors. The humanitarians require special attention because of their 
insistence on being above or outside of politics. Are there certain constant differences between 
humanitarians and the military actors that always are present across interventions? If so, we can 
develop generic analyses of the challenges to coherence between these actors. I answer this by 
offering a taxonomy of military operations and the associated challenges with humanitarian 
issues which reveals it is not merely the intensity of warfare that impacts on the relationship – 
there appear to be fewer conflicts in heated combat such as conventional warfare and other 
enemy-centric approaches. The most serious difficulties appear when humanitarian actors feel 
themselves politicized: as when military and humanitarian mandates become stretched beyond 
core competencies, when military approaches enter new spheres, or then humanitarians fail to 
recognize the political nature or implications of projects they engage in. Hence, politicization 
depends on context and what the actors do, not who they are. This, I hold, implies that 
humanitarians can be approached through the same analytical framework as other civilians. 
Chapter 4 is based on ‘Military and Humanitarian Actors’, which is chapter 18 (pp. 215–27) in 
Roger Mac Ginty and Jenny Peterson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, 
London, Routledge (2015).  
These three chapters map the terrain in terms of categorizing different forms of relationships 
between actors intervening in a conflict, analysed the tensions and similarities between them. 
Taken together, they offer a nuanced picture with taxonomies of the nature of military–civilian 
relations in interventions and the similarities and differences between various operations. They 
show that coherence is a deeply political endeavour, and faces both resistance and ignorance. 
The next step then, is to find out more concretely how all this can be analysed.  
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In Chapter 5, the focus shifts to developing an analytical framework for analysing the tensions 
between intervening actors, the dynamics within an intervention. Therefore, the chapter differs 
from the preceding three in both style and content. I start with a discussion of the most 
comprehensive attempt at theorizing an intervention to date: Séverine Autesserre’s analysis of 
the intervention in the DRC.158 I see Autesserre’s theorizing as primarily inductive, tailormade 
for her specific case, and therefore not directly transferrable to other cases. I propose an 
analytical model that builds on some of Autesserre’s elements, but takes the identity of the 
intervening actors as its starting point. Analysis of the identity formation (or identification) of 
the main sets of actors can provide insights into deeper questions of how they ascribe meaning 
to their mission: how they regard their role and how they regard the other actors, international 
as well as local, in the field of intervention. Here I argue that the very existence of these actors 
is largely built on interventions, because part of their legitimacy and raison d’être is based on 
their role or expertise in engaging other people in interventions. Therefore, if we want to get to 
the heart of an intervention, we need to understand how the intervening actors regard their tasks 
and the reason for their presence. I propose an analytical framework based on this, and argue 
that it is applicable deductively on any intervention, and on any set of actors. And finally, I 
argue that this is also better suited for accounting for change and power struggles than is 
Autesserre’s model.  
In Chapter 6 I apply this analytical framework to the case of Afghanistan, using it to help in 
understanding the limited military–civilian coherence there. A similar set of analytical frames 
will be applied to analyse the identities of three sets of actors – the military, the humanitarians 
and the state-builders – so that we can compare them, noting their differences and similarities. 
How do these different sets of actors ascribe meaning to Afghanistan and to themselves? What 
do they see as their purpose of their being in Afghanistan? Here I will show how understandings 
of the very purpose of the intervention differed significantly among the groups – and in some 
cases within them. The three entities appeared largely ignorant of each other, operating in 
parallel but not in conjunction. There was not one, single, ‘Western approach’ to Afghanistan, 
but at least three, with numerous conflicting representations of the Afghans associated to them. 
If the three sets of actors had such fundamentally different reasons for being in Afghanistan, 
that may help us understand why a comprehensive approach was never achieved. Chapter 6 is 
                                                 
158 Séverine Autesserre, ‘Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention’, 
International Organization 63, no. 2 (2009), 249–80; also her The Trouble with the Congo. 
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a revised version of the article ‘Which Afghanistan? Military, Humanitarian, and State-Building 
Identities in the Afghan Theater’, published in Security Studies, Vol. 21, no. 2 (2012): 266–300.  
The concluding Chapter 7 indicates some avenues for further expanding the theoretical 
approach developed in this dissertation. I begin by examining how we can better theorize the 
interrelationships among groups of intervening actors. Drawing on theories of ontological 
security, I indicate how micro-level interactions could be scrutinized in more detail than in this 
dissertation. Also the power relations between intervener and those intervened upon could be 
explored in greater depth than here. Building on insights from social anthropology and on 

















In the previous chapter I briefly discussed the various actors in an intervention, dividing them 
roughly into three categories: military, humanitarian and political civilian actors. However, 
there are alternative ways of categorizing the intervening actors. Some can be classified as 
international entities, others as national agencies; some are governmental, others non-
governmental, and yet others inter-governmental. All these groups of actors face different 
challenges related to coherence, but we can also find similarities. There are degrees of 
coherence, from mere co-existence of actors, to full integration – all with unique challenges and 
opportunities. Moreover, different actors may be seeking – or resisting – coherence or 
cooperation at different levels.  
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a better understanding of all these relationships, but also 
to make a first attempt at a more critical assessment of the idea of coherence. I begin with a 
taxonomy of various relationships between the actors in an intervention: four types of 
relationships (intra-agency, whole-of-government, inter-agency and international-local), and 
six degrees of coherence (ranging from competing to united actors). Of these 24 constellations, 
some are more relevant than others when it comes to discussing military–civilian relations, but 
the taxonomy provides us with a framework for assessing these relations better.  
Coordination can bring obvious benefits, like de-conflicting, avoiding overlap, firmer long-term 
perspectives – in short, efficient use of donor resources. But is coherence merely a technical 
question of inter-actor coordination and communication? Are there other challenges related to 
the mandates and perspectives of the various organizations involved? In this chapter I discuss 
in greater detail some of the obstacles that restrict the prospects of coherence: output vs. impact; 
conflicting mandates and values; and internal/external imbalance. I then argue that there are 
obvious limits to coherence, and that ‘success’ in this regard is highly context-dependent. 
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Whether there is cooperation or conflict between intervening actors in an intervention may vary 
from case to case, depending on the political circumstances. 
This implies, I will conclude, that analysis of the challenges related to achieving coherence 
must take the social and political circumstances into account. The inductively generated 
categories of challenges discussed may not be valid across several cases. Hence, we need an 
analytical framework which can be applied to all interventions, but which may yield different 
answers in each case, depending on the circumstances, the nature of the conflict and involved 
intervening actors, etc.  
 
2. Emergence of the Comprehensive Approach 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the pursuit of coherence has become an increasingly central 
objective among intervening actors and their programmes and activities in interventions since 
the end of the Cold War. Seeking to improve the overall success rate of these missions, various 
agencies, governments and organizations have developed a range of concepts, models and tools 
aimed at enhancing overall coherence. All these initiatives have a similar goal: greater 
harmonization and synchronization in the activities of the international and local actors, as well 
as across the analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation phases of the programme cycle. 
For simplicity, I refer to these as ‘comprehensive approach’ in this section. 
Already in 1992 the UN stressed the need for holistic approaches to peace. In the ‘An Agenda 
for Peace’ report an extensive ‘toolbox’ of instruments was envisaged for peacebuilders to 
employ in response to the ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War era.159 Since the ‘Agenda for Peace’ 
and subsequent documents and reports throughout the 1990s and the early years of the new 
millennium, the UN has focused increasingly on internal coherence. A major step was taken in 
2006, when then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the initial ‘integrated mission’ 
concept as the guiding principle for future post-conflict complex operations. As  explained  in 
his ‘Note of Guidance’: ‘Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation 
of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions 
of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and 
                                                 
159 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report of 
the Secretary-General, a/47/277 – S/24111. 
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security aspects) into a coherent support strategy.’160 The ‘Guidance Note’ on integration issued 
in 2008 by the next UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon revised this, introducing the concept 
of an ‘integrated approach’.161 This differs from the integrated mission concept in not requiring 
structural integration, although providing for it where appropriate. What the integrated 
approach refers to is a strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping operation and the 
UN Country Team, aimed at ensuring that all components of the UN system operate in a 
coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners.162 
Although the level of implementation will differ from mission to mission, the ambition of 
coherence remains strong on the part of the DPKO and the Secretary-General. Resistance has 
emerged from humanitarian circles in the UN (OCHA), which fear that their impartiality and 
neutrality will be undermined if they are too closely associated with the rest of the UN.163 I 
return to this in Chapters 4 and 6. 
The EU, with its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),164 has been developing its 
crisis management capabilities in the wake of the Cold War, the Balkan crises, the 9/11 attacks 
in the USA and the subsequent operations in Afghanistan. Much of the focus has been on weak, 
failed or failing states, seen as potential breeding grounds and exporters of threats to Europe, 
like terrorism, organized crime and trafficking. To coordinate the various EU instruments in 
field operations, a civilian–military coordination (CMCO) process has been established, but 
thus far its impact has been limited.165 The 2003 EU European Security Strategy stressed that 
the EU must ‘pursue coherent policies’ ‒ ‘bring together the different tools and capabilities of 
EU policy, such as European assistance programmes, the European Development Fund and the 
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Member States’ military and civilian capabilities’.166 Based on this, the EU has developed 
sophisticated crisis-management capabilities, including military, police and civilian capacities, 
but has not yet deployed these capacities together in one integrated operation.167 They have 
been deployed in parallel missions in military or police missions alongside other EU presences 
in the same countries, such as election monitoring missions, development and humanitarian 
missions, and political/diplomatic Council and Commission representation. Internal 
institutional divisions, the pillar divide and the lengthy ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty 
have been among the factors impeding a more coherent EU, despite the huge potentials in the 
military, political and economic sectors.168  
Progress has nonetheless been significant over the past decade.169 The Lisbon Treaty was finally 
ratified, the European External Action Service has been established, and in December 2013 the 
Council and the European Parliament adopted a joint communication on a comprehensive 
approach to external conflict and crises, developed by the High Representative.170 An Action 
Plan was adopted in 2015 to implement this.171 In addition, the EU adopted a ‘Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ in 2016, prescribing an ‘Integrated 
Approach to Conflicts and Crises’. The document states that ‘implementing the 
“comprehensive   approach to conflicts and crises” through a coherent use of all policies at the 
                                                 
166 See European Security Strategy, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1415697994522&uri=URISERV:r00004   
167 Nik Hynek, ‘EU Crisis Management after the Lisbon Treaty: Civil–Military Coordination and the Future of 
the EU OHQ’, European Security 20, no. 1 (2011), 81–102.  
168 Gross, EU and the Comprehensive Approach, 26; Margriet Drent, ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to 
Security: A Culture of Co-ordination?’, Studia Diplomatica 14, no. 2 (2011), 3–18.  
 
169 Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, ‘Managing the Civil–Military Interface in the EU: Creating an Organisation 
Fit for Purpose’, in Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy, eds 
Sophie Vanhoonacker, Hylke Dijkstra and Heidi Maurer, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special 
Issue 1, Vol. 14 (2010), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-010a.htm; Norheim-Martinsen, ‘EU Strategic Culture: 
When the Means Becomes the End’, Contemporary Security Policy 32, no. 3 (2011), 524–41. 
 
170 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Joint(2013)30: 
The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises. 
171 European Commission, Taking Forward the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises 
Action Plan 2015. Joint Staff Working Document (Brussels: High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign and Security Policy, 2015). 
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EU’s disposal is essential’.172 Still, the EU has yet to fully implement these visions in practice, 
and many internal challenges remain among and between the various EU institutions.173  
NATO has had a comprehensive approach as part of its official policies since the Riga Summit 
in 2006. 174  As the NATO Secretary General declared in August 2009: ‘we need a 
comprehensive approach, a reinforced interaction between our military efforts and our 
endeavours with regard to civil reconstruction’,175 and, in a 2010 speech: ‘The days when the 
military could defeat the enemy, then hand the baton off to the civilians and go home, are past 
us’.176 The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept declares: ‘The Alliance will engage actively with 
other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, 
planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximize coherence and 
effectiveness of the overall international effort.’177  
This outreach is crucial, as it has been stressed that NATO is not to compete with the UN or the 
EU, or develop its own civilian capabilities: it will pursue the comprehensive approach in 
coordination with other organizations.178 The Allied Joint Doctrine therefore states that NATO 
should be regarded as a contributor to the comprehensive approach of the wider international 
community.179 NATO has also developed, and largely implemented, a comprehensive approach 
                                                 
172 The 2016 European Union Global Strategy is available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. The quote is from page 9. 
173 For a discussion of the analytical challenges related to this, see Carmen Gebhard and Per Martin Norheim-
Martinsen, ‘Making Sense of EU Comprehensive Security Towards Conceptual and Analytical Clarity’, 
European Security 20, no. 2 (2011), 221–41. 
174 NATO Riga Summit Declaration, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm 
175 First NATO Press Conference, 3 August 2009, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_56776.htm. 
 
176 Afghanistan and the Future of Peace Operations, University of Chicago, 15 April 2010, available at. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_62510.htm  
177 NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
178 See Peter Viggo Jacobsen, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations – a Work in 
Slow Progress  (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2008), 11. 
 





action plan. 180  Nevertheless, it has been accused of ‘slow progress’ in developing its 
contribution to a comprehensive approach.181 International partners have, for varying reasons, 
often been reluctant to be seen as too closely associated with the Western military alliance. For 
instance, it was not until in 2008 that NATO and the UN signed their first Joint Declaration. 
Although they have since exchanged liaison officers in their respective headquarters, interaction 
has been relatively modest due to political sensitivities. 182  This proved challenging in 
Afghanistan, where NATO was unable or unwilling to build the kind of coherence with other 
actors that official documents envisaged. On the tactical level, the introduction of Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), with civilian actors embedded in these otherwise military units, 
may be regarded as an attempt to remedy this. However, the PRTs were too few and too small, 
and entailed their own set of challenges. I return to this below and in Chapter 6. 
In addition to these international efforts, many governments – predominately in the West – have 
developed whole-of-government approaches (WHOGA) to their international engagements. 
This typically entails some form of systematic process aimed at ensuring that the ministries or 
departments engaged in the country’s international peace and stability operations do so in a 
coherent manner. The original Canadian 3D concept – referring to the relationship between 
defence, development and diplomacy – is the signature example of the whole-of-government 
approach. However, today most WHOGA proponents, including Canada, engage not only the 
three ministries mentioned, but also typically the office of the prime minister or president, as 
well as the ministries responsible for justice, police, correctional services, home affairs and 
finance. Some countries, among them Canada, the UK and the USA, have developed 
institutional approaches to coherence and have established dedicated units, usually housed in 
their foreign ministries, to manage their whole-of-government systems. Others, such as the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, have developed a process approach, typically based on a 
White-Paper-level requirement for policy integration, backed up by meetings at the ministerial 
                                                 
 
180 See https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_51633.htm 
181 Jacobsen, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations – a Work in Slow Progress. 
 
182 The Joint Declaration is available here: http://streitcouncil.org/uploads/PDF/UN-
NATO%20Joint%20Declaration.pdf. Other official texts on NATO and the UN are found here: 
http://www.natolibguides.info/nato-un/documents. See also Koops, Peace Operations Partnerships: Assessing 
Cooperations Mechanisms between Secretariats. 
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and technical levels.183 They generally have had an in-country process as well, designed around 
the ambassador, to ensure operational coherence among the various government agencies 
present on the ground. However, although national cohesion may look good on paper, it is far 
from certain that this actually contributes to coherence on the international level. In most cases, 
each national sector (defence, diplomatic, development) will be simultaneously engaged with 
international partners with whom they will need to adapt and coordinate. Pressure for national 
cohesion may make such adjustments more cumbersome. If so, WHOGA may even become an 
impediment to international or mission coherence. 
This we can see in the case of Afghanistan. Most Western countries that adopted a whole-of-
government approach did so in relation to their engagement in Afghanistan.184 Many of them 
were responsible for, or participated in, a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). This was an 
attempt to apply the whole-of-government model to a nationally deployed entity, consisting of 
a military component responsible for security-related tasks, development advisors responsible 
for development projects, political advisors responsible for engagement with local authorities 
and political analysis, and police and/or judicial advisors (in some cases including correctional 
service officers) responsible for rule-of-law assistance. There was no commonly agreed PRT 
model or structure. Each lead-nation developed its own model, and the degree of whole-of-
government integration differed significantly. For instance, the UK PRT in Helmand Province 
was headed by a senior civilian; others were led by the military, with hardly any civilians at all. 
In general, civilians were a small minority in these PRTs. Coordination between the PRTs and 
the ISAF HQ was limited, leading to significant regional differences in terms of scope, 
resources and approaches.185   
Thus, we see that the ‘comprehensive approach’ means different things to different 
organizations and individual countries. The UN’s integrated approach is primarily concerned 
with the security–development nexus: with coherence between the peace, security, 
                                                 
183 Rintakoski and Autti, Comprehensive Approach; Cedric de Coning et al., Norway’s Whole-of-Government 
Approach and Its Engagement with Afghanistan (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 
2009).  
 
184 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Then the Sum of Its Parts?: Assessing ‘Whole of Government’ 
Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007). 
 
185 Oskari Eronen, PRT Models in Afghanistan – Approaches to Civil–Military Integration (Helsinki: Crisis 
Management Centre (CMC), 2008); Touko Piiparinen, ‘A Clash of Mindsets? An Insider’s Account of 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams’, International Peacekeeping 14, no. 1 (2007), 143–57; M. J. Williams, 
‘Empire Lite Revisited: NATO, the Comprehensive Approach and State-Building in Afghanistan’, International 
Peacekeeping 18, no. 1 (2011), 64–78. 
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development and humanitarian elements of the UN family. The EU’s comprehensive approach 
focuses on the civil–military relationship in the elements of its crisis management approach: 
the military, rule of law, protection and conflict management aspects. NATO’s comprehensive 
approach concept aims at addressing the relationship between NATO and the other internal 
actors engaged in the same theatre. The various national WHOGAs are primarily concerned 
with coherence among the government departments and agencies of the specific country (see 
Table 2 for an overview). The objectives of the various initiatives differ, as do the practical 
actions taken. The results of all initiatives appear somewhat meagre – but this is admittedly a 
very provisional overview. 
Table 2: International organizations’ attempts to build coherence 
 Objective Actions Challenges 
UN Internal cohesion Reorganized Missions Resistance from 
OCHA 
EU Internal cohesion Ongoing policy process Internal 
institutional 
divisions 
NATO Outreach, external 
cohesion 
Political declarations 
with UN & EU; PRTs in 
Afghanistan; anti-





National cohesion 3D and similar national 
strategies, coordination 






While there are numerous practical challenges associated with building coherence, most actors 
also share an implicit theoretical assumption. There appears to be consensus that peace and 
stability operations will be more efficient and effective, and will thus have more meaningful 
impact, when the various actors engaged have a common strategy, based on a common 
understanding of the problem, a common theory of change, and an agreed synchronized plan 
for implementing and evaluating such a strategy.186 Thus we can note an assumed cause-and-
                                                 
186 Karsten Friis and Pia Jarmyr, Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and Opportunities in Complex Crisis 
Management (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs (NUPI), 2008); Nilsson et al., Contextualising 
the Comprehensive Approach. 
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effect relationship between coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, and this 
rationale is extended from the national to the international context, or vice versa.  
More specifically, policy-makers appear to base the call for coherence on the assumption that 
inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient 
spending, lower quality of service, difficulty in achieving goals and, ultimately, reduced 
capacity for delivery. 187  Consequently, the policy community has come to believe that 
improved coherence will also improve the efficiency 188 of operations, with more efficient 
operations translating into operations that are more effective 189 and more sustainable.190 While 
this may appear to be merely common sense, it is also a rather ‘technical’ approach to the 
problem, searching for organizational and systemic solutions to the challenges of coherence.191 
However, such assumptions may overlook several deeper impediments to enhanced coherence. 
I will return to these challenges in section 4. First we need a better understanding of what 
coherence means ‒ all the potential modalities, levels of interaction and relationship associated 
with coherence in an intervention. Mapping this out in a broad sense can show where military–
civilian relations matter the most, and the kinds of conflicts that may occur in different 
constellations.   
 
                                                 
 
187 OECD, ‘Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development’, OECD Observer, 2003, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/pcd/20202515.pdf  
 
188 According to the OECD Glossary of Key Terms, ‘efficiency’ is ‘a measure of how economically resources and 
inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results’. ‘Economy’ in this context refers to the absence of 
waste for a given output: ‘an activity is economical when the costs of the scarce resources used approximate the 
minimum needed to achieve planned objectives’. OECD Glossary of Key Terms, 2002, pp. 20 – 21, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf 
 
189 Effectiveness refers to ‘the extent to which a development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are 
expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.’ OECD Glossary of Key Terms, p. 20. 
 
190 The OECD defines ‘sustainability’ as ‘the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after 
major development assistance has been completed’, OECD Glossary of Key Terms, p. 36. 
 
191 Robert Egnell has put forward a similar argument from a theoretical position. He calls for an integrated civil–
military organization, arguing it would enhance conduct and effectiveness. However, he ignores potential deeper 
conflicts, such as diverging mandates, to which we return below. Robert Egnell, Complex Peace Operations and 
Civil–Military Relations: Winning the Peace (London: Routledge, 2009); Egnell, ‘Civil–Military Coordination 




3. Coherence in Interventions 
 
We need to understand better what kinds of inter-organizational relationships can be expected 
in an intervention. More sophisticated analysis should be done only after these various have 
been mapped and grasped. Let us therefore now establish the various forms of relationships and 
the corresponding degrees of coherence. This can be pursued among a broad range of actors, 
across various dimensions, and at various levels. In discussions, however, the levels, 
dimensions and actors often get mixed up and cause confusion. To remedy this, I draw up a 
comprehensive approach taxonomy that distinguishes between four types of relationships and 
six degrees of coherence.192 This is a broad framework that captures more than just the various 
military–civilian constellations: it aims at mapping all possible relations among intervening 
actors, which is necessary to get the full overview. The categories are logically induced from 
the various kinds of actors that usually engage in an intervention, as discussed above and in 
Chapter 1. Four types of relationships emerge: intra-agency coherence, whole-of-government 
coherence, inter-agency coherence and international-local coherence. 
 
• Intra-agency coherence: consistency193 among the policies and actions of an individual 
agency, including the internal consistency of a specific policy or programme. Examples 
could be the internal coherence of a ministry of foreign affairs, or an agency such as the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
  
• Whole-of-government coherence: consistency among the policies and actions of the 
various government agencies of a country – e.g. among the ministries of defence, 
foreign affairs and international development assistance of the UK. 
 
                                                 
192 To simplify I use ‘comprehensive approach’ here as a general term when referring to all the various attempts 
in the UN, EU, NATO and others, discussed above. 
193 ‘Consistency’ in this context is not necessarily ethical, i.e. doing the same under similar circumstances with 
respect to any one rule or norm, and avoiding double standards. Instead it refers to one agency, government, or 
system not working at cross-purposes with itself in a more general sense.  
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• Inter-agency coherence: consistency among the policies pursued by the various 
international actors in a given country context (harmonization).194 An example could be 
NATO–EU–UN coherence in the previous Kosovo pillar system. 
 
• International-local coherence: consistency between and among the policies of the 
internal and external actors (the host nation and international actors) in a given country 
context (alignment).195 Examples here could be an agreed national strategic framework 
between the international community and host government, such as the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy of Liberia. 
 
This categorization is not meant to indicate that coherence is pursued exclusively with one 
specific type of relations only – quite the contrary, actors are likely to pursue coherence with 
all four types where feasible. For instance, an actor like the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands 
would be concerned with coherence in connection with its policies towards, e.g. Afghanistan, 
and would be likely to pursue coherence at the same time: firstly, among the various units within 
the Foreign Ministry; secondly, in a whole-of-government context with other government 
agencies; thirdly, in the inter-agency context among donors or as a member state of NATO, the 
EU and the UN; and lastly, in the internal/external coherence context in its bilateral relations 
with Afghanistan and its participation in collective efforts aimed at international–local 
coherence, such as international donor conferences. Hence, the degree to which a specific 
international state actor can be considered more coherent or less coherent will be a factor of all 
four types of relationships.  
In addition, the comprehensive approach taxonomy can be provided with a range of 
relationships that represent differing degrees of coherence, depending on the context within 
which these relationships emerge. Pursuing a comprehensive approach need not mean that all 
the actors involved must have the same degree of coherence towards each other, or as regards 
an agreed common strategy. Although the context is crucial in shaping the climate within which 
                                                 
194 ‘Harmonization’ in this context refers to the harmonization between donor approaches. See Rome Declaration 
on Harmonization, available at http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/31451637.pdf  
 
195 ‘Alignment’ is a development concept referring to the alignment between the interests of international donors 




relationships function, there are also many other factors that determine relationships – such as 
perceived roles and responsibilities, legitimacy, credibility and mandates. The degree of 
potential coherence can be represented on a scale ranging from unity to competition: 
 
• Actors are united: Actors voluntarily agree to establish a unified structure and undertake 
joint action directed by a unified leadership and command arrangement, e.g. a 
multinational military coalition. This level of coherent action will typically require an 
agreed strategic vision and specific aims and objectives formulated in an official 
mandate and/or campaign plan. In the military context this is often termed ‘unity of 
purpose’. Such unity of purpose is a prerequisite for unity of effort. This level of 
coherence will require a unified organizational structure with a high degree of discipline, 
and clear command and control arrangements that determine and direct joint 
assessments, joint planning, joint implementation and joint monitoring and evaluation. 
However, in the real world, such a level of coherence is rare between independent agents. 
It tends to occur only in certain unique circumstances and cannot be sustained for long. 
Examples include the US-led multinational coalition that undertook the 1991 Gulf War 
(Operation Desert Storm) and the Australian-led multinational coalition ‘INTERFET’ 
that stabilized East Timor in 1999.  
 
• Actors are integrated: Actors agree to seek ways to integrate their approaches and 
activities, but without giving up their individual identities or their right to take 
independent decisions about the allocation of resources. The individual agencies come 
together to undertake joint assessments, joint planning, and even some degree of joint 
implementation and monitoring and implementation – but they implement separately, 
each using its own resources and own organizational means. The UN’s integrated 
approach model would be a clear example here. 
 
• Actors cooperate: Actors with complementary and/or overlapping mandates and 
objectives may choose to cooperate, including joint or collaborative action. They retain 
their organizational independence, but are willing to go rather far in organizing activities 
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together with others, although such arrangements are usually temporary, context-
specific and may need to be renegotiated on a case-by-case basis.  
 
 
• Actors coordinate: This would describe an activity aimed at sharing information and 
acting on that information with a view to avoiding conflict, duplication or overlap, so 
as to ensure a more coherent overall undertaking. Such activity may take place between 
independent actors with different mandates, or between those who require strong 
organizational independence but who nonetheless share some similar interests or 
strategic vision and thus see the need for a degree of coordination with others. There 
will often be a network of coordination mechanisms – some more densely connected 
than others, some operating in hierarchies at various levels between the same actors, 
whereas others are only loosely connected. An example of a standing arrangement in 
this category would be the UN humanitarian coordination system: it is pre-arranged and 
agreed, but allows for maximum independence and voluntary participation. Another 
example could be the former pillar structure used by the UN, NATO, the EU and the 
OSCE in Kosovo. An ad hoc arrangement would be the coordination between military 
and humanitarian actors in a natural disaster like an earthquake or a major flood. The 
difference between coordination and cooperation is that, in the latter category, 
coordination results in joint action; in the former, in independent or separate action. In 
both cases, the behaviour of the agents has changed as a result of the coordination that 
has taken place, but ‘cooperation’ implies that they have reached agreement on and have 
actually implemented joint action. 
 
• Actors co-exist: This would describe the relationship between actors that are forced to 
interact but that have very limited ambitions concerning coordination – for example, 
neutral humanitarian actors who wish to maintain a distance to other, more political, 
actors in the field. It could also describe a relationship involving sceptical or even 
opposing political and military forces: they may not be directly hostile but could resist 
activities that threaten to interfere in their spheres of interest. A certain amount of 
communication and de-conflicting may take place, as well as some opportunistic or 
pragmatic cooperation, but the normal state of their relationship can be categorized as 
co-existence. For instance, humanitarian and military actors operating alongside each 
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other in a complex emergency may, under normal circumstances, follow a policy of 
deliberately maintaining separate identities; but when the humanitarian agencies come 
under direct attack, they may seek shelter in military compounds, or be evacuated under 
military protection. 
 
• Actors compete: This category would describe the relationship among actors that have 
competing values, visions and strategies. It could describe the relationship between an 
NGO committed to non-violence and an international military force with a mandate to 
use force; or it can refer to groups that politically, even violently, oppose the presence 
of an international operation in their country  
 
In short, this comprehensive approach taxonomy has the following characteristics: 
(a) Four types of relationships: intra-agency coherence, whole-of-government coherence, 
inter-agency coherence, and international–local coherence 
 
(b) Six degrees of coherence: actors are united; actors are integrated; actors cooperate; 
actors coordinate; actors co-exist; and actors compete. 
 
Taken together, these characteristics offer a composite understanding of coherence in the 
context of interventions. There may be many other characteristics which could be considered 
as well. Various combinations of these characteristics could be used to explore the interlinkages 
among them, or to develop typologies useful for further analysing the complex range of 
relationships among actors involved in interventions.  
Given the four types of relationships and the six degrees of coherence, we can distinguish 
among 24 different types of coherence (see Table 3). Some are obviously more realistic than 
others, and, as with any taxonomy or model, there are real-world cases that would straddle some 
of these typologies. Most real-world cases will move between them in the course of the lifetime 
of a mission. First and foremost, such frameworks can help us to gain a better understanding of 





Table 3: Comprehensive Approach Matrix: Types of relationships and degrees of coherence 
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The 24 categories outlined here represent different challenges to coherence – although there 
also are obvious similarities and overlaps. For the discussion in this dissertation, the intra-
agency relationships are of less relevance. Military–civilian relations are unlikely ever to fall 
within these categories, but is nonetheless useful to single them out, to get a broader 
understanding of the complexities and challenges. Of the other relationships, inter-agency 
relations are typically associated with comprehensive approach and similar concepts. The 
policy debates about comprehensive approach and the above-mentioned initiatives taken by the 
UN, EU and NATO have all primarily concerned this relationship, and it is also here most of 
the controversies seem to have emerged. On the other hand, the internal/external dimension is 
arguably the most important one in an intervention, as sustainability and lasting results may 
hinge on this. I return to this below and in Chapter 5 when developing the analytical framework. 
Whole-of-government relations may also cause tensions, for instance when governments seek 
to cajole military and other government agencies into one national strategy. The U.S. COIN 
doctrine may be an example of this, as discussed in the next chapter. 
There are also certain general or overarching challenges to coherence that may occur in all the 
above categories. Although not limited to military–civilian relations, they may very well impact 
these as well.  This discussion will help us to understand more systematically what the 
challenges to coherence are, in turn laying the foundations for subsequent deliberations in later 
chapters, not least the analytical framework in Chapter 5. 
 
4. The Limits of Coherence 
 
Although comprehensive approach, unity of effort, and similar concepts seem logical and 
rational from a principled point of view, the fact that they have proven difficult to implement 
in practice indicates that these concepts overlook certain impediments present on the ground. 
These could lie in conflicting ideologies, theories of change or politics – and they cannot be 
resolved simply through improved organizational measures, coordination bodies or weekly 
meetings. Some might be better managed through careful politically informed processes, while 
others appear to be insurmountable. This section explores three such limitations to coherence: 
output–impact limitations; conflicting values, principles and mandates; and external–internal 
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power imbalances. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but as illustrations of typical 
challenges to coherence in interventions. Discussing them can bring us one step further towards 
understanding the challenges facing military–civilian coherence.199 
 
4.1. Short-term output vs. long-term impact 
The concepts of comprehensive approach or unity of effort, as discussed above in the context 
of UN, EU and NATO, address strategic coherence. They are about securing a country or a 
region; about sustainable peace and ultimately about the exit of the intervening actors. This 
means that coherency involves making sure various activities contribute to achieving an impact 
sought by all involved actors.200 The overall effect of the combined activities of all actors is 
usually observable only from an overall impact perspective and the sustainability of their 
individual activities; its combined effect can be measured only over the medium to long term.  
This means that the actors need to shift attention from the immediate output201 level to the 
strategic or longer-term impact level. That can prove difficult, as the interdependence among 
the actors, and the benefits of improving coherence among them, are not immediately obvious 
to actors at the programme or output level. There is a potential disconnect between those who 
measure progress at the strategic or impact level and those who do measure progress at the 
programme or output level. 
Furthermore, very few actors actually work at the impact level, and those that do – for instance, 
a UN Special Representative or Resident Coordinator – are usually individual figures, with 
staffs that have agency for short periods of time and in specific contexts only. They are thus 
                                                 
199 I am particularly grateful to Cedric de Coning for his insights and contributions to this section of the chapter. 
200 Results-Based Management typically operates with a Results Chain, defined by the OECD as: ‘The causal 
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beginning with inputs, moving through activities and outputs, and culminating in outcomes, impacts, and 
feedback’. In this context the OECD defines impact as: ‘Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term 
effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.’ See 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf. 
201 Output is defined as: ‘The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; 




less influential, over time, than organizations that work primarily at the output level, pursuing 
their own interests, persistently over time in many contexts. 
This tension between impact and output undermines coherence. For two reasons, the incentives 
that favour the output level are unlikely to change, and will thus continue to limit the scope for 
coherence. The first reason is that organizations and donors are part of a funding and assessment 
system based on short-term feedback and continuous adjustments. 202  Hence, intervening 
organizations are particularly interested in measuring their output and the immediate feedback 
from that output. They usually cannot afford to wait for the long-term effects of their output 
before making decisions about the next activity, but are forced to act on immediately available 
information. Such organizations tend to be under political pressure to demonstrate results, or in 
financial competition with other actors for further funding: both act as incentives for 
demonstrating quick results. On the other hand, organizations might be expected to monitor 
longer-term progress in order to learn from and improve programme-level action. However – 
and this is the second reason – it is extremely difficult to measure meaningfully the causal effect 
of one given activity on a highly complex non-linear and dynamic set of systemic events. It is 
almost impossible to single out one specific activity and then authoritatively determine its effect 
on the outcome of a specific sector or phase, let alone the peace process as a whole.203 The 
further away we move, over time and in terms of the scope of factors taken into consideration, 
the more difficult it is to determine impact – in turn making it very difficult for organizations 
to focus on impact, and thereby on coherence. 
These output/impact challenges are likely to be present in most of today’s interventions and 
complex crisis management operations. Challenging as they are, however, these challenges are 
not insurmountable: significant progress can be achieved through improved communication, 
organization, systems and dialogue between tactical and strategic levels within and between 
actors. By contrast, the next set of challenges to be discussed are of a more deep-structured 
nature, and are less likely to be resolved. 
 
                                                 
202 Sarah Jane Meharg, Measuring What Matters in Peace Operations & Crisis Management (Montreal: School 
of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 2009). 
203 Cedric de Coning and Paul  Romita, The Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations (New York: 
International Peace Institute (IPI) / Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 2009); Meharg, 
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4.2. Conflicting values, principles and mandates 
The values, principles and mandates of some actors in an intervention may be inherently 
incoherent. Each actor has emerged within a specific context – humanitarian, military, human 
rights, development, law enforcement, etc. – schooled in the values, principles, philosophy and 
theories of change specific to that discipline or profession. This will usually result in the actors 
having fundamentally different approaches as to which aspects to prioritize. Political and 
security actors may prefer to, or be mandated to, focus on stabilizing a situation. This will result 
in their giving priority to stability rather than to human rights violations or to dealing with issues 
like corruption, black-market trading, racketeering or narcotics – especially if actors they 
perceive to be the key to stabilizing the situation are also suspected of being responsible for 
human rights atrocities or criminal behaviour. Those actors for whom justice and human rights 
are paramount will have a directly opposing view. They may argue that enforcing national and 
international laws and safeguarding human rights will have a far greater sustainable stabilizing 
effect in the longer term, because it will also have a deterrent effect on others in future conflicts, 
who will realize that they are likely to be punished, nationally or internationally, for their crimes 
and abuses. This fundamental tension between justice and peace drove the debate about the 
International Criminal Court and its indictment of Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir for 
alleged atrocities in Darfur. He was accused of ‘criminal responsibility in relation to 10 counts 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’.204 Those opposed to the indictment 
argued that it benefited ‘almost no one’, but would undermine the fragile peace process in 
Darfur.205  
Even among the actors engaged in security there may be differences in the emphasis on state 
security versus human security. The latter is often seen as ‘soft’ security, since it focuses on 
individuals and the civilian population, and has traditionally enjoyed lower priority among 
peacekeepers or stabilization forces. Advocates of human security, by contrast, often stress that 
sustainable peace can be achieved only by focusing on the needs of the population, including 
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their security needs as the local people perceive them; and that any security operation which 
fails to take this into account is likely to fail in the end.  
In some cases, the timetable of one actor or dimension may be in conflict with the principles of 
another. One case in point is the elections timetable in Liberia, which motivated those 
responsible for the elections to encourage Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Monrovia to 
return to their home communities in 2005, to register there to vote. The Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) put pressure on the 
agencies responsible for reintegration to persuade the IDPs to return, and to start offering them 
reintegration support in their communities of origin. However, these agencies disagreed with 
the return timetable proposed by UNMIL, because their own assessments informed them that 
conditions in the original communities were not yet conducive to sustainable returns. This 
situation caused tension between the political and developmental/humanitarian actors because 
their respective goals – short-term vs. long-term – and operating values and principles brought 
them into direct opposition with one another.206    
The approaches highlighted in these two examples reflect fundamental differences in the 
mandates, value systems and principles of some of the actors engaged. It would be naïve to 
assume that these differences can be resolved through coordination. As these examples indicate, 
such differences will need to be negotiated and trade-offs agreed in the specific context. These 
case-specific trade-offs cannot resolve the fundamental value differences. They often leave the 
specific actors less tolerant towards each other than before they were forced into the situation 
that required them to enter into such a transaction, so the end-result will not necessarily be 
greater coherence. And yet, such trade-offs do take place in in certain situations, so that actors 
can move beyond the conflict and continue to carry out their respective mandates. Such ad hoc 
transactions should not be confused with strategic coherence, however, which aims to achieve 
a common understanding of a situation as well as a common strategic response to it. 
As mentioned, humanitarian relief organizations constitute one particular set of actors which 
operate under a different mandate than all the others. International humanitarian law and the 
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shared Code of Conduct stress their independence, neutrality and impartiality.207 As a result of 
this operational framework, humanitarian actors have resisted outside attempts to integrate 
them into a comprehensive approach. In Chapter 4 I scrutinize the relationship between the 
military and the humanitarians – as this appears to represent the most polarized relationship of 
all actors in an intervention. 
All the above-mentioned differences in mandates, values and principles tend to become even 
more acute when the security situation is volatile. If security forces are engaged in combat 
operations against spoilers or insurgents, that is likely to have at least short-term negative 
effects on the space for progress elsewhere in the system, for instance in the political, 
governance, humanitarian and developmental domains. Casualties, refugees/IDPs, destruction 
of livelihoods and infrastructure are typical consequences of war. Other actors engaged in 
humanitarian relief operations or development programmes may be outraged by the human 
suffering and destruction taking place. Not surprisingly, this impedes coherence.  
 
4.3. Internal–external power imbalance 
A precondition for sustainability in external interventions is often considered to be engagement 
and involvement of the relevant internal actors. In the context of international development, the 
idea of ‘local ownership’ was established as a principle in 1996 by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
In what is often regarded as a seminal report, DAC stated: ‘the most important contributions 
for development, as in the past, will be made by the people and governments of the developing 
countries themselves’. 208 This is also a central principle underlying the 2000 UN Millennium 
Development Goals, and in numerous other statements and reports from the World Bank, 
international organizations and development agencies.209 
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Similarly, post-conflict peace processes that are predominantly driven by the external 
intervening actors tend to be unsustainable.210 It is commonly recognized that, in order to 
succeed, peace and stability operations must be needs-based; and the priorities, sequencing and 
pace of delivery must be informed by the dynamics of the conflict, through local ownership and 
meaningful internal/external coordination. Peace and stability operations that are not grounded 
in the socio-cultural belief systems that shape the worldview of the internal actors tend to cause 
dysfunction.211 Achieving a coherent partnership between internal and external actors is thus a 
major success factor for any comprehensive approach strategy.212 It is also one of the most 
difficult to achieve. There are two main sets of challenges: one concerns the reluctance or 
inability of the external actors to empower local actors; the other, the limited resources and 
capacities of the internal actors.   
The Rome Declaration213 and related aid-effectiveness policies aim at addressing the core 
structural inequality of the international assistance regime: that the external agency is 
empowered by virtue of being the benefactor. If left unchecked, external agencies tend to 
dominate the internal/external actor relationship. The most effective counterweight to this 
structural imbalance is the recognition that peace and stabilization processes can be sustainable 
only when they are owned and led by internal actors.  
However, that is easier said than done. External actors often encounter a range of obstacles 
when trying to implement policies that encourage local ownership, especially in fragile-state 
and post-conflict contexts. For instance, external actors may find it difficult to identify credible 
internal actors with whom they can enter into meaningful partnerships, especially in the 
stabilization and transitional phases before elections. The parties emerging out of conflict 
typically represent ambiguous constituencies, and there are often conflicting claims of 
ownership and support. Engagement by external actors with internal post-war actors may 
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reinforce the fault-lines of the war and strengthen warlords at the expense of civilian leaders, 
ultimately undermining the peace process.214  
Internal actors also generally lack the time, resources, technical expertise and support systems 
needed to engage meaningfully with external actors. In fact, the concept of ‘fragile states’ was 
initially developed in the donor context to refer to countries where the government is unable or 
unwilling to establish a meaningful relationship with bilateral and multilateral donors.215  
Internal actors often feel intimidated by the momentum, scope and depth of an external 
intervention. They are overwhelmed by the pressure to engage with all the assessments, 
proposals and plans generated by the sudden influx of external actors. Moreover, they feel 
frustrated that, despite all this activity, there is typically little to show, in terms of clear peace 
dividends in the first few years of a peace process, for their time and effort. This is especially 
the case in the stabilization and transitional phases, before or while the necessary capacities 
have been developed/ are developing, but it can remain a problem long afterwards.216  
External actors also point to the dysfunction caused by their own institutional cultures that 
emphasize output rather than long-term sustainable impact, as discussed above. Pressures to 
respond rapidly, achieve planned outputs and to disburse funds within fixed time-frames (like 
annual donor budget-cycles) often lead external actors to compromise on the time and resources 
needed to invest in identifying credible internal counterparts, to generate consultative processes 
and develop meaningful local ownership. Consultations undertaken under pressure, for instance 
during rapid needs assessments, often serve to legitimize preconceived perceptions rather than 
adding value by generating independent and objective opinions and analysis: they thus fail to 
reflect the true needs and priorities of the internal actors. Under pressure from the 
internal/external power imbalance, internal actor representatives may make the common 
mistake of telling the external actors what they think the external agents would like to hear – 
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rather than sharing with them their own perceptions and opinions as to the kind of support they 
think they need, and the priorities as they perceive them.  
Hence, external actors tend sometimes to deny the existence of enormous differences in power 
and influence ‒ like seeing oneself as merely a ‘technical’ adviser, whereas in reality the local 
actors may have only a marginal say in the priorities, content and pace of the programmes being 
implemented. Drafting of laws, for instance, is often conducted by external experts who ignore 
the fact that those who are to implement the legislation neither know it nor have a feeling of 
ownership or understanding of it.217 This approach on the part of the external actors also 
indicates a further attitude: that international norms and standards by default trump domestic 
legitimacy. 218  Poverty reduction strategies and comprehensive peacebuilding strategies are 
often based on standardized templates, not on country-specific and needs-based analyses.219 
The lack of accountability of external actors towards the local population is another challenge 
that may undermine the sustainability of a peace process. This applies not only to extreme cases 
of criminal behaviour by e.g. peacekeepers, but also to the fact that powerful SRSGs, Special 
Envoys, Troop Commanders and Police Commissioners report to their headquarters in New 
York, Brussels or elsewhere ‒ but not to the host-nation capital. That may undermine local 
ownership over time, even if ‘things get done’ in the short term. In the worst case, these 
tendencies may be described as neo-colonial ‘empire lite’ or as ‘empires in denial’.220 
One of the most critical aspects of the comprehensive approach is thus the role of the internal 
actors and the degree of coherence that can be achieved between the external actors and the 
local actors. Yet, internal actors are often ignored in the context of comprehensive approach. 
On the one hand, it is clear that no peace process can succeed without local ownership. On the 
other hand ‒ whether during the conflict phase, in the immediate post-conflict phase and often 
even beyond ‒ some key local stakeholders may either be engaged in the conflict or be overt or 
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covert spoilers in the peace process. Under such circumstances it would be counterproductive 
to include them in a comprehensive approach.  
The internal–external relationship is arguably the most important one in an intervention. 
External actors usually intervene to engage internal actors, and success is measured largely in 
terms of the impact the interveners have on the internal society (political, economic, social). 
These engagements can be direct and forceful, or indirect and discreet, but these engagements 
and relationship are in any case at the core of an intervention. I return to this in developing the 




This chapter has sought to shed light on coherence – and how coherence has come to be 
regarded as a key ingredient for success in today’s international interventions. To get a better 
understanding of coherence and comprehensive approach I offered a taxonomy of various 
relationships: four types of relationships and six degrees of coherence. Of these, the various 
inter-agency relations appear the most relevant for military–civilian relations (but not 
exclusively). Lastly, the chapter has discussed some of the obstacles that restrict the prospects 
of coherence: output vs. impact; conflicting mandates and values; and internal/external 
imbalance. These are examples – the list of challenges could have been extended.   
We have seen that many interventions suffer from poor coordination, training, organization and 
systems. Some of this can be addressed through improved coherence. However, there appears 
to be less room for coherence than generally acknowledged in policy debates. The latter often 
set ambitious targets for coherence that are impossible to achieve in practice, because of the 
inherent contradictions in the mandates, interests and value systems of some actors. The degree 
to which these actors can be coherent with each other is therefore limited. In short, it seems that 
coherence is not a good in and of itself to be pursued in equal measure, in all circumstances, by 
all stakeholders. It is a context-specific function aimed at managing interdependencies – and 
those interdependencies change from situation to situation. The level of coherence achievable 
in one situation will not necessarily be achievable in the next one.  
Nevertheless, from a principled point of view, all the challenges discussed in this chapter – 
short-term vs. long-term results, conflicting values, principles and mandates, and the internal-
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external power imbalance – are social and political in nature. They may be deep-rooted, but in 
theory they can all be negotiated, and trade-offs and compromises be found. But, as pointed out, 
the form and kind of differences will vary significantly from intervention to intervention, 
depending largely on whether there are conflicts between intervening actors, or the nature of 
these, in intervention X and not in intervention Y. That means that an analysis of the challenges 
related to achieving coherence must take the social and political circumstances into account. 
We cannot base an understanding on inductively generated categories of challenges – such as 
those discussed here – that are assumed to be valid across several cases. We need a different 
approach. As argued further in Chapter 5, we need an analytical framework which can be 
applied to all interventions, but which may yield different answers in each case, depending on 
the circumstances:  the nature of the conflict, the intervening actors involved, etc.  
This chapter also has shown the complex and highly political relationships in an intervention. 
This applies to all: peace- and state-builders, diplomats and UN staff, and others. Intervening 
actors, despite their varying mandates and objectives, are all political actors. They intervene 
with a vision of change and with power and tools to implement this – sometimes with success, 
sometimes not. Power and politics are therefore constants in interventions. Consequently, 
coherence cannot be assessed without taking this into account: there may be resistance and 
conflict or cooperation and progress, but they are all political power struggles.  
One possible exception to this are the humanitarian actors, as mentioned.  I discuss this 
particular humanitarian claim – of being above politics – in Chapter 4, as it requires deeper 
scrutiny. Are humanitarian actors really apolitical, and do they need to be treated analytically 
differently from the political actors?  
To some extent, this chapter has also ignored another crucial actor in interventions – indeed, 
the most central one in this dissertation: the military. On the one hand, the military is a political 
actor like the rest, and may therefore not require separate treatment. But the aim of this 
dissertation is to find out how we can understand the challenging relationship between the 
military and the civilian actors as regards achieving coherence. It is not limited to mapping the 
challenges in general – as I have done in this chapter. We therefore need to develop a better 
understanding of the military. The various forms of political challenges discussed in this chapter 
will – presumably – be affected differently depending on how the military actors in the 
interventions operates. We therefore need to nuance and discuss the category ‘military’. 
Depending on the nature of the intervention, military actors will differ significantly in terms of 
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mandates, resources and doctrines, from conventional peacekeeping to robust counter-
insurgencies.  
The next chapter will seek to find out more precisely what today’s military interventions share 
and what differentiates them, by comparing the UN peacekeeping and the US counter-
insurgency doctrines. Are there similarities between them which we can generalize to get a 
better understanding of how they operate in an intervention? In my view, these two military 
approaches may have more in common than often perceived. And that means that we should 
not assume a priori that military–civilian relations will be less conflictual in the UN context 










The Military Dimension:  





The previous chapter gave us a general overview and taxonomy of the various constellations 
between the actors in an intervention, and discussed some of the most challenging obstacles to 
achieving coherence. With this in mind, it is time to return to what is usually the most dominant 
actor in an intervention: the armed forces. To assess the challenges related to military-civilian 
coherence, we need to understand the military component better. In most cases the military is a 
dominant actor. It tends to be the largest intervening actor in terms of number of personnel, 
equipment and physical manifestation. Its use of force/threat of force makes it the most intrusive 
element in an intervention, with the most visible impact on the ground. The heavy vehicles, 
uniforms and fortified camps all contribute to the image of a strong and dominant actor. 
However, there are also clear differences as regards intervening military actors. A forced 
intervention, such as the US invasion of Iraq, is hardly comparable to a UN lightly armed 
ceasefire-monitoring mission. The impact on the people, society and infrastructure will 
obviously be very different. That makes it problematic to generalize about ‘the military’ in 
interventions, without taking account of the mandate, mission or political context.  
Since the 1990s, intervening armed forces have been conducting traditional ceasefire-
monitoring and peacekeeping operations (as in Lebanon), more robust stabilization operations 
(e.g., Bosnia, DRC, Sudan), counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations (Afghanistan 
and Iraq), offensive operations without ground forces (Kosovo, Libya) and with ground forces, 
including invasion and occupation (Iraq).221 Traditional lightly armed UN ceasefire-monitoring 
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missions have become rare,222 as most interventions today involve a relatively robust military 
component. Also, with the exception of the offensive phase of forced interventions (such as in 
Afghanistan and Iraq), the military and the civilians have been parts of the larger post-conflict 
stabilization efforts in all these interventions. 223  Arguably, all operations after an intense 
combat phase share some features. Today’s peacekeeping, stabilization operations and counter-
insurgency operations all seek to preserve the status quo, support incumbent authorities, protect 
a fragile peace, or to prevent violence from re-erupting. Of course there are important 
differences between impartial peacekeepers and stabilization forces and external counter-
insurgency forces (to which I return below) – but they share a certain commonality in terms of 
operational context. In short, most military interventions since the 1990s are – to some extent 
– comparable. 
This chapter undertakes such a comparison to find out more precisely what today’s military 
interventions share and what differentiates them. Are there similarities between them which we 
can generalize to get a better understanding of how they operate in an intervention as well as 
their relationship to other actors – local and intervening ones? To answer this I will analyse and 
compare what are often regarded as two opposing ends on the spectrum of the use of military 
force: namely peacekeeping, and counter-insurgency (COIN). The former has traditionally 
rested on three core principles: impartiality, consent by the parties and use of force in self-
defence only. Peacekeeping typically presupposes a peace agreement and consent from the 
warring parties, and hence a minimum need for the use of force by the peacekeepers. COIN 
operations, by contrast, are situated in a war-like situation, where significant force is used to 
counter the attacks from insurgents that are attempting to topple the authorities. In practice, 
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however, the two concepts may share several features, as we shall see, the difference between 
UN and COIN may not be that significant. Military-civilian relations may be just as tense in the 
UN context as in other interventions. It is the nature of each mission will determine how 
‘political’ a UN or a COIN operation will be regarded by the host population.  
As discussed in the Chapter 1, various military concepts have been developed for ‘irregular’ 
wars. I focus on COIN here because the two largest military interventions of recent years, Iraq 
and Afghanistan, officially adopted COIN as their doctrine or guiding principle in the phase 
following the initial intervention. COIN is therefore the most manifest and concrete expression 
of the kind of warfare in which interveners engage, beside peacekeeping and stabilization 
The chapter explores these questions by comparing the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO)’s ‘Capstone Doctrine’ and the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 
as well as related theoretical and field experience-based literature. It also draws on some recent 
developments in UN missions. For simplicity, I refer to the two as ‘the COIN doctrine’ and ‘the 
UN doctrine’. 
Through a comparative reading of the two doctrines I will demonstrate that there are important 
similarities between the two concepts. In today’s irregular wars, where criminals, so-called 
spoilers 224 and ideological extremists represent the main security threat, both the idea of a 
neutral impartial peacekeeper and the idea of a traditional military victory have been largely 
eradicated.225 As a result, the two concepts face many of the same challenges vis-à-vis host 
nation representatives and civilian intervening actors.  
To simplify comparison, I have classified the similarities along six dimensions:  
• the focus on civilian – not military – solutions  
• stress on the need for protection of civilians 
• the need for international coherence (unity of effort, integrated approach)  
• the importance of host-nation ownership 
• the use of intelligence in support of operations 
• acknowledgement of the limitations of the use of force. 
                                                 
224 Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, in International Conflict Resolution after the 
Cold War, eds Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 2000), 178–224. 




I have identified these dimensions by comparing the two doctrines, by a careful reading of their 
respective emphasis and priorities, as well as their implementation in the missions.  As I also 
will point out, there are still important differences between COIN operations and UN operations, 
in terms of mandates, political foundation, equipment, rules of engagement etc. However, the 
trend is towards greater convergence of these concepts, not divergence. The UN is becoming 
increasingly robust – which is why it merits closer scrutiny. However, this chapter is primarily 
about how, not why: it is about comparing military doctrines and operations, not the mandates 
and political motivations that have triggered the military operations. Hence, in the following I 
will discuss each of doctrines along these same six comparable dimensions and thereby 
demonstrate both similarities and the most significant differences.    
 
2. The COIN Doctrine 
 
The US experience of facing insurgencies after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan forced a 
need to rethink the traditional doctrines. Neither conventional war-fighting doctrines nor the 
stabilization doctrines of the 1990s were adequate for countering the violent insurgencies in 
these countries. Old lessons were taken off the shelf and re-read. As always in military 
theorizing, COIN was nothing new. There had been insurgencies and counter-insurgency 
operations in China, Algeria, Indochina, 226  as well in Malaysia and Vietnam, 227  and the 
architects the COIN doctrine drew on the lessons learnt there. John Kiszely described the 
challenge in this way:  
…war and peace are not easily delineated; ‘defeat’ and ‘victory’ require definition. The 
enemy is not obvious, nor easily identifiable, literally or figuratively, and may change 
on an almost-daily basis; success depends not on destruction of the enemy, but on out-
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manoeuvring opponents – in particular depriving them of popular support, and winning 
it oneself.228 
The most cited publication of the COIN doctrine is the US Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual, adopted in 2006.229 The adoption of the doctrine was in itself 
a result of, and was highly flavoured by, the Iraq experiences of several of its authors, including 
General David H. Petraeus, who later became commander of the NATO forces in Afghanistan. 
Many Western states and NATO have since followed suit, developing new doctrines230 and 
redesigning the setup of their troops. The relatively ‘soft’ approach of stability operations of 
the 1990s (limited use of armour, helmets or heavy weapons) was replaced with more robust 
and agile forces with more firepower.  
‘Insurgency’ is usually defined as a form of irregular warfare – typically an internal conflict 
where the insurgents seek to topple the incumbent government (including colonizers or 
occupying forces). Although this is an internal struggle, regional repercussions are common. 
Neighbouring countries may, for instance, serve as sanctuaries for the insurgents, or as 
supporter of one of the sides. Some early theorizing defined insurgency as ‘revolutionary 
war’,231 but this is less common today. But insurgency is about regime change, since the 
objective is to topple a government.232 This makes the political dimension crucial: the armed 
efforts of an insurgency are in support of the political objective. The aim may not be to win in 
military terms, but to make the authorities lose. By, for instance, provoking the latter to over-
react and apply indiscriminate use of force, the insurgents may try to make the population turn 
against the government. Discrediting the opponent is more important than winning on the 
battlefield. Furthermore, by being seen as supportive of the civilian population, by providing 
assistance and needs, the insurgents build support for their own cause. Typically, insurgents 
have limited resources and need time to build momentum. This means that insurgencies may 
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turn into lengthy wars, a point which also tends to play to the advantage of the insurgents. The 
population may grow increasingly frustrated with lack of stability and blame the incumbent 
authorities. The inability to prevail militarily against insurgents has often also frustrated 
conventional armies. 
Given the nature of insurgency, the counter-insurgents have had to rethink their conceptual 
approach as well. Firstly, it is recognized that armed force is of relatively less relevance to settle 
such conflicts. The military is but one of several lines of efforts working towards the same 
political objective: to quell and defeat the insurgency. Thus, restraint in the use of violence may 
at times serve the political purpose better than overwhelming firepower. It is the immediate, 
tactical-level, political effects of the use of force that matter. This is because the battle often 
takes place in populated areas, ‘amongst the people’ as retired British General Rupert Smith 
described it.233 It is a low-intensity war and civilians have not fled the battlefield: the two 
adversaries face each other in villages and urban centres. Not only may excessive use of force 
prove inefficient, it may also backfire, with the population turning against the counter-
insurgents. As we shall see below, this political-contextual awareness is incorporated in the 
COIN doctrine.  
Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl summarize some of the main tenets of COIN this way: ‘Focus on 
protecting civilians over killing the enemy; assume greater risk; use minimum, not maximum 
force’.234 Furthermore, they (and the doctrine itself) stress several paradoxes that distinguish 
COIN from many traditional military doctrines: ‘Some of the best weapons do not shoot; 
sometimes the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be; the hosts doing 
something tolerably is often better than foreigners doing it well; sometimes the more force is 
used, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.’235 All this points 
towards less use of force; to political rather than military processes; and to local ownership.  
In the following, I discuss five core elements of the COIN doctrine that all stem from these 
basic preconditions: the importance of civilian primacy and the protection of civilians; the need 
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for coherence and unity of effort; the importance of host-nation ownership; the role of 
intelligence; and the need for restrictive use of force.  
 
2.1. Civilian primacy and protection of civilians 
The COIN doctrine defines an insurgency as ‘an organized movement aimed at the overthrow 
of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict’.236 Counter-
insurgency is thus conducted by the authorities to defend their institutions and political system. 
International actors engaged in a theatre would under most circumstances be there to support 
the host nation. 237  Further, the doctrine states: ‘political power is the central issue in 
insurgencies and counter-insurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance 
or authority as legitimate’.238 
The ‘centre of gravity’– defined as ‘the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, 
freedom of action, or will to act’239 – is therefore the protection of the civilian population in 
COIN, as opposed to military strength, as in many traditional military doctrines. This turns the 
driving momentum upside–down. From chasing the enemy, the focus is shifted to building 
political support for the host authorities. As a result, there are no military solutions to a COIN 
campaign, only part-solutions. According to one of the most known analysts of COIN, David 
Galula, a COIN strategy is 80% civilian and 20% military.240 The military, according to the 
COIN doctrine, cannot win the war in traditional sense, by eliminating or entirely pacifying the 
enemy. All it can achieve is to control the situation by suppressing the insurgents to such an 
extent that others (civilians) can build a positive peace process. 
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This approach is often summarized in the maxim ‘clear–hold–build’. The military is to clear an 
area of insurgents, then hold the territory and keep it safe, while civilian actors are supposed to 
build/secure a sustainable peace by providing the population with essential services and 
assistance in reconstruction and development. Through this, host-nation authorities are 
expected to be enabled to expand their authority and support to new regions previously 
controlled by the insurgents. Although written by the military, the COIN literature downplays 
the role of the military, recognizing that military efforts are likely to fail unless civilian actors 
think and operate along the same lines. If nobody is there to ‘build’ after the military ‘clearing’ 
operation, it may end up as a waste of resources, lives and money.  
However, a serious challenge has been the absence of an overarching civilian strategic 
framework from which such a doctrine could naturally emerge. In a sense this is a ‘bottom–up’ 
contribution to a more comprehensive strategic COIN approach, put in place while waiting for 
the civilian departments and agencies to follow suit (or so it is hoped). In Sarah Sewall’s words, 
‘the doctrine is a moon without a planet to orbit’.241 The missing planet is a strategic partnership 
between civilian and military interveners, as well as between internal (in the doctrine, termed 
‘host-nation’) and external (intervening) actors. Without a successful ‘build’ and ‘hold’, the 
‘clear’ will usually be futile. Furthermore, for COIN to be sustainable, one would assume that 
local authorities would need to do the build-up, as foreign actors lack the necessary trust, 
knowledge, skillset and cultural awareness to do so. And they tend to leave. None of this is 
much discussed in the doctrine – whereas, as I return to in Chapter 6, practice both Iraq and 
Afghanistan demonstrated these challenges in practice.  
Despite these shortcomings, the protection of civilians is highlighted as a critical element of 
COIN. Persistent physical presence among the population is recommended in the ‘hold’ phase: 
‘…living among the population in small groups, staying in villages overnight for months at a 
time…it’s the only way to protect the population effectively’.242 By protecting the people, 
legitimacy, support and valuable intelligence may follow. Strikingly, though, while the centre 
of gravity is the civilian population, and the operationalization is the protection of civilians, this 
is not based on any moral imperative of protection of human rights or notions of human security, 
as in the UN context, as we shall see below. It is a means to an end: the end being to reduce 
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popular support of the insurgence and thereby prevail in the political fight. Moving the focus 
from the enemy to the population is nonetheless a fundamental aspect of COIN: ‘military 
effectiveness is not limited by taking protection [of civilians] into consideration; it is based 
upon it’.243 It does represent a significant shift compared to traditional warfare.  
 
2.2. Coherence – Unity of Effort 
Stemming logically from the focus on the civilian primacy, the doctrine particularly stresses 
the need for ‘Unity of Effort’. Integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful 
COIN operations, it claims, acknowledging also the value of ‘political, social and economic 
programmes’ in addressing ‘root causes of conflict’.244 Through what are described as Logical 
Lines of Operations (LLOs) (governance, essential services, economic development etc.), the 
various instruments of power are to be coordinated (see Figure 1). A COIN operation therefore 
involves all these aspects; and it is stressed that successful achievement of the end-state (popular 
support for the authorities) requires careful coordination of actions undertaken along all LLOs. 
COIN operations are described as a rope, where all the LLOs are the individual strings that 
comprise the rope. COIN refers therefore not only to military operations, but to the whole range 
of activities aimed at working towards the same political goal. 
The need for a complex and comprehensive COIN doctrine was stressed by General David W. 
Barno, in his summary of his 2003–2005 experience in Afghanistan.245 The COIN strategy 
which he led was based on a Unity of Purpose model consisting of five pillars: defeating 
terrorism and denying sanctuary; enabling Afghan security structures; sustaining area 
ownership; enabling reconstruction and good governance; and engaging regional states. The 
centre of gravity was defined as the Afghan people. His success, according to Barno himself, 
was due to close integration with US civilians (the embassy), but also to an open approach to 
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international and host-nation actors in developing the strategy. The setbacks since 2005, he 
argues, were due largely to the high turnover of leadership and the loss of unity of effort.246  
On the basis of his Iraq experience, General Petraeus stresses how ‘everyone must do nation 
building’. 247  He explains how it would have been impossible to carry out large-scale 
reconstruction, like re-opening a huge university, without the support of the military and all the 
relevant host-nation ministries. Connected to this is also his observation that one must ‘help 
build institutions, not just units’ – ministries, administration and logistics, education systems 
etc. Whether the military itself is best suited to undertake such nation-building is contested 
within the military ranks and among civilian intervening actors.248 But the idea that the soldiers 
contribute to a larger effort and do not possess the sole key to victory is nonetheless conveyed. 
The COIN doctrine is not very developed when it comes to understanding the multinational 
environment in the theatre. The UN and other organizations are mentioned, but not 
systematically included in the doctrine. The Unity of Effort is primarily a US-Whole of 
Government approach; the other actors typically present in the field – NGOs, coalition partners, 
international organizations and developmental agencies – are not addressed systematically. 
Some scholars, such as retired US Marine Bing West, reject the idea that if the ‘government 
dispensed to a population projects, money, and free services – along with security – then the 
people would reciprocate by rejecting an insurgency’s cause, be it political, religious, or 
nationalistic’.249 He argues that it was the bottom–up soldiering that worked in Iraq: physical 
presence in local communities, partnering and patrolling created success among the Sunni tribes 
– not nation-building, sewage construction, governance or gifts. This is a valid point, which 
strikes at the heart of the Unity of Effort logic. Civilian efforts often yield results (contribute to 
peace) decades after they are initiated, possibly long after the intervening troops have left. This 
does not need to imply that coordination, coherence and communication with civilians is 
                                                 
246 The degree of ‘success’ in the early years of the Afghanistan operation is contested, however. See e.g. Rashid, 
Descent into Chaos. 
 
247 David H. Petraeus, ‘Learning from Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq’, Military 
Review 86, no. 1 (2006), 2–12. 
 
248 I return to this point in subsequent chapters, but for criticisms from within the military sector, see for instance 
West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq; West, ‘Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Iraq’, Military Review 89, no. 2 (2009), 2–12. 
249 ‘Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq’, 6. 
 83 
 
unnecessary – merely that military doctrines that rely on achievements in the civilian sectors to 
achieve their own ends may fail.250  
But again, regarding the civilian dimensions as crucial elements of the very same rope is a 
relatively new element in US military doctrine. While the doctrine fails to engage the full 
spectrum of civilian actors in an intervention, and involves some naïve assumptions about how 
development can create peace, it nevertheless makes the military reader aware of the importance 
of other actors in the field, and that engagement on the local level is crucial. 
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Figure 2. Example of COIN LLOs 
 
Source: U.S. Army, The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual, FM 3-07. Ann Arbor: University 





2.3. Host-nation ownership 
The observation that peace, security and development tend to be more sustainable if not simply 
imposed from the outside is nothing new, and is central also in the COIN doctrine. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, ‘local ownership’ has over the years become a widely acknowledged 
precondition for sustainability in external interventions.251 Also within the security sector the 
same logic is applied, including in the COIN doctrine. Realizing that the outsiders cannot win 
a COIN operation, the doctrine puts considerable emphasis on the host nation, the security 
forces in particular. To have success in COIN, the host nation is must ‘…defeat insurgents or 
render them irrelevant, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level of essential services 
and security for the populace’.252 The host nation’s security forces are thus a crucial element in 
the success of a COIN operation; and an important part of the COIN doctrine is devoted to the 
training and support of these, including the military, police, correction personnel and border 
guards. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the training and equipping of local security forces gradually 
became the major task of the international forces. The COIN doctrine is nonetheless rather 
narrow, as it does not consider the wider security apparatus. The judiciary and the rule of law 
in general are not mentioned, nor are human security aspects such as human rights. The doctrine 
focuses on what the armed forces can deliver, apparently assuming that others will take care of 
the rest.  
This strategy follows logically from the focus on the political aspect of the struggle, and 
experiences like the ‘the host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing 
it well.’253 After all, the COIN doctrine is primarily about supporting authorities that are being 
challenged in a weak state. Also General Petraeus stresses the importance of local ownership. 
‘Do not try to do too much with your own hands’, he urges, underlining the importance of host-
nation involvement. ‘Empowering Iraqis to do the job themselves has, in fact, become the 
essence of our strategy’, he goes on to say, adding that ‘more important than our winning Iraqi 
hearts and minds was doing all that we could to ensure that as many Iraqis as possible felt a 
stake in the success of the new Iraq’. Furthermore, ‘…we began asking, when considering new 
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initiatives, projects, or programmes, whether they would help increase the number of Iraqis who 
felt they had a stake in the country’s success’.254 However, in Afghanistan it proved far from 
simple to achieve local ownership in practice. COM ISAF, General S.A. McChrystal, attempted 
to implement his version of COIN in 2010 by, inter alia, introducing what he called ‘a 
government in a box’ in the city of Marjah after the coalition forces had cleared it of Taliban 
fighters.255 This ‘box’ consisted of a group of Afghans who were to build civilian governance 
instead of the Taliban. This venture was reported as a ‘flop’ and criticized for being naïve and 
doomed to fail, as the US-supported civilians lacked local legitimacy as well.256 Furthermore, 
as we shall see in Chapter 6, the overwhelming dominance of the intervening parties in terms 
of resources, money and political agendas, made local ownership almost impossible to achieve. 
In addition, as the central government was often seen as illegitimate, corrupt and incapable of 
providing the population with security and essential services on the local level, the very idea of 
local ownership proved hard to implement.257 
 
2.4. Intelligence-supported operations 
Intelligence is a cornerstone of the COIN doctrine. An entire chapter is dedicated to it in FM 3-
24, where it is stated that counter-insurgency is  
…an intelligence-driven endeavor. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate 
understanding of the operational environment, with emphasis on the populace, host 
nation, and insurgents.  […] Intelligence in COIN is about people. U.S. forces must 
understand the people of the host nation, the insurgents, and the host-nation (HN) 
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government. Commanders and planners require insight into cultures, perceptions, 
values, beliefs, interests and decision-making processes of individuals and groups.258 
Whereas intelligence is important in any military operation, its focus in COIN is different from 
traditional military doctrine. The attention is less on the capabilities and intensions of the 
adversary, and more on a broader understanding of the cultural terrain and the civilian 
population where the operation takes place. Cultural awareness and local understanding are 
crucial when the campaign objective concerns the political leanings of the population. 
Knowledge of the concerns, attitudes and values of this population is of utmost importance. 
That means that the intelligence needs to focus not only on the insurgents but on the entire 
population and the relevant area, which may include neighbouring states. This all follows 
logically when the ‘centre of gravity’ is transferred from the enemy to the wider population. 
However, it also requires different kinds of skills and approaches on the part of the intelligence 
community when the focus shifts from the ‘order of battle’ of the adversary to the socio-cultural 
terrain of the operation.  
To implement this, the US Army introduced the Human Terrain System (HTS) in 2006 to 
‘address cultural awareness shortcomings at the operational and tactical levels’.259 The HTS 
was intended to ‘provide deployed brigade commanders and their staffs direct social-science 
support in the form of ethnographic and social research, and social data analysis…’260 through 
five-person Human Terrains Teams (HTT) embedded in a brigade staff. This effort at building 
contextual cultural awareness went beyond the traditional intelligence, as it engaged the entire 
military structure, and was not limited to security-related issues, as regular intelligence would 
be.  
The HTTs attracted considerable attention and were accused of being unethical and 
undermining the professional integrity of social scientists. The American Anthropological 
Association, for instance, expressed disapproval of anthropologists’ work in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, claiming that they were helping in ‘identifying and selecting specific populations as targets 
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of U.S. military operations’.261 Also some military commentators questioned the virtue of 
adding ‘a quick fix layer of social science expertise’ to the military organizations, arguing 
instead that the US doctrine (including COIN) mandated the US military to train and maintain 
organic cultural expertise. Irrespective of the specific model, the urgent need for cultural 
understanding was recognized in COIN. But in practice it proved challenging. As late as in 
2010, Flynn et al. argued that ‘because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority 
of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus 
still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we 
operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.’262 They recommended ‘sweeping 
changes to the way the intelligence community thinks about itself – from a focus on the enemy 
to a focus on the people of Afghanistan’.263  
Not only should intelligence be broader in scope in COIN, it should also be shared outside the 
military ranks as a part of the Unity of Effort:  
Knowledge of these organizations [non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, 
multinational forces, nongovernmental organizations, and HN organizations in the AO] 
is needed to establish working relationships and procedures for sharing information. 
These relationships and procedures are critical to developing a comprehensive common 
operational picture and enabling unity of effort.264 
Despite these intentions, the realities in the field were often very different. Intelligence sharing 
remained a sensitive issue, constrained by prejudices and legal obstacles. Non-military 
organizations often complained that they felt they provided information, without receiving 
anything of relevance in return, like threat assessments.  
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But the very fact that the intention of sharing was stated in the doctrine indicates a new way of 
thinking. It was recognized that success in a COIN campaign hinged on a wide range of socio-
economic intelligence – and that improved liaison and communication with civilian actors were 
a necessity to this end. 
All in all, good intelligence and cultural awareness in COIN reduce the need for use of force, 
by indicating alternative routes to achieve the goals. Furthermore, they assist in improved 
targeting when forces are used, thus reducing collateral casualties. Basic knowledge of local 
customs also helps to avoid unnecessarily alienating the population, for example when house 
searches are conducted. In this context the introduction of the HTTs represented important 
recognition of the significance of contextual understanding for the armed forces. Despite these 
insights, it proved challenging to implement in practice, due to resistance from within and 
outside the military ranks. But this seems to be more a struggle over how to compile information 
and by whom – not disagreement over the crucial importance of such information for a COIN 
operation. 
 
2.5. Restrictive use of force 
Lastly, the doctrine stresses the importance of applying appropriate levels of force. Given the 
potentially severe consequences of collateral damage, it notes paradoxes like ‘sometimes the 
more force is used, the less effective it is’; or ‘sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction’. 
These may seem counter-intuitive, but are reflective of the political nature and the true centre 
of gravity of the mission.265 The need to keep in sight the longer-term goal of gaining political, 
rather than military, victory is clear in statements such as: ‘An operation that kills five 
insurgents is counter-productive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more 
insurgents’.266 It is thus acknowledged that collateral damage is far more damaging here than 
in traditional warfare, because the focus has shifted from victory over the enemy forces to 
winning over the host population. This was a difficult doctrinal shift for Western forces, the US 
military in particular, as the deeply ingrained doctrine of using overwhelming force against the 
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enemy, to ensure maximum force protection, had to be overcome at the tactical level, in every 
encounter.  
Whereas traditional military doctrines have often advocated large-scale ‘sweeps’ thorough use 
of kinetic means to shock the enemy, such tactics are not advised in the COIN doctrine. 
Similarly, traditional ‘battle damage assessment’ and body counts are no longer considered 
suitable for measuring progress. Here the use of air strikes is particularly cautioned against, as 
‘inappropriate or indiscriminate use of air strikes can erode popular support and fuel insurgent 
propaganda’.267 Since the objective in COIN is defined as to increase popular support for the 
host-nation authorities, it is the perceptions of the population that define progress.268 Losses 
inflicted on the insurgents are an indication of success only to the extent that they have a bearing 
on the perceptions of the local population.  
Again, the practice in Afghanistan proved challenging. What is an appropriate level of force? 
At what times should restraint be shown, and when not? Troops under fire tend to respond with 
whatever weapons they have at hand – it is, after all, a matter of personal survival in the midst 
of combat. As a result, some critics have voiced dissatisfaction with the idea of restraint, and 
argued for a return to a focus on incapacitating the enemy.269 The restrictive use of force is 
perhaps the area where the COIN doctrine differs the most from other doctrines of offensive 
warfare, and is also apparently an area where practice has not always matched theory.  
To summarize, the COIN doctrine contains several aspects that seem to alter war-fighting 
somehow. First and foremost, it is focused more on the immediate, tactical-level political effects, 
as these often also are strategic effects. Actual practice has often differed from the doctrine, as 
will always be the case. Nonetheless the explicit attempt by Western powers to tune their armed 
forces in the direction of the COIN doctrine indicates a renewed understanding of insurgencies 
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and irregular wars. As we shall see, also the UN has responded to the changed security 
landscape, albeit from the opposite position towards a more assertive use of force.  
 
 
3. The UN Doctrine 
 
UN peacekeeping underwent dramatic changes after the end of the Cold War. According to 
Bellamy and Williams, there was ‘a triple transformation’ in the 1990s: UN peacekeeping 
changed quantitative, qualitative as well as normative ways.270 Quantitatively it transformed 
by deploying a vast number of new missions. Between 1988 and 1993 alone, more troops were 
deployed than in the previous forty years and twenty new missions deployed. In qualitative 
terms peacekeeping evolved by beginning to take upon itself new and complex tasks – state-
building, local peace-making, etc.271 The normative change came through the predominantly 
Western promotion of a post-Westphalian world order – a world where universal human rights 
trump national sovereignty. 272  Associated with this was also the liberal-democratic peace 
theorem, that building democracy is the best bulwark against the recurrence of violence after 
civil wars.273  
As a result of new demands for peacekeepers (inter alia with the end of many conflicts that had 
been fuelled by the Cold War) and a new willingness to mandate operations and to provide 
troops (with a more permissive Security Council and greater global media attention to conflicts), 
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UN peacekeeping gradually evolved towards a more assertive role. 274  The new era was 
accompanied by the seminal report An Agenda for Peace, released by UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992.275 The report called for new resources to meet the new tasks, 
but otherwise reflected the optimistic spirit of the times in terms of the potential the UN now 
possessed. Peacekeeping was no longer restricted to Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) 
of the UN Charter, but begun to invoke Chapter VII (Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches 
of the Peace and Acts of Aggression), which provides a legal basis for more affirmative resolve 
on the part of the peacekeepers.  
However, the setbacks came early. Failures in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-
Herzegovina from 1992–1995 dealt a blow to the optimistic tone represented by the Agenda for 
Peace report. Although Somalia was primarily a US failure, and the genocides in Rwanda and 
Srebrenica can be blamed only partly on the UN (the gap between mandate and available 
resources was a Security Council member-state responsibility), these catastrophic events led 
many states to lose their appetite for peacekeeping.276 Lack of political will to equip forces, 
inadequate funds and limited institutional capacity in the UN were among the reasons for the 
failures, making the Security Council more reluctant to authorize new missions.277 In 1993 there 
were 70 000 peacekeepers globally, while in 1996 the number was down to less than 20 000.278 
Despite this setback, the main lesson learned for the UN was not to withdraw from 
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peacekeeping or to go ‘back to basics’, but to engage more firmly in the protection of civilians 
and in forceful implementation of mandates.279  
UN peacekeeping in the 2000s was to be influenced by another seminal text, generally known 
as the Brahimi Report.280 This report was the conclusion of a study conducted by a panel of 
experts tasked with identifying the main weaknesses of UN peace operations and providing 
concrete recommendations. Perhaps the most important contribution was the introduction of an 
explicit distinction between neutrality and impartiality. While the three core principles of 
peacekeeping were reaffirmed (impartiality, consent by the parties, use of force in self-defence 
only), the report also stated that impartiality meant ‘adherence to the principles of the [UN] 
Charter’. Neutrality on the other hand, was defined as ‘equal treatment of all parties in all cases 
for all time’.281 Hence, peacekeepers did not need to be neutral, only impartial – meaning they 
could ‘use force against those who act against their mandates and the “Charter principles” on 
which they are based’.282  
Furthermore, ‘In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors 
and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally 
compelled to do so.’283 Hence, peacekeepers should no longer be passive bystanders when 
massive violations of human rights or crimes against humanity took place in their vicinity. In 
practice, though, this was far from straightforward. As Hikaru Yamashita puts it, this ‘new 
impartiality’ was an attempt to find ‘a principle for forcible action without undermining 
equidistance’.284 How can force be used against one of the parties, without simultaneously 
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undermining the core principle of consent? As we shall see below, this dilemma is still far from 
resolved.  
The Brahimi Report made several other recommendations, inter alia on UN reform, mandates 
and resourcing, and became the bedrock for all peace operations in the following decade. As a 
result of these changes and the perceived success of several missions (Balkans, Timor-Leste, 
Burundi…), 285  the number of deployed personnel again increased steadily, reaching, as 
mentioned, a total of about  85 000 troops in 16 missions as of January 2017.286 Many of the 
new missions nonetheless remain within the traditional parameters of peacekeeping – ceasefire 
monitoring and similar – but the drift towards a more assertive and robust UN peacekeeping 
has been underway ever since the release of the Brahimi Report.287 In particular, peacekeepers 
have been mandated to use force for the protection of civilians as well as for implementing the 
mandate – both of which have been widely debated. I return to this below, but on a more general 
level it can be argued that the ‘new and assertive’ UN has been struggling partly with resource 
constraints, and partly with finding a strategic purpose for the use of force.288 The question of 
having sufficient and right resources has haunted the organization since the mid-1990s although 
the situation improved after the Brahimi Report. However, the absence of military strategy 
complicates mission command. When is ‘sufficient force’ applied? What shall it achieve in the 
longer run? When are civilians ‘adequately’ protected?  
This is particularly challenging in those of today’s missions with the most forceful mandates, 
which represent a kind of crescendo in the use of force in the UN context. The current mandates 
of the UN operations MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
MINUSMA in Mali, and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (CAR), are all far 
removed from the original peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and self-protection. 
In the DRC, after a very troublesome decade, the UN mission was authorized to establish a 
Force Intervention Brigade in 2013, mandated to ‘take all necessary measures’ to ‘neutralize’ 
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and ‘disarm’ groups that were posing a threat to ‘state authority and civilian security’.289 Troops 
from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi moved in and soon defeated one of the rebel groups.290 
Despite operational success, a whole range of other challenges and implication have emerged: 
for instance that the entire MONUSCO as a result changed status under International 
Humanitarian Law and became ‘a party to the conflict’,291 with all the political, legal and staff 
security-related aspects that implies. The mandates of MINUSMA and MINUSCA are not as 
offensive as MONUSCO, but nonetheless push UN peacekeeping away from the original three 
basic principles of peacekeeping. Currently the debate is whether this trend needs to be reversed 
or if the principles need to be revised.292 
 
3.1. The Capstone Doctrine 
The Brahimi Report also paved the way for the ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 
Principles and Guidelines’, widely but unofficially called the ‘Capstone Doctrine’.293 It sums 
up 60 years of peacekeeping and attempts to bring the basic foundations, principles and 
approaches into a singular document. Although missions have evolved since the publication of 
the Capstone Doctrine, many of the seeds of a new and more assertive UN can be discerned in 
this document. It is in many ways comparable to the COIN doctrine discussed above.  
In the spirit of the Brahimi Report, the doctrine defines peacekeeping as: 
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…a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been 
halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over 
the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing 
ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex 
model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay 
the foundations for sustainable peace.294 
The doctrine focuses on peacekeeping, explicitly distinguishing this from other activities 
conducted by the UN, such as conflict prevention, peace-making, peace enforcement and 
peacebuilding.295 It also distinguishes between peace operations, which are what others may do, 
and peacekeeping, which is the distinct activity that the UN undertakes according to its stated 
principles and doctrine. However, it acknowledges that the lines between these categories are 
blurred:  
While United Nations peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the 
implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an 
active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding 
activities. United Nations peacekeeping operations may also use force at the tactical 
level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend themselves and their 
mandate, particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and 
maintain public order.296 
Separating peacekeeping from peacebuilding and peace-making, or the tactical level from the 
strategic level, is not easy in practice. The labels tend to overlap, as witnessed in most UN 
missions deployed in recent decades. The end of war and beginning of peace are often processes 
that last for years.  
Let us now see what the Capstone Doctrine has to say on the same topics as discussed in 
connection with the COIN doctrine. 
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3.2. Civilian primacy  
The Capstone Doctrine focuses on ‘multi-dimensional’ peacekeeping operations: ‘These 
operations are typically deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and 
may employ a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of 
a comprehensive peace agreement.’297 The doctrine thereby envisages a broad role for today’s 
peacekeepers: 
a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to 
provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights; 
b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and 
supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; 
c)  Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international 
actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated 
manner.298 
 
Thus, multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations do much more than merely fill a power 
vacuum. It is generally acknowledged that today’s conflicts require a long-term peacebuilding 
commitment, and that a political settlement and political stability are core issues. As a result, 
greater attention has also been paid to the related areas of institution building and state 
building.299 
Hence, the doctrine also addresses key peacebuilding aspects, like ‘restoring the State’s ability 
to provide security and maintain public order’, ‘supporting the emergence of legitimate political 
institutions and participatory processes’, and ‘promoting social and economic recovery and 
development’, to mention just a few. UN peacekeeping missions have explicit roles in this 
endeavour: as with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants; 
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security sector reform (SSR) and other rule of law-related activities; electoral assistance and 
support to the restoration and extension of state authority.300 
All this reflects an incorporation of non-military tasks into the doctrine. The basic premise is 
that sustainable peace requires stability and security, but also a political process and a wide 
range of peacebuilding activities. Figure 3 illustrates the tasks. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Core Business of Multi-dimensional UN Peacekeeping Operations. 
 
Source: DPKO. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. New York: 
United Nations, 2008, p. 23 
 
Despite the different starting points, this illustration reveals significant similarities with the 
COIN illustration in Figure1. Both envisage a whole range of ‘tools’ tuned for achieving the 
same goal, and both recognize that a safe and secure environment (i.e. security) is only a part 
of a wider solution. The security sector (peacekeeping) must be integrated with, and supportive 
of, the overall political and peacebuilding process.  
 
                                                 
300 DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 25–26. 
 99 
 
3.3. Protection of Civilians 
Protection of civilians is a key principle of the UN doctrine. It is based on UN Security Council 
Resolution 1674 ‘On the protection of civilians in armed conflict’, and the subsequent follow-
up attention in the UN system.301 The background for Resolution 1674 itself may be traced back 
to the Rwanda and Srebrenica disasters, and how these experiences were interpreted in the 
Brahimi Report. Through its own painful experiences, the UN learnt that, despite the legality 
of the mandates issued to its missions by the UN Security Council, constraining its 
peacekeeping missions to act to protect civilians in these cases, the United Nations is held to a 
higher moral authority by the international community. It cannot retain international legitimacy 
while standing by when innocent civilians are being killed or harmed. These experiences, and 
the general ‘trend’ in contemporary conflicts whereby civilian populations are increasingly 
targeted, has resulted in a norm in UN peacekeeping, where ‘…most multi-dimensional United 
Nations peacekeeping operations are now mandated by the Security Council to protect civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence’.302  
In the UN context, the protection of civilians is a moral imperative. It is a reaffirmation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stressing the responsibilities of states towards their 
own populations, as well as the responsibility of a peacekeeping mission to look after those 
rights in a post-war situation. The motives for protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping 
operations thus differ from the motives for protection civilians as expressed in the COIN 
doctrine, in that the latter seeks to protect civilians as a means to an end (to win over the 
population, so as to win the war), while in the UN doctrine the protection of civilians is an end 
in and of itself.  
From the perspective of the population in a war-torn society, however, it does not matter much 
what the motivation for a specific action is, since legitimacy is established on the basis of how 
the international actors act on the ground. Viewed that way, the two doctrines may not differ 
that much for the population in question: improved security will normally be welcomed by the 
civilian population. Furthermore, the two doctrines share the understanding of the importance 
of the civilians in today’s conflicts. The protection of civilians is an integral part of the modern-
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day security complex: it is not only a question of deeds or actions, but is seen by both doctrines 
as the cornerstone of sustainable peace and security. 
 
3.4. Coherence – Integrated Approach 
In peacekeeping, as in COIN, inter-agency coherence is a central task. As discussed in Chapter 
1, this is not merely a question of resource management: it is recognized as a basic necessity. 
Without coordination, few if any actors are likely to achieve their objectives, it is held. For 
peacekeepers it is about laying the foundations for a sustainable peacebuilding process, through 
all the above-mentioned efforts. According to the UN Doctrine, ‘multi-dimensional United 
Nations peacekeeping operations also play a critical role in ensuring that the activities of the 
United Nations system and other international actors are guided by a common strategic 
vision’.303 However, there is little specification of how this should be done in practice.  
To find out about that, we must examine another UN-system initiative which emerged at more 
or less the same time: the ‘Integrated Approach’.304 The ‘Integrated Approach’ is largely about 
getting DPKO-led peacekeeping missions and other UN agencies deployed in the same field 
(the UN Country Team) to act with greater coherence. According to the Guidelines of the 
Secretary-General, ‘an integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared 
understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken 
at various stages of the recovery process’. 305  Organizationally, it has meant that the 
Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Resident Coordinator (RC) of the development 
agencies also are part of the peacekeeping mission structure, with the Deputy Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General (DSRSG/RC/HC). However, they have otherwise remained fully 
independent and have retained their organizational structure. Implementation of this model has 
varied from mission to mission, but the Integrated Approach has become a key principle in all 
UN missions. 
Nonetheless, whereas recent years have seen significant progress in this UN-internal 
coordination, the ambition that the UN should also take the lead in the coordination with other 
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actors in the field appears to have been implemented to a lesser degree. (The exception here is 
humanitarian coordination, where the UN coordination role has been established since 1991.) 
The tools and mechanism for doing so are less developed than the internal UN Integrated 
Approach process, and the doctrine is not very sophisticated as regards addressing the 
challenges related to such inter-agency coordination. Key questions like leadership, priorities, 
mediating conflicting mandates, level of ambition regarding coordination have remained 
unanswered.306  
That being said, the recognition that UN peacekeeping cannot be carried out in a vacuum, and 
that a comprehensive, multi-dimensional and integrated approach is required, closely resembles 
the similar stress in the COIN doctrine on civilian efforts to achieve the objectives. In practice, 
the UN appears to have developed this further than the COIN doctrine, despite some shared 
shortcomings when it comes to cooperating with other actors in the field.  
 
3.5. Host nation, local ownership 
As mentioned under 2.3 above, the idea of local ownership as a precondition for sustainability 
in any external development programme, is widely acknowledged. As stated in a UN Handbook: 
‘National and local ownership is not only considered essential to building sustainable peace but 
also critical for preserving consent, and reinforcing the legitimacy of a mission.’307 Also in post-
conflict peace negotiations, it is considered crucial for the sustainability of the process that the 
partners ‘buy in’ on it and see their interests represented.308 It thus comes as no surprise that 
UN doctrine also stresses the need for local ownership as a way of securing legitimacy and 
sustainability of operations:   
National and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation of a peace 
process. In planning and executing a United Nations peacekeeping operation’s core 
activities, every effort should be made to promote national and local ownership and to 
foster trust and cooperation between national actors. Effective approaches to national 
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and local ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and 
support mandate implementation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any 
national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.309 
However, besides elaborating on the more general principles of local ownership and mentioning 
some challenges, like resistance to change, the doctrine is not very specific as to more concrete 
tasks. In a brief discussion of Security Sector Reform (SSR), an activity often considered central 
to sustainable, locally owned peace, it says: 
…United Nations peacekeeping operations may be called upon to assist in the 
restructuring, reform and training of the national police and/or armed forces. [They] also 
play a catalytic role in the strengthening of national judiciary and corrections systems, 
and have also been mandated […] to promote legal and judicial reform or support the 
development of essential legislation.310 
Whereas the COIN doctrine dedicates an entire chapter to the training of host-nation security 
forces, the UN doctrine does not elaborate on this. Challenges related to securing both local 
ownership and a minimum judicial and democratic standard in the context of an SSR process 
are also ignored (but that is the case in the COIN doctrine as well). Nonetheless, since UN 
multi-dimensional peace operations are partly political, partly developmental, there is reason to 
expect that the ‘local ownership’ concept is intrinsic to the various programmes and activities 
of a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission. 
Despite this, many observers have noted that ‘local ownership’ sometimes is more of a 
catchword than a real commitment. There are numerous practical challenges entailed: who are 
the legitimate local stakeholders, what is being owned, to what extent shall they be empowered, 
at what stage, etc.311 This has led to reluctance on the part of the UN to give local actors a stake 
in the processes, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor and elsewhere.312 As a result, the 
                                                 
309 DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 39. 
310 Ibid., 27. 
311 Simon Chesterman, You, the People. 
312 See Timothy Donais, Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008). Annika 
Hansen et al., The Transition to a Just Order – Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict – a Practitioners’ 




UN has been more successful in handovers and building local capacity in some missions than 
in others.  
Local ownership, even if sometimes an empty phrase, nonetheless remains a key concept in the 
language of peacebuilding and development. UN Peacekeeping and COIN operations are both 
external interventions, and both have a limited number of years to consolidate a peace process 
before their presence becomes increasingly resented. There can be no sustainable peace process 
if the local institutions do not develop the capacity to sustain the peace process on its own. 
Local ownership is therefore a moral as well as a pragmatic ideal. It is a prerequisite for any 
exit strategy, irrespective of whether it is a COIN or UN peacekeeping mission. 
 
3.6. Intelligence-supported operations 
The UN has also begun introducing intelligence to support its operations – unthinkable only a 
few years ago. Since ‘intelligence’ for some translates as ‘espionage’ and ‘covert operations’, 
it has long been too sensitive for the UN to engage in. Indeed, it was deemed ‘contrary to the 
open nature of the UN system and therefore absolutely forbidden’.313 Also, many (but not all) 
traditional peacekeeping operations did not need much intelligence, as force protection was of 
limited concern. However, lessons from Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda in the 
1990s revealed the need for intelligence, on the tactical as well as the strategic level.314 
As ‘robust’ mandates and threats from ‘spoilers’ have become more common and missions are 
increasingly integrated and multi-dimensional, there has developed greater acceptance that 
intelligence support is required to implement the mandate. Wider mandates require wider 
understanding. Today, all larger UN peacekeeping missions are expected to establish a Joint 
Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) at HQ level.315 Their tasks are described as follows: 
Multidimensional peacekeeping missions conduct a wide range of mandated activities 
in fluid and unpredictable environments. This demands an enhanced operational 
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capacity to monitor developments and to understand the operational environment on a 
continuous basis. Missions must be able to identify, prevent and/or respond to threats or 
emerging threats. Senior mission leaders must be informed of and understand 
developments on the ground, their likely consequences and the possible impacts of 
decision options for mandate implementation and for the security of UN personnel and 
facilities.316 
 
The tasks thus go beyond basic tactical-level force protection. Intelligence analysis is aimed at 
advising the mission leadership on a broad range of issues related to threats to the peace process. 
To do so, information gathering and analysis need to focus beyond the risks associated with 
spoiler groups and include all risks that may be associated with the consolidation of the peace 
process. The responsibilities of the JMAC include the following: 
• acquire and integrate information from all mission components and other sources, in 
order to develop analytical products that are timely, accurate, complete and usable; 
• analyse and synthesize information, including intelligence-related material, to prepare 
integrated analyses and medium and long-term evaluations; and 
• prepare and disseminate operational and mission-level assessments to support planning, 
decision making and implementation of mission mandates.317 
 
The resemblance to the description of intelligence in the COIN doctrine is obvious. The focus 
is socio-political: intelligence is an integral part of the planning and execution of operations and 
an important asset for understanding the operational environment. The ambition to reach out 
across to other agencies is also shared. Intelligence in multidimensional peacekeeping focuses 
on the entire theatre, not only the spoilers or violent threats, just as in COIN. It is a context or 
environment analysis. The complexity of the mission and the mandates requires an 
understanding of the wider operational environment, not just of the opposing force(s).  
In practice it is the UN mission to Mali (MINUSMA) that has developed this the most, with the 
largest intelligence capability in UN peacekeeping to date. The All Sources Information Fusion 
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Unit (ASIFU) consists of hundreds of soldiers from predominantly Western countries, many 
with first-hand experience from Afghanistan. Newer technologies, such as mobile phones and 
drones, are also increasingly applied by UN missions to collect information.318 The difference 
from COIN is thus more a matter of scale than principle.  
 
3.7. Minimal use of force  
It is on the questions of the use of force that the similarities with the COIN doctrine become 
perhaps most apparent. Recent experience in UN peacekeeping missions, as in the DRC, Haiti, 
Mali, CAR, Darfur and South Sudan, has shown that the UN is increasingly willing to use force 
to protect civilians and to implement its mandate. 319  Unofficially labelled ‘robust 
peacekeeping’, this reflects a trend away from traditional peacekeeping. Missions are now 
tasked with consolidating a peace process by engaging with all levels of the host-nation in order 
to support and build local capacity to sustain the peace process on their own. Very often, UN 
peacekeeping environments are ‘…characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, 
and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the 
civilian population’.320 
In such cases, the UN doctrine legitimizes the use of force on the tactical level, thereby 
preserving the distinction from peace enforcement operation, which can be deployed against 
the will of the host nation (strategic level).321 The UN doctrine therefore focuses on missions 
which are deployed non-controversially, but which may encounter the above-mentioned 
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categories of opponents. Most missions today are mandated by the Security Council according 
to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, ‘…authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter 
forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of 
physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.’322  
To some extent, the UN rationale for this use of force resembles the COIN doctrine when it 
states: ‘The ultimate aim of the use of force is to influence and deter spoilers working against 
the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat’. 
Furthermore: ‘The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be 
calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the 
minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect.’323 
This approach is similar to the COIN doctrine, which does not seek a traditional military victory 
but is rather aimed at keeping the situation stable enough for a peace process to commence; and 
the use of minimum force is stressed. The difference is that the COIN doctrine places these 
principles in a political strategic framework (winning the war by strengthening the legitimacy 
of host-nation authorities), whereas this is more subtle in the UN doctrine. Its provisions are 
based more on ethics than on tactics – but in practice the difference may have little meaning. 
As discussed above, the recent trend in the UN has been to increase the use of force, as seen 
particularly in the DRC, Mali and CAR. These operations may include the use of artillery, heavy 
weapons, air support and intelligence, making it apparent that the distinction between the use 
of force at the tactical and strategic levels, and the distinction between COIN and UN 
peacekeeping, can at times be more semantic than substantive.324 By definition, insurgents, 
spoilers and other violent non-compliant actors operate on the tactical level: they are non-state 
actors or proxy armies supported by neighbouring states. But the fact that they operate locally 
does not mean that the fighting may not have ramifications or effects at the strategic level. 
Typically, in areas like the African Great Lakes region they are regional actors, crossing borders 
between countries as they please. Their presence and activity are among the main strategic 
challenges in this region.   
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The same could be said about the Taliban operating in the border regions of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. The Taliban have been trying to disrupt the political process in Afghanistan, 
topple the elected government and state institutions, attack civilians and undermine law and 
order. The ISAF’s counter-insurgency struggle against the Taliban in Afghanistan could 
therefore very well have been defined as a ‘tactical-level’ fight against spoilers, thereby fitting 
the description of a UN ‘robust mandate’ as noted above. In this context there is no difference 
in principle. 
Nonetheless, even if a COIN operation and a robust UN peacekeeping operation appear 
surprisingly similar in many respects, there is little doubt that actual practice remains very 
different. The US-led COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were aimed at victory and far 
better equipped, more robust, and technologically more sophisticated than the new robust UN 
missions. The FIB in eastern Congo remains more of an exception than the rule compared to 
other UN missions.  
The point here, however, is that the UN distinction between strategic and tactical level appears 
state-centric and not attuned to the conflicts taking place ‘among the people’ in many places 
today. The UN finds itself struggling to transform tactical victories into long-term strategic 
objectives.325 In short, the UN seems uncomfortable with some of the political implications of 




In his chapter I have argued that, despite their differing points of departure, the UN Capstone 
Doctrine and the COIN doctrine share some crucial features: 
• focus on civilian – not military – solutions  
• stress on need for protection of civilians 
• need for international coherence (unity of effort, integrated approach)  
• importance of host-nation ownership 
• use of intelligence in support of operations 
                                                 
325 Berdal and Ucko, ‘The United Nations and the Use of Force: Between Promise and Peril’. 
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• acknowledgement of the limitations of the use of force. 
 




Table 4.  Overview and comparison of COIN and Peacekeeping along the six comparable 
dimensions 





Relies on civilians to ‘build’ after 
‘clear’ and ‘hold’ to succeed.  
 
Multi-dimensional peacekeeping. Facilitate political 










UNSC Res 1674 
A moral imperative, as well as a key for the 




US Whole of Government. 










Focus on host-nation security 
forces and SSR. 
No reference to other aspects 
 
Legitimacy of the UN 





Human Terrain Teams 
Cultural and contextual 
understanding crucial to prevail 
 
JMAC 
Cultural understanding recognized as important in 
complex operations 
 
Use of Force 
 
Restrained – avoid collateral 
damage, but be assertive when 
needed 
 
Restrictive, only for Protection of Civilians, 
implementing mandate or self-protection. 
Increasingly assertive mandates 
 
 
These six dimensions are all important for success in both doctrines, even if the underlying 
rationales may differ. Interestingly, some of the shortcomings are also shared. Neither is very 
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sophisticated when it comes to dealing with other actors in the field, i.e. employing an inter-
agency comprehensive approach. Also, both stress the need for host-nation ownership, but tend 
to ignore the real-world challenges this entails. As always in military doctrines, realities on the 
ground tend to differ from written prescriptions. Some principles in the texts may prove very 
challenging to uphold in the field, not least in non-permissive security environments. For the 
UN to restrict the use of force to the tactical level may prove impossible, for instance, facing 
rebels with support from a neighbouring country. Similarly, a COIN operation may wish to 
avoid casualties, but if the operation attacked in inhabited areas this is very hard to avoid.  
It must also be stressed that the origins and foundations of these two doctrines differ 
significantly. The COIN Doctrine builds largely on Western experiences in colonial wars and 
the recent invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where military operations were explicitly political 
and linked to the objective of a state or a coalition of states. COIN is thereby closely intertwined 
with the strategic security interests of the engaged actors. The US and NATO operations in, 
e.g., Afghanistan were considered to be a central part of the global struggle against al-Qaeda  
In contrast, UN peacekeeping operations are generally considered of less strategic interest for 
the states that contribute troops.326 The UN engagement usually focuses more on peace as such, 
on a peace process or the preparation for such a process. Still, when multifunctional and robust 
peacekeeping missions are deployed, this tends to be in volatile, uncertain environments. With 
increasing ‘robustness’, the UN also becomes increasingly politicized. As a result, the UN is 
more of a political player now than in traditional peacekeeping, but it is usually less so than, 
for instance, the USA was in Iraq. 
The point here is that these are sliding scales, not fixed positions. The nature of each mission 
will determine how political a UN or a COIN operation will be regarded by the host population. 
In the field, the difference between UN and COIN may not be as significant as one might expect 
when comparing the different starting points. When studying interventions and the relationship 
between the intervening actors, one therefore cannot assume that for instance relations are better 
in a UN context than in other interventions. As we shall see in the next chapter, politicization 
(or perceptions of politicization) can often an impediment to cooperation – and UN troops can 
be as politicized as other troops. Basically any intervention of forces into another country will 
                                                 




impact on local balances of power and politics. The degree of politicization must be a case-by-
case assessment, depending on the role, mandate, size and activity of the armed forces in 
question. This implies – just as we found in Chapter 2 – that challenges related to achieving 
coherence between military and civilian actors not can be understood without a recognition of 
the contextual political circumstances. 
The next chapter will nonetheless focus in on the possible exception to this: the military-
humanitarian relationship. The humanitarians’ insistence of being non-political – the principles 
neutrality, impartiality and independence – implies a reluctant attitude towards coherence and 
cooperation with other intervening actors, in particularly the military. They differ in other 
aspects as well: mandates and mission, resources available, the socio-cultural background of 
personnel. Although the ultimate humanitarian organization, the Red Cross Movement, was 
born out of war and has a legal role to play in warfare, today humanitarians and militaries tend 
to be regarded as diametrically opposed to one another. But must this always be the case? What 
exactly are the differences based upon? Together with the previous and the current Chapters, 
the analysis in Chapter 4 will provide a systematization and overview of the various civilian–
military relations in an intervention, as well as preparing the ground for Chapter 5, on 















In the previous chapter I argued that the military part of interventions often shares common 
features, irrespective of the intervention mandate or military organization. Today’s robust UN 
peacekeeping is comparable to Western counter-insurgency operations along several 
dimensions. Both forms of military operations are political, but also the degree of politicization 
differs, depending on the role, mandate, size and activity of the armed forces in question. In this 
chapter I discuss how various kinds of military operations differ in their relations to the 
humanitarian actors. The focus is on military–humanitarian relations because these often are 
the most strained and tense of all military–civilian relationships in an intervention. Why is this 
so? And why is the relationship more challenging in some settings than others? 
Some analysts have highlighted the internal cultural and national differences between these 
strange bedfellows – the military and the humanitarians may have little in common except being 
foreign interveners in the same territory. 327  Furthermore, both the military and the 
humanitarians have proliferated in numbers, missions and tasks over the last decades, perhaps 
                                                 
327 Donna Winslow, ‘Strange Bedfellows in Humanitarian Crisis: NGOs and the Military’, in Twisting Arms and 
Flexing Muscles: Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding in Perspective., eds Natalie Mychajlyszyn and 
Timothy M. Shaw, The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2005), 113–30; Chiara Ruffa and Pascal Vennesson, ‘Fighting and Helping? The Domestic Politics of NGO–
Military Relations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies’, Security Studies 23, no. 3 (2014), 582–621. 
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making overlap and clashes basically unavoidable. 328  Indeed, in most interventions, the 
humanitarian and NGO communities represent the largest non-military dispatch of staff.329  
On the other hand, the two camps, military and humanitarian, have been operating side by side 
in wars and conflicts since the 19th century. In the words of Hugo Slim: ‘to a large degree 
modern humanitarianism may be said to have been born out of war’.330 The International 
Committee of the Red Cross was founded in 1863 following Henry Dunant’s descriptions of 
the 1859 Battle of Solferino, in which he called for better care for wounded soldiers in 
wartime.331 Similarly, both the First and the Second World Wars led to the emergence of many 
of today’s humanitarian organizations, like Save the Children, Oxfam and CARE.332 As we 
shall see, humanitarians are also mentioned in the Geneva Conventions.  
The boom in humanitarian relief efforts as well as in international peace and stabilization 
operations in the 1990s marked the beginning of today’s military–humanitarian relationships. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the 1990s witnessed a significant broadening of the security sector, 
where war and violence were regarded as being associated with poverty and weak states.333 In 
this period, humanitarian–military relations remained relatively positive, as both parts were 
seen as supporting the same ends. This was perhaps most clearly illustrated during the Kosovo 
crisis, when the humanitarians let NATO take charge of the refugee camps in the neighbouring 
countries without much protest.334 Humanitarians have also frequently called for international 
                                                 
328 Mats R. Berdal and Spyros Economides, United Nations Interventionism, 1991–2004 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. 
329 The number of humanitarian field staff was estimated to 274 000 in 2013, working for more than 150 NGOs. 
Kai Koddenbrock, The Practice of Humanitarian Intervention. Aid Workers, Agencies and Institutions in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (London: Routledge, 2016), 56.  
330 Hugo Slim, ‘The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil–Military Relations in Peace Support Operations’, in Beyond 
the Emergency, ed. Jeremy Ginifer (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 123. 
331 See History of the ICRC, available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/history/overview-section-
history-icrc.htm  
332 Slim, ‘The Stretcher and the Drum’. 
333 Hugo Slim, ‘Military Humanitarianism and the New Peacekeeping: An Agenda for Peace?’, The Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance (22 September 1995); Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. 
334 Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, 189; Sarah Kenyon Lischer, ‘Military 
Intervention and the Humanitarian “Force Multiplier”‘, Global Governance 13, no. 1 (2007), 99–118; Michael 
Pugh, ‘Civil–Military Relations in the Kosovo Crisis: An Emerging Hegemony?’, Security Dialogue 31, no. 2 
(2000), 229 –42. See also Michael Pugh, ‘Civil–Military Relations in International Peace Operations’, in Peace 
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military intervention to help prevent bloodbaths, curb civil wars or avoid escalation. Again, 
Kosovo can serve as an example.335 
This changed after the ‘9/11’ attacks on the United States in 2001, with the subsequent ‘war on 
terror’ and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Western military forces in these operations 
became more explicitly political in their approach, aiming at regime change and counter-
terrorism. Furthermore, they utilized humanitarian aid as a ‘force multiplier’ to gain local 
sympathy and prevail in the conflict – as stipulated in the COIN doctrine discussed in the 
previous chapter. 336  Unsurprisingly, this led to a more strained relationship with the 
humanitarians. Much of what has been written and said about the military–humanitarian 
relationship in recent year is flavoured by these wars. The heavy involvement of the USA and 
the West in terms of troops, money and diplomacy is quite unique, so we should perhaps be 
cautious about drawing firm conclusions about the state of affairs on the basis of these 
experiences. However, the exacerbated political climate did bring to the fore conflicts or 
challenges that are latent also in less extreme situations. Although these wars tended to entrench 
the military and humanitarian camps, they also demonstrated that political context matters. The 
military–humanitarian relationship may shift, depending on the situation and the nature of the 
military operation in question. 
But that is arguably also the case with other civilian organizations, as discussed in the previous 
chapters. What makes the humanitarians unique is their perception of themselves as being above 
or outside politics: they consider themselves to be apolitical interveners.  
Other civilian actors may at times underestimate or ignore their own political impact on a local 
economy or political system, but they are nonetheless mandated and established on a political 
vision or objective. Diplomats, UN police, peace- and state-builders, development agencies and 
international experts are all political actors of various shades and forms. Their political agenda 
may range from democratization, distribution of wealth, good governance and minority rights, 
to diplomacy, mediation and direct political interference. As discussed in Chapter 2, sometimes 
                                                 
Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives, eds Kurt R. Spillmann, et al., 109–34 (Bern: 
Peter Lang, 2001). 
335 Wheeler, Saving Strangers. 
336 US Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2001 infamously labelled the NGO community as their ‘force 
multiplier’, and ‘important part of our combat team’. See http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/powell_brief31.asp. 
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these mandates, values and principles makes coherence with others, including the military, 
deeply challenging. Perhaps they appear to be insurmountable. But they are nonetheless 
competing political agendas – and are therefore in principle negotiable.  
The humanitarians on the other hand, seek to stay away from all this, and operate independently 
of the rest. This leads to another kind of conflict with the military which is more principled than 
political: the humanitarian actors seek to be above politics. Their core values of ‘independence, 
impartiality and neutrality’ are often referred to as the ‘humanitarian imperative’, and have been 
codified in the Red Cross Code of Conduct.337 Humanitarians see their access to victims of war 
and conflict as being predicated on this apolitical identity: they are to have no agenda besides 
saving lives.338 Any collaboration between military and humanitarian actors may politicize 
them, and such politicization, it is held, can deny them access to territories held by the 
adversaries, as well as putting their own security at risk.339  
Thus we must ask: are humanitarians really apolitical? If so, does this warrant a different 
analytical approach from that applied to other civilian (political) actors? Is the military–
humanitarian relationship significantly different than other military–civilian relations? Can we 
single out certain principles or generic challenges between the military and humanitarian actors 
that always are present across various interventions?  
I begin with a brief discussion of the international legal foundations – primarily the Geneva 
Conventions – that guide military and humanitarian interaction in interventions. Humanitarians 
sometimes mention them when they experience conflicts with the military. However, I argue 
that there are limits to what the international legal framework can offer in terms of clarification 
                                                 
337 International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and GOs in Disaster Relief’, 1995, available at http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-
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338 As I return to later, there are also humanitarians who seek to address the causes of suffering. See Barnett, 
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of these relations. The law is deliberately vague, allowing for interpretations, pragmatism – and 
therefore also politics.  
Throughout this chapter, I present and discuss various ideal-type constellations between 
militaries and humanitarians, based on a taxonomy of military operations. Taking different 
kinds of military missions as a starting point, I systematically compare military–humanitarian 
relationships from case to case, and discuss the challenges. From this, I argue that context and 
politics are always present, also in the military–humanitarian sphere. Thus, although in most 
studies of interventions the humanitarians will require special attention, there is no reason not 
to include them in the same analytical framework as other civilian actors.  
  
2. Legal Foundations 
 
Laws regulating warfare are nothing new. The jus in bello tradition (‘just [i.e. fair] conduct in 
war’) may be traced as far back as to the Old Testament, medieval philosophers and other now-
classic writings. Today this tradition is usually associated with the first secular international 
legalists, such as the 17th-century lawyer Hugo Grotius.340 However, he focused primarily on 
jus ad bellum (‘just reasons for going to war’), not on conduct in war. The Geneva Convention 
of 1864 is therefore widely recognized as first major specification of the responsibilities of 
armed forces towards civilians and non-combatants in international law. Further clarification 
came with the Fourth Convention of 1949 (‘The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War’), and the additional 1977 Protocols (‘Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts’ and ‘Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts’). These, together with certain other international agreements, represent International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), also referred to as ‘Law on War’ or ‘Law on Armed Conflict’.341  
The relationship between warring parties and humanitarian actors is addressed many places in 
the Geneva Conventions, as in Article 70 of the First Convention:  
                                                 
340 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, xiv. 
341 According to the ICRC, IHL ‘protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and 
restrict the means and methods of warfare’. See What is International Humanitarian Law? ICRC Advisory 





If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, 
other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies […], relief 
actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any 
adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties 
concerned in such relief actions.  
Similar formulations are found in the Fourth Protocol, Articles 10, 23, 55 and 59.342  
The Geneva Conventions underline the responsibility of the warring parties to ensure that the 
basic needs of the civilian population are provided for; they also stipulate that humanitarian 
actors require the consent of the warring parties to engage. Certain provisions regulate the 
foundations for such consent, but it is not totally clear on what grounds humanitarian aid 
agencies may legitimately be granted or refused access. As Collinson and Elhawary point out, 
‘authorities may refuse humanitarian action if it interferes with a military strategy or aids the 
other side of the conflict. This reflects the fundamental pragmatism of IHL, which is always 
concerned with balancing military and humanitarian necessities.’343 
This need for consent has provoked contention between militaries and humanitarians, and the 
principle of consent is sometimes overlooked by humanitarian actors when they call for respect 
of the ‘humanitarian space’. There is, however, no reference to such a humanitarian space in 
the Geneva Conventions, nor in IHL more  broadly.344 Various definitions and interpretations 
are in circulation, but the basic idea is that ‘humanitarian organisations should be allowed to 
assist populations in need in conflict situations if their relief action is impartial, humanitarian 
and neutral’.345 OCHA and the UN tend to emphasize their own operational freedom, by using 
the term ‘humanitarian operating environment’, but there is nothing in IHL that stipulates that 
this space is exclusively for humanitarian agencies. It is the civilian and military authorities in 
the given country that bear primary responsibility for the well-being of civilians, also during 
                                                 
342 The Geneva Conventions are available on the ICRC website, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-
customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp. 
343 Sarah Collinson and Samir Elhawary, Humanitarian Space: A Review of Trends and Issues, HPG Report 
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armed conflict.346 I return to this in Chapter 6; the point here is merely that IHL can provide 
only limited guidance on the relation between military and humanitarian actors, actually leaving 
the military with a significant say on humanitarian action. 
Moreover, IHL and the Geneva Conventions apply only in cases of armed conflict. Many 
military operations today may be characterized by a volatile security situation, but not armed 
conflict as such. Defining something as an ‘armed conflict’ involves a subjective assessment, 
but the involvement of armed forces is one indicator, as is the level of organization of the 
belligerents and their political vs for instance criminal ambitions. Many of today’s civil wars 
or insurgencies would not qualify as ‘armed conflict’ in the legal sense. 
In the absence of armed conflict, the alternative legal framework for regulating the behaviour 
of armed forces is International Human Rights Law (IHRL). In contrast to the IHL, IHRL 
applies to peacetime conditions. However, in applying IHRL, military operations would be 
guided according to the principles of international law enforcement – policing – which may not 
always be suited for military operations. For instance, in an armed conflict regulated by IHL, a 
certain level of collateral damage may be tolerated in offensive operations, but that is 
unacceptable in peacetime, when IHRL applies.347 Furthermore, IHRL does not deal with the 
military–humanitarian relationship. In practice, troops in interventions tend to refer to IHL as 
their guidance – even if not always strictly applicable – as that is what they are trained for and 
are familiar with.348  
In short, international law appears insufficient if we wish to understand all the various shapes 
and forms the relationship between military and humanitarians may take. It is a rather pragmatic 
set of regulations that provides certain guidelines for cases of armed conflict, but is silent on 
many other issues. What I do next, therefore, is to analyse the relationship according to the kind 
of intervention, presenting a taxonomy of various forms of military operations or tasks. 
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3. Taxonomy  
 
The taxonomy of international military–humanitarian relationships presented below and in 
Table 5 simplifies complex relationships into ideal-type categories. It takes various forms of 
military operations or tasks as the starting point, showing how the challenges as regards 
humanitarians differ from case to case. Seven forms of military operations are singled out, 
ranging from non-combatting logistical support, to escort of humanitarian convoys, via 
traditional peacekeeping, to protection of civilians and robust peacekeeping, and to countering 
armed groups and conventional warfare. As military operations vary significantly in purpose, 
mandate and operational rules, relations with humanitarians differ accordingly, as we shall see. 
However, it should be borne in mind that these are ideal types: most military missions 
incorporate more than one of the categories below, or evolve through several of them. The 
purpose here is analytical: to shed light on the differences and variations among the categories, 




Table 5: Military tasks and related challenges 
Type of Military 
Task 
Military Role Security Objective Humanitarian 
Role  
Guidelines and Doctrines Challenges Examples 
Logistical Support Logistical support Not security-related Lead • Oslo Guidelines • Recipient refuses aid from military 
• Political desire to use troops 
• Too many actors 
• Pakistan earthquakes 2005, 2010 
• Indian Ocean tsunami 2004 
Escort Provide security for 
humanitarian relief  
Protection of agencies Lead • MCDA Guidelines 
• Civil–Military Guidelines & 
Reference for Complex 
Emergencies (CMGR) 
• Escort may attract resistance 
• Dependency  
 
• UNITAF (Somalia); 
• MONUSCO (DRC) 
Traditional 
Peacekeeping 
Oversee peace accords, 
demilitarized zone, 
ceasefires 
Security within clearly 
defined parameters 




• MCDA Guidelines 
• UN Capstone 
• Humanitarian CIMIC initiatives  • UNIFIL (Lebanon) 
• UNPROFOR (Bosnia-
Herzegovina) 
• UNFICYP (Cyprus) 
Protection of 
Civilians 
Protect national civilians 
against violence; 
guarding, patrolling  






• MCDA Guidelines 
• UN Capstone 
• CMGR 
• Coordination  
• Difficult to operationalize 
militarily;  
• Risk of escalation 
• False expectations 
• MINURCAT (Chad) 
• MONUSCO (DRC) 
• UNMIS (Sudan) 







Provide general security, 
assist civilian efforts, 
implement peace 
accords 
Maintain security, supress 






• MCDA Guidelines 
• CMGR 
• UN Capstone 
• FM 3-07 (US) 
• AJP-3.4.1 (PSO NATO); 
AJP-3.4.9 (CIMIC NATO) 
• IHL 
• Humanitarian resistance to 
comprehensive approach and 
integrated missions  






centric) or indirect 
(population-centric) 
Defeat insurgents, (re-) 





• FM-3.24 (US) 
• AJP-3.4.4 (NATO) 
• IHL/Geneva Conventions 
Protocol II 
• Disproportionate use of force  
• Politicization of humanitarian 
efforts 
• Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF); MONUSCO ‘intervention 
brigade’ (DRC) 
• ISAF (Afghanistan) 
International 
Armed Conflict 
Defeat enemy forces Pave way for political 
surrender and peace 
accords 
Coexist • IHL • Denial of humanitarian access 
• Failure of occupying power to 
provide security  
• US invasion of Iraq 2003 




3.1.  Logistical support 
The military logistical apparatus has increasingly been called upon to assist humanitarian relief 
operations. Military organizations usually have special assets available, especially as regards 
transport. In such operations, the armed forces have no security role, and are fully at the disposal 
of the humanitarians. Further, according to the ‘Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and 
Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – Oslo Guidelines’, foreign military and civil defence 
assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative.349  
Even these operations have faced challenges. Firstly, the nation receiving aid may be reluctant 
to welcome foreign military units – as in Sri Lanka, where the government accused India of 
military support to the Tamil areas after an (according to India) humanitarian air-drop;350 in 
Aceh, where foreign troops were accused of espionage;351 and when Myanmar refused aid from 
US warships after Cyclone Nargis.352 Military units are often viewed with greater suspicion and 
political bias than other actors. Secondly, the ‘last resort’ principle may be circumvented, 
because states may wish to use military assets to legitimize their military presence in the region. 
US efforts after the Indian Ocean tsunami have often been described in such terms, as have 
various contributions to Pakistan, Haiti and other instances.353 Practical coordination represents 
a third challenge, as in cases where the UN cluster system is not fully functional or where many 
national military forces engage simultaneously: overlap, miscommunication and 
ineffectiveness may result.354  
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Escort operations aim to offer protection to humanitarian agencies operating in insecure 
environments. In general, humanitarian convoys do not use armed escorts, but in exceptional 
circumstances this may be a necessary ‘last resort’ to enable humanitarian action. And here the 
military does have a security mandate: to protect the aid workers. However, that mandate is 
restricted to protection of the agencies; the troops are not to pursue attackers or seek to create 
general security in the area.  
The most commonly mentioned standard for such operations are the ‘MCDA Guidelines’,355 
which stress that the military is to be under civilian control and engage only on request from 
the UN humanitarian coordinator. It is the humanitarian agencies that decide where to go and 
what to do at destinations. During convoy, however, the military commander is usually in 
charge, and may halt an aid convoy if the situation is deemed too risky. 
Such operations entail challenges. Firstly, nations offering military support tend to be selective 
as to where they offer it, usually in connection with a crisis in which they have political or 
security stakes. Secondly, the fact that escort is needed normally indicates that the intrusion 
may not be welcome, and that resistance is likely. The moment force is used, troops may 
become entangled in a protracted conflict. Hence, even if an armed escort is initially successful 
in providing aid, it may also draw the troops into continued clashes with armed groups, as the 
USA experienced in Somalia in 1993. As a result, also humanitarians may be affected. Thirdly, 
the use of armed escorts appears to be increasing. Pressure is coming from within the UN system, 
from those responsible for the safety of UN staff, like the Department for Safety & Security. 
However, humanitarian agencies outside the UN tend to be critical to this development, which 
they see as creating dependencies and causing unnecessary militarization of humanitarian aid – 
which also affects them.356 
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3.3. Traditional peacekeeping 
Traditional peacekeeping refers primarily to post-conflict ceasefire monitoring operations on 
an inter-state border, like UNIFIL in Lebanon, but also along demarcation lines, as with 
UNFICYP in Cyprus. While the mandates may differ, the roles and responsibilities of the 
military are relatively limited.  
The armed forces have a narrow security mandate in terms of monitoring, for example, a de-
militarized border zone. They may support and protect humanitarians operating in this zone, 
but not beyond this area of operation. This is a static and defensive mandate, where the military 
may respond only when fired upon, in self-defence. 
In these cases, humanitarians and peacekeepers tend to operate side by side. They may 
communicate and exchange information but have few overlapping tasks and responsibilities. 
Problems have occurred when peacekeeper contingents have initiated Civil–Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) activities of a humanitarian nature without coordinating with 
humanitarians operating in the same area.357 Peacekeepers have also sometimes been tasked by 
the Security Council to provide humanitarian assistance, as during the Israeli occupation of 
Lebanon 1982–85. Generally, though, there have been relatively few reports of friction between 
militaries and humanitarians in traditional peacekeeping.  
 
3.4. Protection of Civilians (PoC) 
As discussed in Chapter 3, after the UN failure to prevent the genocides in Srebrenica and in 
Rwanda in the 1990s, peacekeepers and other intervening troops in conflict zones have been 
increasingly mandated to protect civilians. Failure to protect civilians undermines not only the 
credibility of the peacekeeping operation, but also the UN itself. For the last decade or so, 
basically all UN peacekeeping operations have been had PoC tasks as part of their mandate, 
usually worded as ‘protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. Sometimes a 
protection mandate may be the sole task of the troops, as with MINURCAT and EUFOR in 
                                                 




Chad in 2008. Their responsibility was restricted to refugees from neighbouring Darfur in 
Sudan, not the population in Chad.358 
PoC is not conducted by peacekeepers alone, but is often described as a shared task between 
military and humanitarian actors.359 The first set of challenges concerns coordination. There 
exists no authoritative definition of PoC in the UN or anywhere else, but the definition 
commonly referred to by civilian agencies reads: ‘all activities aimed at obtaining full respect 
for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of 
law (i.e. international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law)’.360 
This broad definition is not limited to physical protection, but may include a range of 
humanitarian efforts. For humanitarians, PoC means looking beyond people’s immediate 
material needs to the wider questions of personal safety, dignity and integrity, in the short and 
the long term. 361  The military has usually preferred the narrower approach of physical 
protection. As a result, PoC has tended to be a number of parallel processes rather than a 
coherent approach, and PoC has suffered in terms of sustainability and efficacy.362  
Seeking to remedy these shortcomings, the UN has recently begun work on expanding 
peacekeepers’ understanding of PoC, by, for instance, organizing it in three tiers: protection 
through political process; providing protection from physical violence; and establishing a 
protective environment.363 Despite such efforts, the UN is unlikely to achieve a unified coherent 
definition or approach to PoC. Differing mandates, organizational interests and agendas among 
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UN organizations work against such coherence.364 The UN will probably continue to leave it 
largely to each mission to develop a coherent approach to PoC, and as a minimum expect troops 
to provide physical protection of civilians, as this concerns the legitimacy of the UN itself. 
Even if PoC for the military should be limited to physical protection, the task remains 
challenging. Firstly, in the absence of a doctrine, the armed forces struggle to implement PoC 
into an operational concept.365 Military logic usually presupposes an end-state or a defined 
objective – but when is ‘protection’ achieved? What is ‘enough’ protection? Such uncertainties 
may cause tensions with humanitarians, for instance if the troops are regarded as withdrawing 
too early.366 Secondly, if physical force is applied to protect certain groups of civilians, troops 
may become a target, or be seen as a party to the conflict. Those subjected to the use of force 
may respond by attacking the troops or accusing them of bias – with potential repercussions for 
other actors in the field, including humanitarians. Thirdly, with limited resources it is 
challenging to prioritize varied protection efforts. Women and children may have top priority, 
but then? If specific categories are selected – minorities, tribes, ethnic groups, geographic areas 
– the troops may be seen as politically biased. The UN cannot ‘protect everyone from 
everything’.367 Protection mandates may fuel disproportionate expectations by civilians in need. 
Furthermore, troops may yield to mounting demands for protection, and end up thinly spread, 
offering unrealistic perceptions of protection. Failure to meet expectations may backfire on all 
actors in the field. 
Even if these challenges are basically military, they affect humanitarian actors directly. This 
may encourage enhanced coordination between militaries and humanitarians, if nothing else to 
avoid doing more harm than good. However, given the diverging definitions and approaches 
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between the military, humanitarians and others, PoC is likely remain a series of parallel and 
partly overlapping activities.  
 
3.5. Robust Peacekeeping/Stability Operations/Peace Support Operations  
‘Robust peacekeeping’ is not an official UN term, but it is widely used to refer to modern-day 
peacekeeping, as noted in the previous chapter, with troops better equipped to protect 
themselves and to help implement the mandate or peace accords.368 The Security Council 
generally authorizes peacekeepers ‘to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to 
disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or 
assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order’.369 Similarly, doctrines for such 
operations have been developed by regional security organizations like NATO and the AU, as 
well as by the USA.370  
In these operations, the military are responsible for providing security and stability in a defined 
area of responsibility. Usually this is a post-conflict environment where major combat 
operations are over and a peace agreement is in place, but where the situation remains volatile 
and the peace fragile. The main task of the military is to provide security and stability, and to 
prevent the recurrence of violence. This means that the military are primarily defensively 
oriented, but may take offensive initiatives to avert attacks, apprehend criminals or to counter 
‘spoilers’ to the peace process.371 As noted, mandates usually include PoC tasks as well. As 
seen in Chapter 3, because security is defined broadly (encompassing human security, children, 
minorities, women, etc.), such missions are generally ‘multi-dimensional’ and political, and 
require close collaboration with civilian agencies, including humanitarians. Refugee-camp 
security, patrolling, demobilization of child soldiers, de-mining and removal of unexploded 
ordinances: these are examples of the tasks of a robust peacekeeping operation that touch on 
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humanitarian tasks as well. The various models of ‘integrated missions’ and ‘comprehensive 
approach’ discussed in Chapter 1 have emerged in these contexts, where civilian and military 
agencies are expected to build cohesion of some sort, recognizing that there are no purely 
military solutions in these situations. 
As mentioned, humanitarians have tended to distance themselves from both the UN integrated 
approach and the various comprehensive approaches.372 They fear becoming politicized by 
being forced to collaborate with troops and political UN staff. This restrictive attitude has 
frustrated the militaries, which often cannot implement their mandate or achieve their objectives 
without collaboration with the humanitarians. 
 
3.6. Countering armed groups 
This category incorporates military operations aimed at countering armed non-state actors – 
insurgents, terrorists, guerrillas, militias, criminal organizations, warlords, tribal factions, and 
similar.373 We can roughly subdivide this into two types: enemy-centric and population-centric 
operations.374 The first is generally associated with counter-terrorism and historical counter-
insurgency (COIN) operations, the second with recent COIN operations, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
The enemy-centric approach aims at weakening the adversary directly, by military engagement. 
It is based on the conventional military tenet that military victory paves the way for later 
political solutions and peace. 375  The unconventional nature of the adversary will require 
unconventional responses, not least when the fighting takes place ‘amongst the people’, but the 
aim is nonetheless to engage the enemy and incapacitate him.376 With enemy-centric operations 
the Geneva Conventions usually applies, although the legal status of the insurgents is sometimes 
debated. For instance, the Bush administration in the USA invented the term ‘unlawful 
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combatants’ to cover al-Qaeda and their Taliban associates, so that they would be treated neither 
as legal combatants (and granted status as Prisoners of War), nor as regular criminals. The secret 
arrests globally of alleged terrorists and the opening of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp 
illustrate this. But most legal commentaries appear to argue that the USA and its allies were 
under Geneva Conventions jurisdiction also in these operations. 377 
Controversies with humanitarians have often arisen in cases involving disproportionate use of 
force and high levels of civilian casualties, something which is partly a condition of the nature 
of these conflicts. As noted, also the UN has begun conducting operations of this kind recently. 
The UN has described the ‘intervention brigade’ in the DRC as its ‘first-ever “offensive” 
combat force, intended to carry out targeted operations to “neutralize and disarm”’ rebels.378 
Some commentators have warned of the high risk of violent retaliation against civilians in such 
operations.379 That would make it even more challenging for humanitarians to cooperate with 
the UN. 
The population-centric COIN was discussed in Chapter 3. The current version was launched in 
Iraq when the enemy-centric approach did not seem to be working, and collateral damage and 
failure to protect civilians had fuelled local resentment towards the foreign troops. As noted, 
COIN is often summarized as ‘clear–hold–build’: clear an area of adversaries, then hold the 
territory, and build up its security and governance structures. The term ‘population-centric’ 
indicates that the real struggle concerns the allegiance of the population in the ‘build’ phase. 
There can be no isolated military solution: victory is achieved only when the government has 
won over the population by offering security and services.380 A consequence of this broad 
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approach is that the entire area of operations is regarded as part of the political struggle that 
COIN represents, including humanitarian relief. According to the US COIN doctrine: ‘There is 
no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance (…) in COIN. Whenever someone is helped, 
someone else is hurt, not least the insurgents.’381 
The doctrine thus defines the entire area of operation as politicized, ruling out possibilities for 
a humanitarian space. The problem is that most humanitarians would not consider themselves 
as being ‘in COIN’. They would refute the claim that the entire area of operations is politicized, 
and would argue that they may very well provide ‘impartial humanitarian assistance’ as long as 
the troops keep a distance to them. Humanitarians have protested when soldiers have conducted 
humanitarian or other civilian aid operations, seeing them as aimed at winning local ‘hearts and 
minds’, boosting troop legitimacy or collecting intelligence, rather than being impartial and 
needs-based. This, it is argued, has politicized aid and undermined the security of humanitarians 
by blurring the lines between the humanitarian and military actors. Furthermore, the military 
has often done this through ‘quick impact projects’ and other short-term efforts, which 
humanitarians criticize for being inefficient as well as unsustainable. In short, the humanitarian 
core values of neutrality, impartiality and independence are seen as threatened.382 These are 
serious concerns, with potentially huge repercussions for security in the field.  
That being said, many humanitarians have contributed to this blurring of roles themselves, by 
engaging in projects that are closer to reconstruction and development work than humanitarian 
relief, and are thus political rather than humanitarian in nature.383 In Afghanistan for instance, 
humanitarians have been involved in educational programming, livelihoods, economic 
development and agriculture – thereby potentially undermining their own concept of 
impartiality and neutrality.384  Michael Barnett labels these attempts at addressing the root 
causes of suffering as ‘alchemical humanitarianism’ – as opposed to the emergency workers 
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who limits themselves to saving lives.385 He is critical of the knowledge-base underlying such 
attempts at peace-building and of the inherent politics involved: ‘you have to advocate for 
redistribution of political power, the reallocation of resources and the enforcement of rights’.386 
We return to this in Chapter 6; suffice it here to conclude that the most controversial recent 
clashes between humanitarians and the military have been in the context of these kinds of 
military operations. 
 
3.7. International armed conflict 
Most armed forces today are still based on the concept of conventional warfare, defined in IHL 
as International Armed Conflict. Basic doctrines, concepts, training and education are all 
primarily preparations for inter-state conventional war. All the categories of military operations 
discussed above are seen as exceptions, or at least assignments that are additional to the primary 
task of an army. In such wars the Geneva Conventions regulate the respective responsibilities 
of the belligerents and the humanitarians, as discussed in the introduction of this chapter. There 
have in fact been few such international state-to-state wars in recent decades. The Russia–
Georgia war in 2008 is the most recent one, and before that the US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003.387 The 1990s also witnessed predominantly intra-state wars.388 We do not have many 
examples of recent challenges related to humanitarian issues in inter-state wars.  
The primary challenge appears to be granting access for humanitarian actors to conflict zones. 
In both Georgia and Iraq, humanitarians called for better access to the civilian population.389 
As noted above, although the Geneva Conventions grant access in principle, they do not specify 
on what grounds belligerents may deny humanitarian access. In the case of Iraq, US troops did 
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not allow aid workers passage until the areas had been declared as safe. As a result, 
humanitarians were at times as far as 300 miles behind the frontline.390  
Another challenge has been the humanitarian responsibilities resting on the occupying power, 
which, by according to IHL, is obliged to provide the necessary humanitarian aid and to secure 
the basic human rights of the civilian population. Again, the case of Iraq demonstrated that this 
may not always go smoothly, not least as the security vacuum in Iraq was filled by looters and 
violent gangs.391 Occupying forces are also responsible – as far as possible – for overall security 
in the territory they occupy. 392  The devastating terrorist bombing of UN Headquarters in 
Baghdad in 2003 showed how complicated this is, legally and in practice. The attack led to a 
surge of resentment against the USA from the UN, the humanitarians and the broader NGO 
community. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan went so far as to accuse the USA of failing to 
protect the UN. When it emerged that the UN Mission had in fact turned down an offer from 
the USA for a security detail at the site, the Secretary-General responded that the United States, 
‘as occupying power, is obliged to protect people nonetheless.’393 Furthermore, he claimed that 
the UN Mission not should have been allowed to turn down the offer, indicating that he thought 
the USA should have imposed a security detail on the UN.394 Here we can imagine the uproar 
from the UN and the humanitarians if this had happened and no attack had taken place. As in 
other cases, IHL is far from crystal-clear, and the term ‘as far as possible’ in the law brings a 
caveat or war-zone realism into the discussion. Occupying forces cannot be held responsible 
for everything that insurgents do, and it is impossible to define a priori what ‘sufficient security’ 
would look like in a volatile security environment in an occupied territory. Occupying forces 
can be accused of imposing too much or too little security; what is the appropriate level one 
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day may be insufficient the next. Security is a dynamic process with measures and counter-
measures: it is certainly no exact science.  
In short, even in cases like this when IHL applies, it is not sufficient in and of itself to resolve 
all humanitarian questions. Practical challenges confront the military and the humanitarian 




The taxonomy of military operations and the associated challenges with humanitarian issues 
developed here offers a framework for differentiating various types of conflicts and challenges 
that militaries and humanitarians are likely to face in the field. Since the military and 
humanitarians often operate in rural areas, where other interveners are less present, this 
taxonomy also provides a mapping of the most common forms of military–civilian challenges 
encountered in the field.  
Military mandates differ significantly from category to category, and conflicts may occur in all 
operations, not only in intense warfare. The challenges range from practical questions of 
coordination and communication, to dealing with shared and overlapping tasks, to potential 
escalation of the conflict. All the operations identified here are regulated by IHL, IHRL or 
specific guidelines or doctrines, but it appears that these not have been sufficient to resolve all 
the challenges. Politics have a pervasive presence. 
The most serious difficulties emerge when humanitarian actors feel themselves politicized, as 
this is seen as threatening to undermine their own core values of independence, impartiality and 
neutrality. Such politicization is more likely to occur in offensive military operations – when 
troops are tasked with implementing a peace agreement or engaging an adversary. Furthermore, 
when the military task requires active engagement with civilian populations, as in PoC and in 
population-centric COIN, friction with humanitarians tends to increase. However, it should also 
be noted that humanitarians sometimes politicize themselves when they fail to recognize the 
political nature or implications of their chosen activities.  
To resolve these tensions, some argue that the militaries should disengage the humanitarians 




with impartiality and neutrality.395 But it is unlikely that the military and the humanitarians 
could ever escape each other, even if they wanted to. In almost all types of military operations 
discussed here, the humanitarians are present and conduct activities that may impact on the 
activities of the military, and vice versa. If nothing else, they need to communicate in order to 
de-conflict. Furthermore, the degree of politicization of an intervening actor cannot be directly 
deduced from the type of organization. In principle any intervention, civilian or military, is 
political – or may be locally regarded as such.396 The degree of politicization is therefore likely 
to be defined more by what the various actors do, than by who they are. In some circumstances, 
basic humanitarian aid may be viewed as political interference; elsewhere, local belligerents 
may welcome projects traditionally regarded as political. Separating the military from the 
humanitarians is not be feasible, nor could it resolve the challenges related to politicization.  
Overlapping tasks and mandates, physical proximity and situational circumstances in the field 
will continue to keep these strange bedfellows together. The relationship will depend on the 
category of operations, as discussed here, but also on local circumstances. Each conflict and 
intervention is unique. But politics are always present, also in the military–humanitarian sphere. 
The role of humanitarian actors in interventions is therefore usually relevant and important. 
Humanitarians do have a political impact towards other intervening actors, even if they manage 
to remain apolitical in relations with the local body politic. IHL does not grant them an apolitical 
‘humanitarian space’, even if their impartiality is recognized. In other words, there are no 
generic or context-independent elements that can be applied to develop an understanding of the 
military–humanitarian challenges. As regards analysis, humanitarians can be approached 
through the same analytical framework as other civilians.397  
In the next chapter I develop such an analytical framework. In this and the previous chapters I 
have identified numerous challenges facing the intervening actors, have organized them in 
taxonomies and discussed various military–civilian constellations. But these challenges as such 
have not been fully analysed. That requires an approach that looks at how these challenges are 
                                                 
395 Egnell, ‘Civil–Military Coordination for Operational Effectiveness’. 
396 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2002). 
397 This is an analytical conclusion, which by no means necessarily implies that the humanitarian imperative 
should be abandoned as an operational foundation for humanitarians. Striving for this may be efficient, safe, and 




developing, and not least why they are emerging. We need to discuss analytical tools and 
theoretical approaches in greater depth. As discussed in Chapter 1, a theory is more than a map: 
it is also an attempt at explaining or understanding social processes in a simplified way. In short, 
then, the next chapter aims to develop an analytical framework, a theoretical approach, that can 
















Chapters 2 to 4 have offered a discussion of the challenges related to coherence in interventions, 
and how these challenges differ depending on the actors and the type of operation involved. 
There are many forms of relationships in an intervention, and there are certain limits to what 
striving for coherence may achieve. I have also argued that there are significant overlaps 
between various forms of military operations, and that neither peacekeepers nor occupying 
forces or COIN troops are necessarily difficult partners for civilians – although they may all 
very well be so. Lastly, I have shown that military–humanitarian relations differ depending on 
the nature of the military operation in question, tending to be most strained in the context of 
offensive military operations.  
However, the previous chapters do not offer a full exploration of the processes and mechanisms 
that create these challenges. For a deeper understanding of the drivers of and impediments to 
coherence in an intervention, there is a need to ask how the challenges that have been identified 
emerge and evolve. The dynamics underpinning these observations needs to be analysed. Such 
an analysis would have to be broad in scope, encompassing several of the most important 
intervening actors, the incentives and impediments for interaction, as well as the power-
relations between them. To do so a theoretical analytical framework that can help to understand 
the challenges, is needed. That is the purpose of this chapter, which differs from the previous 
chapters in focusing on developing such an analytical framework.  
I begin by exploring the work of one scholar who has made a thorough attempt at 
comprehensive theorizing of an entire intervention: Séverine Autesserre, with her study of the 
intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).398 Investigating her approach in 
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detail to see if it is applicable to other cases as well, I assess her main analytical and theoretical 
tool, what she labels ‘the peacebuilding frame’, and discuss this concept of ‘frame’ and its 
supporting theoretical elements, ‘world polity’ and ‘organizational field’. I will argue that the 
concept of ‘frame’, as applied by Autesserre, has serious shortcomings. It cannot account for 
change, and the theorizing is primarily inductive, tailormade for one specific case and therefore 
not applicable beyond that. Therefore I will propose a deductive analytical framework which 
builds on certain of Autesserre’s elements, but is more generally applicable to other cases. This 
framework focuses on the identity formation processes of the intervening actors.  
In a nutshell, what identification theory contributes is an analysis of how the Self and Other co-
constitute each other. In this dissertation, I argue that the way the intervening actors (Self) 
represent those they engage (Other), and how this representation evolve over time, can shed 
light on changes in the policies of the Self. Importantly, although the focus of this dissertation 
is the relationship between intervening actors, the important Other for intervening actors are 
usually not other interveners, but the local populations they are deployed to engage. After all, 
the purpose of an intervention is to alter an Other in some way – for instance by killing, saving, 
or reforming. This is why the interveners are there, why they are deployed. By analysing the 
dynamics of identity formations of the interveners and the various associated power-struggles, 
we will also be better equipped to understand the challenges related to coherence between the 
intervening actors. If they view the Other very differently, coherence and cooperation is less 
likely to succeed. In Chapter 6 I then apply this analytical framework to the intervention in 
Afghanistan. 
 
2. Autesserre’s Frames 
 
Séverine Autesserre can be placed in the camp of the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ critique, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. But she develops a more comprehensive theoretical framework on one 
specific intervention than other scholars have done. She seeks to explain why the intervention 
into the DRC largely failed, by showing how the intervening actors came with several 
predisposed opinions and ignored local-level violence. Seeing it as irrelevant to their role or 
mandate, they focused solely on the national or central level. As she points out, the importance 




failed to address the local causes of violence in the DRC. As a result, peacebuilding efforts 
collapsed, and the conflict flared up again. 
The explanation can be found in what Autesserre calls a ‘postconflict peacebuilding frame’ 
which is ‘shared by international actors belonging to many different organizations, such as 
diplomacies, international organizations, and nongovernmental agencies.’399 This frame can 
‘account for what shapes the international understanding of the causes of violence and of the 
interveners’ role, and how this understanding makes certain actions possible while precluding 
others.’400 According to Autesserre, in the Congo this frame contained four key elements: 1) 
the international actors labelled the DRC as ‘postconflict’; 2) a certain level of violence was 
regarded as innate and therefore acceptable; 3) the interveners were concerned with the national 
and international realms, but not the local ones; and 4) they preferred holding elections to 
engaging in local conflict resolution. This shared approach among the interveners, says 
Autesserre, explains their behaviour. It led them to engage in peacebuilding on the basis of 
several assumptions while simultaneously ignoring worrying signals from the field. 
Autesserre states that her term ‘frame’ builds on Erving Goffman’s 1974 work, Frame Analysis: 
An Essay on the Organization of Experience, and later refinements in political science.401 In 
Autesserre’s version, the concept of frames ‘focuses the analysis on how people organize 
knowledge and interpret it’.402 Frames are not independent of the actors embedded in them: 
they are in a dynamic relationship with them, and are thus mutually constitutive over time. 
Hence, in terms of Jackson’s philosophical ontological wagers discussed in Chapter 1, 
Autesserre can be said to be applying an analyticist methodology: mind-world monism 
combined with phenomenalism. She regards frames as embedded in the social, not outside it; 
and she does not rely on independent non-observables, such as ‘social structures’, to make her 
explanatory arguments. This could also be termed ‘constitutive theory’, as discussed in Chapter 
1. 
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Autesserre highlights four characteristics of frames as she defines them: what frames are, where 
they come from, how they operate; and how they relate to strategic explanations. The last is 
directly related to her specific case and is less relevant for our discussion here, but the three 
others are generic, and can help us to understand her theoretical framework better. 
 
2.1. What are Frames? 
Autesserre describes frames as ‘social objects…. embedded in social routines, practices, 
discourses, technologies and institutions.’403 They may consist of, for example, ideologies and 
paradigms – perceptions about the world that not are questioned, and the practices that follow 
logically from such perceptions. In her The Trouble with the Congo (2010), Autesserre replaced 
the term ‘frame’ with ‘culture’, without changing the definition otherwise.404 ‘Culture’ is often 
regarded as a very loose analytical concept, dismissed altogether by some scholars. Rationalists 
like Jackman and Miller, for instance, reject the inherent conservatism and predetermination of 
behaviour and action which they claim is present in cultural explanations. 405  Also the 
anthropologist Adam Kuper warns against cultural determinism and underlines the importance 
of other socio-political factors in explaining human thought and behaviour.406 Ned Lebow 
stresses that there is a major risk of tautology associated with unobservable and fluid concepts 
such as culture (as well as markets, polarity and many other concepts in social science).407 
When using the term culture – as he does – it must have manifestations other than the behaviour 
it is expected to produce, he stipulates. Lebow tracks its evolution over time; he also 
operationalizes culture in three dimensions (fear, interest, honour), thereby making the term 
analytically manageable. 
Unfortunately, culture or frame, as used by Autesserre, is not a rigorously defined analytical 
concept, but a relatively open-ended one. Frames are the ‘luggage’ the intervening actors carry 
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with them in their minds, procedures and practices when entering the field. The existence of 
such ‘luggage’ – in one form of the other – is well established within the social sciences, but 
the unique analytical value of ‘frames’ is unclear in Autesserre’s version. 
The reason for this elusiveness might be that Autesserre concludes that there is one overarching 
frame that is shared by almost all interveners. This is analytically induced from empirical 
studies in the DRC: ‘different actors with distinct identities, internal cultures, and interests show 
puzzling behavioural similarities’ she notes.408 These similarities she then theorizes into a frame 
with all its characteristics. Given such broad application, the term must remain somewhat 
intangible by default. However, for frames to have any unique analytical value – in order to 
avoid the problems of predetermination and tautology – we need to have a better understanding 
of how the frame emerges and how it influences behaviour: the dynamics and mechanisms 
creating the ideologies and paradigms of the frame. 
 
2.2. Where do they come from? 
Autesserre’s discussion of where frames come from may help us along on the way. In the Congo, 
she holds, much of the peacebuilding frame existed prior to the intervention, although the pace 
of events during the intervention also contributed to building it. That a frame exists prior to an 
intervention follows logically from the definition, but it is crucial to understand how it emerges 
and evolves for it to have any analytical value. Frames are socially constructed, she holds, and 
do not exist a priori or independent of the intervening actors.409 They are somehow part of the 
intervening actors, but Autesserre holds that locating them within each and every intervening 
organization is too narrow an approach. If frames were a result of intra-organizational processes 
only, each organization could be expected to have its own frame and to behave in different ways. 
In the case of the DRC, Autesserre registered behavioural similarities across organizations. 
Therefore, she argues, a frame must encompass more than each single organization: it must be 
localized outside or between the individual intervening organizations. 
2.2.1. World polity 
Autesserre locates the sources of the frame at two levels: the world polity and the field. The 
former term is borrowed from Roland Paris, who in turn builds on the ‘world polity school’ of 
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sociology.410 The argument here is that it is possible to identify a distinct global culture made 
up of rules of organization and behaviour for global actors. Drawing also on the institutional 
approach of March and Olsen, Paris holds that scholars have largely overlooked the importance 
of ‘logics of appropriateness’ in the formulation of peacekeeping policy. In other words, 
policies are not based on rational calculations only, but also on identity; and that, according to 
March and Olsen, is ‘in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, 
publicly known, anticipated and accepted.’411 Hence, writes Paris, ‘the design and conduct of 
peacekeeping missions reflect not only the interests of key parties and the perceived lessons of 
previous operations, but also the prevailing norms of global culture, which legitimize certain 
kinds of peacekeeping policies and delegitimize others.’412  
In short, Paris argues that peacekeeping has mirrored the evolution of the global culture from 
the Cold War until today. During the Cold War, the Westphalian principle of sovereignty 
remained dominant, and peacekeepers rarely engaged in issues of domestic governance. Since 
1989, however, peacekeeping missions have ‘mirrored the second revolution in the meaning of 
sovereignty: the emergence of a new standard of legitimate statehood — one that treats liberal 
democratic institutions and practices as the most appropriate model of domestic governance.’413 
The mushrooming of new missions, concepts and actors such as ‘peacebuilders’ reflects this 
change. Paris continues: ‘peacekeeping agencies have been unwilling to consider strategies that 
appear to contravene global cultural norms’, such as ‘international trusteeship’.414  
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In the case of the Congo, Autesserre claims that ‘veneration of elections’ and an ‘understanding 
of violence as intrinsic to the Congo’ were part of a similar global culture.415 The focus on 
elections was based on the evolution in the UN as described by Paris, where liberal democracy 
increasingly became the medicine prescribed for securing the peace in transitional and post-war 
societies. The belief in ‘intrinsic violence’ stemmed from a 19th-century representation of the 
Congolese as ‘“by nature” brutal, barbarous and savage’ – a view still evident at the time of the 
intervention.416 This left the interveners with a feeling of powerlessness, while also leading 
them to regard local violence as ‘normal’ in the Congo and not as part of the larger conflict. 
These two notions thus existed external to the intervening actors and prior to the actual 
intervention.  
In her analysis of the Western reluctance to intervene in the Balkan wars in the 1990s, Lene 
Hansen identifies a similar representation of the local people as ‘barbaric’, carrying in them an 
‘ancient hatred’ which outside forces could not alter.417 Such essentialist representations of the 
belligerents made intervention unattractive, indeed futile. Hence, it seems likely that (potential) 
intervening actors in conflicts do carry with them certain perceptions about the ‘nature’ of the 
conflict in question.  
Nonetheless, neither Autesserre nor Paris is very clear on how these norms in the world polity 
emerge and evolve. Lene Hansen, in contrast, shows how a different representation of the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina gained international momentum in the West – one which held that what 
was happening was not some ‘ancient’ civil war between monolithic ethnic groups. Rather, the 
alternative representation held that what was happening was a deliberate attempt by certain 
leaders to eliminate, by violence, the multicultural nature of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This 
‘genocide discourse’, says Hansen, turned intervention on the part of the West into a moral 
necessity.  
Although such a change of perception did not take place among interveners in the Congo, it is 
analytically crucial that we should allow for it – otherwise, the world polity would be treated as 
a constant or as detached from the intervening actors. As Martha Finnemore puts it: ‘If the 
world culture they specify is so powerful and congruent, the institutionalists have no grounds 
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for explaining value conflicts or normative contestation – in other words politics.’418 Any 
analysis incorporating such historical and macro-factors as ‘global cultures’ thus needs to 
consider the fluidity of these concepts and how groups of actors may change their perceptions 
of the situation. As was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the historical representations, 
worldviews and established approaches to interventions may change in the midst of events. 
Competing representations will always exist: and it is essential to grasp the power struggles 
between these if we are to understand change. 
 
2.2.2. Organizational field 
The second source of the frame Autesserre identifies is the field, an ‘intermediary level between 
that of the individual organization and that of the world polity.’419 By this she is referring to the 
term organizational field as used by DiMaggio and Powell in 1983 to explain institutional 
isomorphism, or why organizations become increasingly similar. 420  Inspired by Pierre 
Bourdieu,421  they wrote in opposition to the then-dominant Weberian theorizing based on 
market-driven rationalization, and proposed instead a model where ‘organizational change 
occur(s) as the result of processes that make organizations more similar without necessarily 
making them more efficient.’ 422  A field is defined as an ‘increasingly structured set of 
organizations that ‘in the aggregate constitute a recognized area of institutional life’.423 In the 
case of the Congo, Autesserre observes such an isomorphism – making ‘organizations as 
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different as the UN, the United States, South Africa, and many NGOs…adopt the same 
understanding of the situation and similar intervention strategies’.424  
DiMaggio and Powell’s analysis of isomorphism is based upon three mechanisms: coercive 
(pressures exerted by other organizations and by cultural expectations in society), mimetic 
(organizations model themselves on other organizations in case of ambiguity or uncertainty), 
and normative (legitimation and networks stemming from professionalization).425 However, 
none of these are included in Autesserre’s analysis of the international intervention in the DRC. 
Her analysis is primarily empirical – dealing with the various actors comprising this field. We 
therefore do not know precisely how the field contributed to the emergence of the widely shared 
peacebuilding frame. What processes and mechanisms were at play? It remains somewhat 
unclear what analytical value the term ‘organizational field’ has in Autesserre’s model, besides 
serving as an inductively established framework for presenting empirical findings  
Of course, the three mechanisms of isomorphism may have been present also in the case of the 
DRC. Still, a ‘field’ is usually associated with an ‘industry’, a ‘sector’ or similar. Although field 
boundaries must be empirically defined, on the basis of such things as membership, activities, 
relations, culture, or proximity, the organizations in a field need to share something, participate 
in a common meaning system, for it to be analytically relevant. 426  It seems Autesserre is 
stretching the concept of a ‘field’ further than most other scholars applying this theory. I have 
no reason to doubt the empirical foundation on which she bases her approach. But if we are to 
apply her model to other interventions – or use it to help answer the research question of this 
dissertation – it may be less fruitful to operate with only one such overarching frame. It would 
be more natural to ask whether several fields (and thus several frames) could be singled out 
within an intervention – for instance a humanitarian and a military – operating side by side in 
the same intervention.  
Furthermore, for the purposes of understanding coherence in interventions it would be better to 
examine the relations between these fields than relations between the organizations comprising 
them. A central question then, is: do DiMaggio and Powers’ mechanisms of coercive, mimetic 
and normative isomorphism say anything about how organizations relate to other fields – or 
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other actors outside the fields, such as those who are being intervened upon? Unfortunately, 
few scholars in sociological organization theory have investigated the relationship between or 
outside organizational fields, tending instead to focus on inter-organizational relations within 
the same field. There is therefore not much to build on.  
One could have expected students of IR, who usually operate on a higher level of analysis than 
sociologists, to have conducted such analyses. The common focus on inter-state and inter-
organizational relations within IR should increase the probability of such studies. However, 
very few have applied organizational fields within IR. Michael Lipson combines organizational 
field with regime theory in studying interactions and sub-optimal convergence between 
international regimes, and finds that such things as legitimized standards matter more than 
effectiveness in the case of weapons-export control regimes. 427 However, his main interest is 
in explaining convergence within the field. Dingwerth and Pattberg, who study transnational 
rule-making organizations in the field of environmental politics, also address ‘the dynamics that 
promote similarity among organizations’.428 Bremberg and Britz, on the other hand, identify an 
absence of coherence in the field of EU civil protection.429 By noting how the institutional 
logics in the European national civil protection fields are conflicting, they show why no 
institutional logic has become dominant on the EU level. This could be a promising approach, 
since they are thereby operating with several fields. Nevertheless, these fields are rather similar 
and may be regarded as sub-fields (national/international), rather than distinct fields, as in an 
intervention. Ulrika Mörth’s study of the emergence of a European policy on armament is the 
most promising in this regard, as she focuses on how informal and formal organizations take 
part in two organizational fields (defence and market) and how these move closer to each other, 
thereby creating a new field.430 Her analytical framework is original because it focuses on two 
fields and on processes and change, recognizing that organizations may form new fields and 
frames. It is nonetheless convergence of organizations that is the main focus. Therefore, the 
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application of organizational field theory in IR, while operating on a higher level of analysis 
than in sociology, has remained within the basic parameters of its sociological ancestors. The 
focus is still largely on convergence within a field – or, as with Mörth, between two fields 
To summarize, organizational theory may well have much to offer in studies of interventions – 
but primarily if the research focus is on the various intervening organizations and their relations 
with similar organizations within the same field. What this body of literature seeks to explain 
is organizational behaviour – whether convergence, rational or irrational behaviour, 
institutionalization or other organizational features within a field.431 It would seem to have less 
to offer for those interested in the interaction between fields. 
To return to our initial question about the emergence of frames: neither world polity nor 
organizational field seem to offer good theoretical explanations of the emergence of a frame, 
which could be applied to other cases. What we need is an analytical concept that can enable a 
dynamic analysis of how the frame emerges and functions – a theory-based understanding of 
the policies in the intervention. So far this has only been explained by factors that existed prior 
to, and independent of, the intervention itself. Let us see if this is addressed in Autesserre’s 
third characteristic of frames: ‘how they operate’.  
 
2.3. How do they operate? 
‘Frames shape how people understand the world and, based on this understanding, what they 
perceive to be appropriate action’, Autesserre writes. 432  In other words, frames constitute 
specific identities, interests and assumptions that ‘justify specific practices and policies while 
precluding others.’433 Since the interveners regarded violence as ‘normal’ in peacetime in the 
Congo, they did not consider the ongoing violent conflict in parts of the country as a significant 
problem to its overall stability. Similarly, diplomats considered their sphere of responsibility to 
be on the macro-level, and restricted their focus to that. In short, the frames made local conflict 
resolution an irrelevant, inappropriate and illegitimate task for international actors. Alternative 
approaches to peacebuilding were simply ignored.  
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According to Autesserre, the frames and the practices legitimize and constitute each other: 
‘these actions in turn reproduce and reinforce both the dominant practices and the meanings 
upon which they are predicated (the frames).’434 Frames ‘do not cause action; they make it 
possible.’435Autesserre uses frames to ‘document a dispersed process where social objects have 
multiple sources, and where ideas, actions and environmental constraints mutually constitute 
each other.’436 
However, if actions also legitimize the frame, the theory must be able to capture how this 
happens. How do the actions and practices reproduce the frame? Furthermore, the theory must 
account for actions that oppose the frame, or seek to alter the dominant view the frame 
represents. Otherwise, actions and practices end up as independent variables as a result of the 
frame, and not in a process of mutual reinforcement as Autesserre claims. 
In the Congo there were very few opposing voices resisting the peacebuilding frame, according 
to Autesserre. Some local residents, some smaller NGOs working on the local level, and some 
UN staff challenged the dominant point of view, but these were too weak and insignificant to 
challenge the dominant narrative.437 As a result, changes in the frame were rare, occurring only 
when key actors saw ‘external change or shock as threatening to organizational survival’.438 In 
the Congo the dominant frame changed only in the wake of ‘unexpected, genocidal, or 
particularly horrific violence’ that threatened the survival of the UN mission.439 
If we were to generalize this into a generic theory, however, we would face two challenges. 
Firstly, the external shock, as described by Autesserre, again refers to organizational survival. 
That may be too narrow an approach in other cases, as there could be other shocks or challenges 
that may threaten or alter an intervention, or parts of an intervention, not limited to the 
intervening organizations as such. When, for instance, German forces conducted airstrikes 
against two Taliban-held fuel tankers in Kunduz, Afghanistan in 2009, causing some 90 civilian 
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casualties, this had a shocking effect on German society. It was not a question of the 
organizational survival of the Bundeswehr: no, it marked a significant alteration of the role of 
the military and perceptions of the operation in Afghanistan. Der Spiegel described it as the 
‘end of innocence’ that ‘changed everything’. 440  Sudden events and shocks may lead to 
adaptations and shifts in interventions, also without threatening organizational survival as such. 
Secondly, restricting the prospect of change of the frame to external shocks will be less fruitful 
in a general theory of intervention. This is because such an approach would a priori ignore or 
dismiss resistance and opposition within the frame. One would assume that there will always 
be internal power struggles in a frame, with competing factions and alternative approaches. It 
may have been the case in the Congo that internal resistance was too weak, but an analytical 
model needs to be able to incorporate change also from within. In other cases, internal resistance 
may prove stronger. This means that we must be able to capture resistance and opposition within 
the frame systematically, and analyse the evolution of the relative strength of the various voices 
within the frame. In that way we can understand better why and how the main actors keep 
reproducing a frame, and why change occurs if it does. 
Autesserre’s account of how her frame operates is not a convincing basis upon which to build 
a general theory. It relies on her empirical findings from the DRC where opposition to the frame 
was minimal, making it robust and dominant. Change took place only in extreme cases, and 
only from external forces. However, a deductive theory will need to be able to capture cases 
where the frame is more contested and change is more likely. Events on the ground can alter 
the perceptions and policies of the actors involved. Moreover, challenge and change may come 
from within the frame, from actors who are part of the intervention. 
 
2.4. Frames: Conclusions 
Autesserre’s analysis of the intervention in the DRC represents the most ambitious attempt at 
theorizing interventions to date. It draws on numerous sources and theories, some of which are 
worth exploring further. But her theory is largely inductively tailormade for this specific case: 
it cannot be applied deductively in other cases without significant modifications.  
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The term ‘frame’ (like ‘culture’) itself is rather loose, and requires further operationalization. 
The core elements of the Autesserre’s frame theory are the world polity and the organizational 
field, which provide the frame with a set of normal and acceptable ways of behaviour among 
the intervening actors. However, world polity theory cannot help us to understand norm change, 
which was seen largely as a force exogenous to the intervening actors themselves, imposed 
upon them from ‘the world’, as it were.  
While the organizational field appeared to offer an approach to study inter-organizational 
behaviour, Autesserre does not make clear how this field came about or which mechanisms 
were involved in creating the convergence observed in the Congo. As theories of organizational 
fields focus predominantly on organizational convergence or isomorphism, such studies do not 
fit in with what students of interventions are primarily interested in. This is unfortunate, because 
such convergence is an obvious precondition before any concept such as field – or frame – can 
be applied. In order to be treated as analytical units, organizations need to share features, but 
students of interventions may be interested mainly in what a given unit does to others, outside 
the unit. A primary focus on organizations and organizational behaviour in organizational field 
theory may limit the analytical scope in studying interventions.  
Furthermore, the frames come across as surprisingly robust. In Autesserre’s version, they 
change only when exposed to external shocks that threaten organizational survival. If so, that 
can help in explaining lack of change and adaptability – but it is analytically risky to operate 
with such rigidity in a concept as vaguely defined as frames are. The tautology that Lebow 
warned of may be close, if the frame is there because it is upheld by the frame. Moreover, in 
other cases, resistance from within may be significantly stronger than it was in the Congo, so 
we need a theory that can take that into account.  
Autesserre’s comprehensive theorizing has several positive some elements worth retaining in a 
deductive theory of interventions, as well as certain negative aspects that need to be dealt with. 
Her philosophical ontological approach – which I defined as being within the analyticist 
category – makes it possible to build on her main methodological orientation. Following this, 
her usage of constitutive theory also seems fruitful in this context, as events on the ground may 
impact the perceptions and assumptions (or frame, in Autesserre’s terminology). However, 
some of her theoretical building blocks, such as the term ‘frame’, and the underlying concepts 




We therefore need to find a way to maintain Autesserre’s basic orientation and focus, while 
replacing some of her analytical tools. To this I now turn. 
 
3. Analytical framework: Identification 
 
An alternative theory and analytical framework, applicable to several cases in a deductive 
fashion, needs to be general enough to fit several groups of actors (such as ‘peacebuilders’ and 
‘humanitarians’) in several different cases. The aim in the context of this dissertation is to 
understand challenges related to coherence between intervening actors, but that does not rule 
out that the framework might also be applied to investigate other questions related to 
interventions. As discussed above, the framework must be able to account for change and 
evolution of the policies and practices in various groups; it must avoid ending up with 
explanations that are based on factors outside the scope of the study (such as world polity), and 
avoid analytical concepts that do not necessarily bring new clarity or insights (such as frames).  
What defines humanitarians, international police forces, diplomats or the armed forces as 
groups in an intervention? A basic answer would be identity. They define themselves vis-à-vis 
other groups by attributing a shared meaning to themselves – a reason for being there, a common 
vision or purpose – in other words, their identity. An analytical focus on identity directs us to 
fundamental questions such as: Who are they intervening upon? How do they represent and 
engage them? How do they perceive themselves and their task? And crucially: how does their 
perception of the intervention evolve over time? The answer to these questions will show how 
the various intervening actors, or groups of actors, differentiate themselves, from those they are 
deployed to engage, as well as from other intervening actors. To this process of defining who 
and what is Self and Other in this context I now turn, as this lays the foundation for perceptions, 
worldviews, policies and practices. As such, identity as an analytical tool has the same ambition 
as Autesserre’s frames, but offers a more dynamic and flexible analytical approach that can 
account for change. 
In the following I sketch out an analytical framework that enquires into the processes of identity 
formations of the intervening actors. It will offer a systematic account of how the worldviews 
and perceptions of intervening actors emerge and evolve, and how these actors relate to and 




I define ‘identity’ as the meaning that various actors ascribe to themselves and the operation of 
which they are a part. This concerns how the presence in the intervention is legitimized and 
how one set of actors differentiates itself from other actors. Since the Self largely is constituted 
by differentiation from the Others, this can be investigated by analysing one group’s 
representations of the Other in contrast to themselves. In principle any group could function as 
such a differentiating Other, but in the case of intervention, the main Others tend to be those 
people who are on the receiving end of the intervention.  
But first: is not ‘identity’ just as elusive a concept as discussed about ‘culture’ above? It may 
entail the same analytical challenges in terms of being vague and undefinable. Like many other 
concepts in the social sciences – such as ‘market’, ‘class’, ‘nations’ and ‘frames’– it is hard to 
pin down. Identity is applied in various academic fields, from philosophy to psychology, 
ethnography, sociology, economy and IR, and may have different connotations in each. 
Moreover, ‘identity’ is a word used in everyday language, as well as being a political concept 
employed for political purposes like nationalism or demands for self-determination. What the 
term ‘identity’ means is not immediately clear – and it may be taken out of context and 
(mis)used for political purposes.  
Many researchers seek to escape this dilemma of politicization by stressing the elusive and fluid 
nature of identity. The challenge is of course that an overly-loose concept loses its analytical 
vigour. Therefore, Brubaker and Cooper argue for dismissing identity altogether as an analytical 
concept: ‘… “identity” is too ambiguous, too torn between “hard” and “soft” meanings, 
essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social 
analysis.’441 Further: ‘…if one wants to argue that particularistic self-understandings shape 
social and political action in a non-instrumental manner, one can simply say so.’442 
Nonetheless, they suggest some alternative analytical idioms which can do ‘the theoretical work 
“identity” is meant to do, without its confusing, contradictory connotations’ 443  These are: 
‘identification’, ‘categorization’, ‘self-understanding’ and ‘commonality’. One particularly 
attractive feature of these alternatives is that most of them are derived from verbs, and describe 
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processes rather than conditions. This seems to fit well with the constantly evolving nature of 
identities, while simultaneously opening up for agency in the analysis.  
Studying identification would therefore entail looking into the very basics of a social group, the 
glue that keeps them together, and the constant evolution of this glue. Such analysis can provide 
a platform for subsequent analyses of more narrow character. We can understand the very basic 
ideas shared by a group of interveners and how these are challenged, contested or upheld.  
 
3.1. Self and Other 
The first academic studies of collective identities, of groups of Selves and Others, and their 
mutual co-constitution, is often associated with the pioneering work of Fredrik Barth.444 The 
definition of Self and Other is about drawing boundaries in several dimensions. The struggles 
over such boundaries and the power-relations this entails are political.445 It is here that change 
is allowed or denied, and normalities are defined. Identities are made up of the set of traditions, 
ways of thinking, and representations that define and usually restrict the possible scope of 
political action. We may also study identity at different levels. The focus here are on collective 
identities, but these can be in smaller or larger groups, more or less explicitly codified in 
institutions, organizations, religion, nations or something else. Intervening actors will for 
instance in most cases be organizations: military units, NGOs, UN agencies and so forth. Each 
of these organizations probably have a certain identity, that give the staff some pride, 
uniqueness or collectiveness vis a vis other organizations. However, as discussed above, in the 
analytical framework here, I will pay attention to collective identities that are on a higher level. 
i.e. identities that are shared between similar organizations. In these cases the shared identities 
may be less explicit, compared to an organization with a logo, a budget and a history, but it is 
analytically approachable by looking at their shared representation of their Other.  
Importantly, if we are to take Brubaker and Cooper’s criticism of identity as an analytical 
concept into account, we must pay attention to the processes of identification. We will need to 
study not instances of identity, but the processes (and thus struggles) of defining them – the 
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identification. This can be done in several ways, depending also on the case. For instance, with 
his concept of ‘imagined communities’, Benedict Anderson conducted an historical study of 
how nations have been ‘imagined’ through history: people who had never met nonetheless 
shared a notion of the nation they were part of.446 He saw imagination as similar to identification, 
emphasizing process and change. Similarly, Charles Taylor demonstrated that we cannot 
understand our present modern identity without an historical grasp of the evolution of its 
sources.447  
Identity formation is a dynamic process; it is relational and political, since it is about drawing 
borders between categories of Self and Others. Analysing how the key actors in an intervention 
represent their Others may thus help us to understand identity formation of the Self. Further, it 
can help us to identify resistance, alternative voices, and representations which at some stage 
might change the frame from within – a possibility less evident in Autesserre’s approach. The 
identification process is also linked to policies: various representations of Self and Other may 
legitimize or preclude certain actions. 
The Self, the intervening actors, always involves a contrast to someone else. In William 
Connolly’s words: ‘Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts differences into 
otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.’448 The very purpose of intervening actors is 
to engage Others: without the existence of an Other to fight (for the military) or save (for 
humanitarians), there would be no need for them. The exact nature and location of these Others 
keeps changing – but without the prospect of their emerging from time to time, the very 
existence of the interveners would be called into question. If there were no more humanitarian 
disasters, there would be no humanitarian actors. If there were no post-conflict peace processes, 
there would be no need for peacebuilders. If organized political violence were somehow 
eradicated from the globe, armed forces would lose their meaning. None of these scenarios are 
likely – but representations of the nature of the Other impact on how these actors define 
themselves.  
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A theatre of intervention constitutes something ‘outside’ of them – a place where one intervenes 
or enters, doing something that legitimizes the activity: it serves as the Other to the intervening 
Self. Each identity represents the theatre and its perceived needs, and defines a policy in 
response. Herein also lies power. Some actors are stronger than others; some views are more 
dominant than others among intervening actors. Any representation of an Other implies the 
power of definition and knowledge. In this case, the representation of the Other (as those 
intervened upon) and its needs also carries an element of dominance.449 Those intervened upon 
tend to be the weaker part, often overwhelmed by the interveners, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
On the other hand, resistance from the Other is also often significant, as seen in numerous 
political and military interventions. It may play out in various forms; as violence, political 
resistance, undermining, corruption, or simply foot-dragging.  
The Self–Other relationship is at the core of any intervention. It is in this relation the intervening 
actors define the purpose of intervention, and thus the purpose of themselves. The Self–Other 
relationship should therefore be at the heart of analyses of interventions and the relations 
between the intervening actors as well. How, then, we should go about making analyses of such 
identification processes? 
 
3.2. How to study identification: Representing the Other in three dimensions 
In IR, David Campbell’s Writing Security (1992) was a pioneering work that showed the 
importance of identity in the formulation of US foreign policy. However, he focused primarily 
on the perceived dangers: Others that were represented as radically different from the American 
Self. He paid less attention to alternative representations of Self and Other in American foreign 
policy.450 However, most Self/Other relations in international relations are neither violent nor 
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odious: the Other need not be so radically different from the Self. There are rather degrees of 
difference, as evident in Western representations of Russia or ‘the East’, ‘the Balkans,’ or ‘the 
Orient’.451 Such differentiations may be just as important in defining the Self as the existence 
of a radically different Other. The question of the status of the Other has therefore been widely 
discussed among students of identity.452 
It is the spatial dimension, such as geopolitics, states and empires, that has traditionally attracted 
most attention in IR. That is not very surprising, as states and territory are central elements in 
world politics. However, identity may also be formed along other dimensions. For instance, as 
Ole Wæver has argued that, even if Europe is a spatial unit which has defined itself in contrast 
to other regions, such as Russia or the Middle East, it defines itself in historical terms as well: 
today’s Europe is often represented as different from its own violent past. The drive for 
European integration has been largely fuelled by a fear of a repetition of European history. 
Integration is meant to prevent war. This contrasting of the present Self from the past would 
constitute an Other in the temporal dimension.453 A further example of such identification in 
temporal terms could be ‘developing states’ as opposed to ‘developed states’, where ‘we’ 
consider ourselves to be more advanced than ‘them’. Such views of history as linear and 
trajectory were perhaps best expressed in the ‘modernization’ theories of the 1950s, but traces 
may still be present in today’s interventions, as often claimed by the critics of ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’.454  
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Another dimension of identification can be found in Tzvetan Todorov’s modern classic The 
Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. 455  He discusses several levels of value 
judgements in 16th-century Spanish debates about how to define ‘the Indians’ of the New World. 
Where they to be regarded as unalterable outcastes (which could be eliminated) – or as 
‘potential Christians’ and thereby a group that could be engaged and reformed, in essence 
assimilated?456 Different ethical perceptions of the Other can legitimize radically different 
courses of action. Charles Taylor also focuses on morality in his quest for the sources of the 
modern self. ‘Selfhood and morality’ he argues, ‘turn out to be inextricably intertwined 
themes.’457 Our view of ourselves and others along such moral-ethical lines may be referred to 
as the ethical dimension of identity formation.  
One scholar who has attempted to combine these three dimensions of identity is Lene Hansen 
in the above-mentioned work on the Western response to the Bosnian war.458 Hansen refers to 
spatial, temporal, and ethical dimensions as the core elements of foreign-policy identity 
formations: ‘Space, time and responsibility are the big concepts through which political 
communities – their boundaries, internal constitution, and relationship with the outside world – 
are thought and argued.’459 As noted, she uses this approach to show, inter alia, how the 
dominant discourse changed from a ‘Balkan discourse’ (intervention is futile) to a ‘genocide 
discourse’ (intervention is necessary). This parallel analysis of the representations of the Other 
in three dimensions is fruitful and worth building on, as it makes for a broader and more robust 
analysis than some of the other studies discussed above.  
However, Hansen’s approach has certain limitations when it comes to applying it on a theory 
of interventions. Firstly, her epistemological focus is explicitly poststructuralist, and she 
develops a discourse analysis within this tradition. As we have seen, identity formations can be 
analysed in many ways beside poststructuralist discourse analysis, and there is no reason why 
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the analytical framework of interventions should limit itself to one methodology.460 Secondly, 
Hansen’s empirical basis is limited to written and oral texts: official documents, newspaper 
articles, speeches etc. She does not consider practices or policies (such as military operations), 
which in the case of interventions may prove highly relevant for identification processes. 
Thirdly, she studies the foreign policy of states – not other global entities or actors, such as 
international organizations or groups of organizations. The dynamics of identity formation and 
policy formulation in states may for instance be more confined and constant compared to those 
in and among international organizations.  
Therefore, I seek to offer a more open analytical framework: one that focuses on identification 
processes through representations of the Other in the three dimensions, but which includes more 
than texts, and which can focus on groups of actors in an intervention, and not only the foreign 
policy of states. 
The spatial dimension refers to how the physical boundaries of an identity are drawn – where 
the Others – and thus the Self – are located in space. In the context of interventions this will be 
where the Other is located in contrast to the Self. For the military, it could be ‘enemy territory’, 
a certain part of the country, mountains, etc. For diplomats, it could be the country in which the 
intervention takes place, generally limited to the capital and the local interlocutors present there.  
The temporal dimension refers to how the boundaries of development or progress are drawn. Is 
the Other regarded as, for instance, ‘backward’, ‘primitive’ or ‘underdeveloped’? Are the 
institutions in a country considered to be in need of reform in order to meet ‘international 
standards’ in management, efficiency, gender balance, etc.? Many intervening actors are 
engaged in capacity building, training and institutional reform in everything from the military 
sector to police, judicial, correctional services, to ministerial and municipal bureaucracies. The 
Selves thus legitimize their presence in the services they are offering by referring to the need 
for reform and ‘modernize’ the Other. 
The ethical dimension refers to how the boundaries are drawn between values and ethical 
principles. The military may, for instance, regard the Other as a ‘barbarian’ or ‘non-legitimate’ 
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warrior. Humanitarians see their mission to do relief work as deeply ethical, saving people’s 
lives irrespective of politics. They see victim Others, which legitimizes the engagement of 
humanitarian Selves. Peacebuilders seek democracy and liberal institutions as a means to 
provide freedom and liberty for the people with whom they engage.  
A study of an identification process therefore needs to look for policies, practices, texts, 
doctrines, debates where the lines are drawn between Self and Other in all three dimensions. 
By representing the Other in certain ways along the three dimensions, the Self is shaping its 
own identity.  This will also legitimize certain policies and practices, while precluding others. 
As a constitutive theory, this framework is aimed not at explaining certain concrete actions, but 
at exploring and understanding the circumstances that made them rational, natural, or necessary 
in the eyes of the Self. These practices and policies will also contribute in maintaining or 
altering these identities. However, alternative practices or specific events may challenge the 
dominant identity. Identity and associated practices are co-constitutive: the identities are not 
just ‘out there’ as de facto ‘independent variables’ (as Autesserre’s world polity and 
bureaucratic fields proved to be), but are in a fluid relation to the associated practices. Both 
may change or alter the other. By focussing on the debates, conflicts and struggles associated 
with each identity dimension, as well as the practical implications, this analytical framework 
can account for change. 
 
3.3. Delimitations  
Like any other analytical categorization, an identification process is an approach that one 
chooses in an attempt to analyse societies in a specific way. As discussed in Chapter 1, seen 
from an analyticist perspective, a study of identification is a way of helping us to connect with 
the world and conduct our analysis. The analytical framework therefore needs to be delimited 
in three directions. 
Firstly, the borderlines of each identity must be defined. Where the analyst chooses to draw the 
borderline between the analytical categories will impact upon the analysis, as there is a risk of 
ignoring relevant factors or actors. It is not a priori given that one categorization is better than 
another. As discussed above, each identity will comprise various intervening organizations, that 
themselves are likely to have an organizational identity of their own. The focus of the analytical 




If we are to analyse the shared identity of for example the humanitarian actors in an intervention, 
we need to analytically define who is part of the group ‘humanitarian actor’ and who is not. 
This will largely be an empirical question, as the actors themselves draw their lines between 
Other and Self. However, since there are degrees of otherness and three dimensions, it may not 
always be clear-cut where the researcher should draw the demarcation line. On the other hand, 
a study of identification processes will generally include precisely these debates and power-
struggles over where to draw these borders. For instance, many NGOs are involved in 
humanitarian relief as well as in development projects of a more political nature. The internal 
debates among humanitarians over such combinations will in itself shed light on where they 
draw the demarcation line. As these may well be fluid processes, the analysis might fruitfully 
focus on the struggles and debates, rather than on defining exactly which actors should be 
placed in each category.  
Furthermore, certain groups are more readily categorized analytically than others. 
‘Humanitarians’ may be a more homogeneous group than, for instance, ‘peacebuilders’. The 
latter may include UN staff, democratization officers, gender advisers, diplomats, and police 
officers, and they may not refer to themselves as ‘peacebuilders’ in the way humanitarians do. 
This is therefore an analytical categorization which the researcher will need to legitimize as 
valid or relevant by demonstrating that they share certain features in terms of their identity – 
for instance, they may all see themselves as important and relevant to the process of helping the 
Other to achieve sustainable peace through reform and democratization.  
In short, if a researcher believes or suspects the existence of one, two, or three dominant 
identities in an intervention, the research design may be constructed accordingly. However, 
since the empirical study will look in particular for conflicting representations of the Other, the 
researcher should be prepared to revise her analytical categories (number of Selves) if this 
proves more feasible for the analysis. 
Secondly, an analysis of identification processes must be delimited in time. Besides the basic 
delimitation of the period under empirical scrutiny, it could for instance include historical 
comparisons. As in most social science methodology, the relevance of the historical pretext 
needs to be assessed.  The humanitarian identity can probably be traced back to the 
establishment of the International Red Cross in the 19th century. An analysis of an identification 
process among intervening actors will therefore usually need to incorporate also processes that 




‘world polity’, ‘global cultures’, or traditional and essentialist perception of a country or a 
people may very well be present in the awareness of interveners, prior to the actual intervention. 
However, in contrast to Autesserre’s model, a study of identity formations may account for 
changes in such pre-positions. The intervening actors may alter their perceptions in the course 
of an intervention. The researcher needs to draw a line in time, but again it is the actual empirical 
findings related to the usage of the past that matter the most. If the actors themselves make 
reference to historical background or principles in their debates and representations of the 
current situation, that is relevant for the analysis as well.  
Thirdly, an analytical framework that examines identification processes among groups of 
intervening actors faces the same challenges in terms of case-study research design and validity 
of sources as other social science methodologies. This applies in particular to validity in source 
and data selection.  Sources may be documents, such as official texts, mandates, legal 
documents, international humanitarian law, military doctrines public debates and speeches. But 
it could also be actions, policies, or ‘socially meaningful patterns of action’, often referred to 
as practices.461 Methodologically, the data may be collected through field-work, interviews, or 
secondary sources, depending on the research design. 
The analytical framework is applicable to any intervention and any group of actors, along the 
three dimensions. The concrete research design in each case will need to be delimited in these 
three directions.  
 
3.4. Understanding the challenges to coherence  
This analytical framework offers a flexible approach which can be applied to the study of any 
intervention and any set of actors. It will reveal the dynamics of the identification processes – 
how some representations of the Other are more dominant than others, but that these 
representations also may be challenged both from within the group and outside of it. The 
dominant identity legitimizes certain policies and practices and preclude others. If, for example, 
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the humanitarians consider engagement with the military as a threat to their own identity, they 
are unlikely to cooperate or even communicate. However, as discussed here, for most 
humanitarians, the most prominent Others are not the other interveners, but the people they 
intervene on – the resident population, the insurgency adversary, or the local authorities. For 
that reason, what makes coherence challenging is rarely the tensions, competition or conflicts 
between the intervening actors as such. No, we need to examine how the Selves consider their 
Others, and how the objectives of the Self require, or make possible, cooperation with other 
interveners. Two conditions need to be met: 
Firstly, do the Selves consider military–civilian coherence to be of any relevance? A 
conventional military force, fighting a similar enemy, may, for instance, consider military–
civilian coherence irrelevant. However, as we saw in Chapter 1 and 2, NATO, the EU, the UN 
and many states see coherence as a precondition for success in interventions. That is the very 
basis of this dissertation. As we have seen, concepts such as ‘the security–development nexus’ 
and ‘integrated approach’ are widely recognized among intervening actors. Civilian actors may, 
for instance, consider the Other as somebody who should be introduced to democratic standards 
and practices: someone who can be reformed. They may also consider it necessary to engage 
the military to achieve this goal, for example by creating a secure environment in which 
elections can be held. Similarly, if the military interveners consider their Other to be the local 
security forces, and if they are seen as being ready to take upon themselves more security tasks, 
the intervening military may reach out to international police units and other civilians to help 
in achieving this goal. This was part of the COIN doctrine, as we saw in Chapter 3. In short, 
successful military–civilian coherence requires that the Selves reach out to other Selves: but it 
also requires that these other Selves share a similar representation of the Other.  
This, then, is the second condition: a similar view of the Other. If for instance, in the first case 
above, the military give priority to searching for enemy strongholds and adversaries to fight (an 
enemy-centric approach: see Chapter 4), rather than securing the conditions forholding 
elections, it indicates that they are engaging very different Others. Similarly, if the civilian 
actors regard the local security services as criminals or illegitimate warlords, or show no interest 
in them whatsoever because they focus on different Others, coherence and comprehensive 
approach will be difficult to achieve.  
For the second condition to be met and fruitful coherence achieved, there needs to be a certain 




must, firstly, be a degree of shared opinion of which Others to engage and where: which groups, 
organizations and locations are most important? (This involves the spatial dimension.) 
Secondly, there must be a shared view of how to engage them: should, for instance, they be 
reformed, or supressed? (This concerns the temporal dimension.) Lastly, some commonality on 
the ethical value of the Other is required: are they criminals or nascent democrats? (Here the 
ethical dimension enters in). The relative importance of these dimensions will differ from case 
to case, depending on the nature of the conflict, the intervening actors, relative resources etc. 
What the proposed analytical framework offers is exactly that: a framework which can be 
applied to make sense of and understand these relationships in a systematic way. There are no 
universal answers or generic explanations of the challenges to coherence in today’s 
interventions. Nonetheless, if a researcher conducts several empirical case studies with this 
analytical framework, certain commonalities across interventions may be revealed, as discussed 
above (external validity). The framework may even be adapted to study other topics and 




In this chapter I have argued that Séverine Autesserre’s study of the DRC stands out as an 
attempt at comprehensive theorizing of an intervention. Her usage of the theory concept of 
frames, with the supporting concepts of world polity and organizational field, has many positive 
features for studying interventions. However, the theoretical framework she develops is one 
inductively tailormade for her specific case and is not readily transferrable to other cases. 
Furthermore, Autesserre’s frames are on the one hand vague and elusive, on the other hand 
robust and static. They do not account very well for opposition to the dominant frame or for 
change. Lastly, her theories are not very helpful for studying several groups of intervening 
actors. To do so we would need to introduce several parallel frames within the same intervention. 
But since Autesserre’s theorizing focuses solely on how the frame constitutes similar mindsets 
across the whole range of actors, it offers little help in understanding how the intervening actors 
relate to the other frames or to other actors in the field, like local ones. 
I have therefore proposed an alternative analytical framework that can account for several 
groups of intervening actors, as well as being able to account for change from within. Instead 




Identity is studied on the level above the specific organizational identities that may exist, on the 
shared identity shared by similar intervening actors, such as military actors or humanitarian 
NGOs. By examining how they represent those whom they are deployed to engage (their Other), 
we can get a grasp of some very basic features of an intervention. This approach will explicitly 
look for opposition and change – both from within the identity (or frame, in Autesserre’s 
terminology) and from outside it.  
The framework I propose should be applicable to studies of interventions where political 
tensions are high and where many international actors are operating in parallel. These 
interventions may be studied from various angles, depending on the research question. But in 
all cases, an analysis of the processes representing the Other by main sets of actors will provide 
insights into the deeper questions of how they ascribe meaning to themselves their mission: 
how they regard their role, and how they regard the other actors, international as well as local, 
in the field of intervention. These are the basic issues underlying many practical, day-to-day 
issues, such as cooperation and conflict between the actors involved. This analytical framework 
will need to be adapted to each specific case. In the next chapter I demonstrate the relevance of 
this approach by sketching out an analysis of the identification processes of the main sets of 













The time has come to assess the analytical framework outlined in the previous chapter, to see 
if it is applicable to empirical cases – specifically, to the international intervention in 
Afghanistan 2001–2012. Here I have singled out three sets of intervening actors – the military, 
humanitarian and state-builders – for analysis. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the 
utility of the analytical approach developed in Chapter 5.  
Afghanistan attracted considerable Western attention and engagement. The military operation 
was the largest ever deployed by NATO, and the various civilian efforts were manifold and 
many-layered. Operations in Afghanistan included everything from counter-narcotics efforts 
and police training, to refugee return and school construction, finances and human resource 
management in the government – conducted by various agencies and donors in different places 
in the country simultaneously. Recent policy debates about coherence and comprehensive 
approach have emerged largely as a result of these experiences, as have the heated debates about 
the humanitarian space. The intervention has also been widely analysed and scrutinized, 
providing considerable amounts of material for this analysis. 
However, comprehensive and theoretically informed analyses of the intervention in 
Afghanistan have been few. Many studies have been commissioned by donors to evaluate 
specific programmes: they focus on the activities and day-to-day challenges of specific actors, 
rather than the country as such.462 There have been some comprehensive analyses conducted 
by journalists; however, these studies tend to lack deeper analysis of the underlying rationale 
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and the assumptions of change and progress on the part of the international community.463 
Numerous studies have attempted to explain why the intervention went wrong, despite all the 
resources invested. In the years leading up to the military drawdown, 464  the international 
interveners witnessed surging violence, limited developmental and economic progress, inept 
domestic political leadership, and widespread corruption. There were those who held that 
Afghanistan was a ‘graveyard of empires’ or like a ‘walk in the Old Testament’: almost beyond 
redemption, reform, or modernization.465 Yet others noted the centuries-old internal cultural 
and religious conflicts and modes of government.466 Some have pointed to conflicts between 
leaders of various international agencies, and between these and the Afghan authorities.467 
Despite these difficult circumstances, there have been numerous suggestions as to the right 
recipe. Some have argued for greater UN engagement, others for more ‘local ownership’.468 
Some have maintained that far too few resources were applied, or that they were mismanaged 
and wasted.469 Many therefore called for a military and civilian ‘surge’.470 Related to this, as 
discussed in previous chapters, there were many, particularly from the military, who held that 
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what was needed was better coordination among the international donors and actors.471 These 
myriads of explanations and associated remedies probably all offer important insights – but 
they do not offer a comprehensive understanding of the intervention per se. Some good 
academic efforts have been made to explain the international failures, but they have been 
relatively few, and are case-specific with limited theoretical ambitions.472 In short, there is 
plenty of research material to draw on, but few studies that have aimed at theoretically analysing 
a broad set of intervening actors. Furthermore, there are no theoretically informed studies of 
the challenges related to coherence or to the comprehensive approach in the Afghanistan 
intervention.  
This chapter will show that an analysis of identity processes can help us to understand how the 
various intervening actors acted the way they did, and why coherence between them was so 
difficult to achieve. To this end a similar set of analytical lenses will be applied to analyse the 
identity formations of three sets of actors – the military, the humanitarians, and the state-
builders – so that we can compare them, note their differences and similarities, and better 
understand their policies and practices. That will also demonstrate the utility of this analytical 
framework for other cases. 
By studying the identification processes of the three groups in question, I delve into the 
foundations of each group. By studying how they represent their Others, we simultaneously 
learn about their Self identities, and about their policy choices. 
The research design will be delimitations in three directions as, discussed in Chapter 5. Firstly, 
the number of identities or Selves. I have chosen to analyse three sets identities in Afghanistan: 
the military, humanitarian and state-building identities. But could more have been added, or 
would less have sufficed? The following analysis could surely be expanded; the UN and EU 
civilian police, the international counter-narcotics efforts are some actors I have chosen not to 
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Columbia University Press, 2009); Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in 
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include. Including them would probably have provided a richer analysis, but without necessarily 
altering the overall conclusions as they most likely would fit under the state-building identity.  
Furthermore, each Self could be broken down into several selves. For example, there are 
arguably several military identities operating simultaneously in Afghanistan. Each national 
contingent would for instance most likely represent an analytically identifiable Self. Reducing 
them to one is therefore a simplification. But, as I will show below, one identity has been 
dominant, while other representations may be regarded as challengers. Conversely, having 
fewer selves in the analysis would have weakened it, as all three represent significant elements 
of the overall international engagement in the Afghan theatre.  
The second is delimitation in time. The focus here is on the years 2001 to 2012, which was up 
to 2018 the period with greatest international engagement in Afghanistan. However, the 
identities of the intervening actors existed prior to the intervention, and most brought with them 
certain perceptions about the Other (such as the above-mentioned ‘a walk in the Old Testament’) 
prior to their deployment. This ‘luggage’ will form part of the analysis, to the extent it has been 
used by the actors themselves. 
An alternative design could have been to compare moments or make historical comparisons. 
With Afghanistan, comparison could be made with other similar contemporary invasions, such 
as Iraq, or historical ones, such as the experiences of the British Empire, or the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan. My choice of concentrating on one (extended) moment in time – the situation in 
2012 and the decade preceding it – follows somewhat logically from the research question and 
the number of selves. Adding more dimensions might not improve the analysis substantially.   
The third delimitation is source selection, which is crucial in any analysis, as it usually impacts 
directly on the findings and conclusions. Should, for example, the study of the military 
identification process include academic journals, blogs, and newspaper articles, in addition to 
military doctrines and official documents? I will argue yes, as the military identity is formed by 
much more than official doctrine alone. Where to draw the line will be a choice for each 
research design, and in the analysis below – due to space limitations – the selection will be far 
from exhaustive.  This analysis is also based upon secondary sources. I have not conducted 
field-work, nor done interviews with relevant stakeholders. The aim of the chapter is to 
demonstrate the utility of the analytical framework, not to offer a thorough analysis of the 




The three identities identified here (military, humanitarian and state-building) share one feature: 
the actors saw the need for them to be in Afghanistan, and with a role for themselves. Thus, 
‘Afghanistan’ constitutes something outside of them – a place where one intervenes or enters, 
doing something that legitimizes the activity: it serves as the Other for the intervening Self. 
Each representation of the Other is formed along three dimensions: spatial, ethical and temporal. 
Through this identification process, the respective ‘Afghanistans’ are defined within each group, 
which in turn normalize the ‘appropriate’ policy response.  
As we shall see, these three Selves appeared largely ignorant of each other, operating in parallel 
but not coherently. In contrast to Autesserre’s argument of there being a shared ‘peacebuilding 
frame’ in the DRC, I find no similar ‘Western approach’ to Afghanistan. There were at least 
three, with numerous conflicting representations of the Afghans. If we can understand how the 
three sets of actors had such fundamentally different reasons for being in Afghanistan, we may 
also grasp why a comprehensive approach never was achieved. 
 
2. The Military Identification Process 
2.1. The spatial dimension 
The military in Afghanistan was by far the most dominant group of interveners. It involved the 
greatest number of people and was the most powerful in terms of force on the ground. In 
Afghanistan as elsewhere, the identity of the military was based on a binary relationship with 
an adversary or enemy: by definition, this entailed a spatial relationship with an Other, 
physically located outside the military itself. This entity was usually labelled the Taliban, al-
Qaeda or ‘the insurgents.’ After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States declared itself at 
war on terror, thereby defining terrorism as a military matter, not a police one.473 Spatially, the 
terrorist is harder to pin down than the traditional state-enemy, but Afghanistan was quickly 
singled out as the location where terrorists had their base. This gave the War on Terror a 
locus.474 
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Initially the aim of intervention, named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), was to take 
control of Afghanistan and oust the Taliban government. After the coalition forces had removed 
the Taliban’s military and governing structures, the focus switched to rooting out the remaining 
elements and the al-Qaeda leadership, held to be hiding primarily in pockets in the mountainous 
border areas with Pakistan. In spatial terms, it was about gaining full control of the territory, by 
removing any remaining resistance. 475  The enemy Other was harder to see, but was still 
discernible as a distinct entity that could be eliminated through conventional means.476  
Around 2008, this conventional approach to the enemy was challenged by the launch of the 
counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine discussed in Chapter 3.477 It emerged as a result of the 
failures of the conventional approach, as the killing of Taliban soldiers failed to produce victory. 
Heavy reliance on airpower led to collateral damage and civilian deaths that served to alienate 
the local population.478 The Other responded with unconventional force: Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs), road mines, ambushes and acts of terror. In return, the COIN approach shifted 
focus from eliminating the enemy to alienating the enemy from the wider population. The centre 
of gravity then became the civilian population, not the enemy forces. This shift came as a result 
of internal developments in the US armed forces, represented by General David Petraeus’ 
success with a similar approach in Iraq and his subsequent drafting of the new US COIN 
doctrine.479 
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Spatially COIN remained a contest for territorial control, but the focus was on building 
legitimacy in the already-captured territories. As discussed in Chapter 3, the COIN tactic was 
often described as ‘clear–hold–build’: clear out the insurgents, hold the territory, and build 
sustainable domestic political and security presence. The enemy was thus clearly defined 
spatially as outside the areas controlled by the COIN soldiers and their local allies. The main 
objective was no longer to engage the enemy wherever he was located: it was to consolidate 
the areas already captured, and build local trust there.480 
As the focus changed from the enemy to the wider operational context, better knowledge about 
the environment, the culture and local customs became crucial. The ‘battle-space’ developed 
into several layers or ‘lines of operation’ that included economics, agriculture and 
infrastructure.481 The spatial dimension involved not only physical space but also non-military 
sectors of relevance for the political struggle. The introduction of Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) consisting of both civilian and military personnel was the most concrete example 
of this focus. The idea behind the PRTs was to support ‘reconstruction and development (R&D) 
in Afghanistan’ and to secure ‘areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other 
national and international actors.’482 The PRT model represented a significant deepening of the 
battle-space compared to conventional warfare.  
Another challenger to the conventional military identity was the ‘stabilization approach’ of 
several European countries that considered Afghanistan to be a limited threat to their own 
national security.483 They saw ISAF as a matter of NATO solidarity, and they were there in 
support of their most important ally, the United States. They tended to regard Afghanistan 
primarily as a weak state, where the role of ISAF was to support the UN and the Afghan 
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government until the latter could stand on its own.484  Spatially, the aim was to assist the 
implementation of authority of the central government through the PRTs, so that the 
government would one day control the entire territory. 485  The enemy was defined not as 
terrorists, but as all those who resisted this expansion of the authority of the government in 
Kabul, the governance and the security forces. This approach tended to focus on creating 
general stability within the ‘Area of Responsibility’, but was less interested in what happened 
outside of this area.  
 
2.2. The ethical dimension 
The ethical dimension was important for the military identification process. The very legitimacy 
of the war in Afghanistan was based on the fact of the 9/11 attacks in the USA, denounced as 
‘barbaric’ and ‘evil’ by President George W. Bush and numerous commentators. The ensuing 
war in Afghanistan became a war in defence of US national security and dignity. It was seen as 
just and necessary, a moral response from the free world against the ‘enemies of freedom’, to 
quote Bush.486  
Here, the enemy was branded as morally and ethically inferior, employing terrorism against 
innocent civilians as well as their own people. This ascribed backwardness was also reflected 
in the images of religious fanatics, depicted as devoid of compassion or other human traits. In 
warfare, such persons ignored Western rules of engagement, indiscriminately employing 
suicide bombers and roadside bombs. As a result, the Bush administration refused to recognize 
the Taliban as ‘enemy combatants’ (which would entitled them to prisoner-of-war status 
according to the Geneva Conventions), or as civilians: they became ‘unlawful combatants’.487 
This new categorization of the enemy made clear the extraordinarily low moral standing of the 
Taliban in the eyes of the US administration. The Taliban was indeed a radical Other. 
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In this way the conventional military identity was reinforced: it was boosted nationally and 
politically, but also morally. The stark contrast to the enemy made the US military self-superior 
also in moral/ethical terms. The operational result of this identity was the view that the enemy 
could be overcome by conventional means. The military now had a mission that was achievable, 
and one that reinforced its status as an efficient, necessary, and morally justifiable force.  
Gradually, however, this position eroded. Lack of progress in the war and heightened criticism 
of civilian casualties made it difficult to maintain an identity of ethical superiority. When the 
COIN doctrine was launched, it focused less on an ‘evil’ and ‘barbarian’ enemy as contrasted 
to the ‘morally superior’ US forces. Instead, assisting the local forces now became more central 
– so, to a greater extent, the defining Other became the Afghan soldier who could be trained 
and brought up to a certain modern standard. Success in COIN was measured largely in terms 
of success in training and equipping local forces, and of enabling them to hold territory and 
keep the Taliban at bay.488 The ethical dimension of the military identity remained a morally 
righteous one, but it was more nuanced, less black-and-white: also one’s own troops could make 
mistakes. There were degrees of difference among the Others, and the ethical dimension in the 
COIN focused on those that who be transformed into something ethically similar to the Self. 
The conventional approach was also challenged along the ethical dimension by the stabilization 
approach. Many European ISAF countries, among them Germany and the Nordic countries,489 
have had a domestic ‘peace identity’ that made explicit references to ‘warfare’ in Afghanistan 
difficult for their governments. ‘Assistance’ or ‘stabilization’ had a better ethical feel. 
Furthermore, in ISAF the legal definition of the adversaries was ‘criminals’, not ‘enemies’. 
These adversaries violated domestic, not international, law by using violence,490 and were 
therefore not legal combatants according to international law. An enemy combatant may be 
captured or pacified, becoming a prisoner of war, but will retain his military rank and identity 
                                                 
488 See for example, President Barack Obama, ‘A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, March 2009, 
available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/03/27/a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 
489 With the exception of Denmark, which has opted for a more offensive deployment policy in international 
operations since 2001. See Anders Wivel, ‘Between Paradise and Power: Denmark’s Transatlantic Dilemma’, 
Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005), 417–21; Alyson J. K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf and Bengt Sundelius, The 
Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy (Solna: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 2006).  
490 From the perspective of international law, the fighting in Afghanistan was defined as a non-international or 
internal war from the moment the Karzai government was inaugurated in June 2002 (before then it was an 





until the war ends. He is not expected to switch sides or change his basic identity. As noted, the 
Bush administration’s term ‘unlawful combatants’ implied that the enemy was beyond 
redemption. Criminals, by contrast, can and shall be reformed, according to Western legal and 
philosophical traditions. They are expected to serve their time of punishment and then in 
principle be reintegrated into society, thereby switching sides. The ethical consequence of 
applying the term ‘criminal’ to the adversary is the expectation that that, if given the chance, he 
can change for the better. 
For the identity of stability-approach soldiers this can be confusing, because it calls into 
question what soldiering is all about. While the Self-identity of the soldier remains ethically 
superior to that of a criminal, troops cannot engage in war with criminals: force is to be applied 
only in self-defence. How then to draw the line between policing and soldiering?491 The military 
have no training in law enforcement, but end up as a quasi-police. Such questions may have 
been discussed primarily by military lawyers and less by the troops themselves, but these 
dilemmas did create real-world challenges, not least as regards the rules of engagement. 
 
2.3. The temporal dimension 
The definition of the quality of the Other was also the issue in the temporal dimension, where 
the conventional approach typically portrayed the enemy Other as ‘backward’, ‘tribal’ or 
‘exotic’.492 Stories of Taliban rule focusing on the oppression of women, banning of music and 
pictures, extremely conservative dress codes, etc., were familiar in the West also prior to the 
invasion. 493  The Western military was therefore fighting an enemy who was considered 
primitive and undeveloped, entrenched in its own medieval interpretation of Islam. Importantly, 
this reading of the Taliban saw them as unchangeable – they were not seen as enemies who 
might surrender or negotiate a peace agreement: they could not become less radical Others 
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through rational dialogue. No progress was possible. As a result, conventional warfare became 
the response of the Self: engage the enemy, kill or capture him, and destroy his infrastructure. 
By contrast, the COIN approach focused on developing a sustainable security situation through 
institution- or state-building.494 There, the Others could also be regarded as evolving toward an 
‘almost-Self’ as they modernized and developed Western military standards. The radical enemy 
Other, the Taliban, loomed in the background and threatened to interfere, but the very logic of 
COIN entailed degrading them to a secondary position. There was no need to fight them all: 
instead, they were to be marginalized.495 As Afghanistan made progress, they were expected to 
become less and less attractive or relevant for the local population. Over time, formerly hostile 
tribes and groups were expected to seek to come to terms with the new, stable, prosperous 
Afghanistan, and would either succumb, negotiate, or gradually integrate into the wider society. 
COIN was premised on the assumption of change and progress, to which the military were to 
contribute. 
Similarly, the stabilization approach referred to reform and achievements compared to the 
Taliban when assessing success. For example, when asked if the deployment was ‘worth it’, the 
head of Norway’s Afghanistan contingent said: 
Last year 400 000 girls were enrolled in the schools for the first time (…) this year 500 
000 girls (…) by the end 2009 2.5 million girls will be attending school. The child 
mortality rate has been reduced by 25% since 2002…90% of the population today have 
access to healthcare, while only 10% did in 2001…I would like to hear someone tell me 
that 2.5 million girls in school is ‘hopeless’.496  
Interestingly, the justification for the military operations is here based on civilian progress, not 
military progress or even general security. This was not uncommon among European ISAF 
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forces, and indicates how some senior soldiers saw their own role and identity.497  In this 
representation, ISAF has been contributing to a liberalizing development process, aimed at 
helping Afghanistan modernize and move away from the times of the harsh Taliban regime. 
 
2.4. Conclusions: The military identification process 
To summarize, in the conventional approach, the Other was regarded as a fixed entity – evil 
and unchangeable, beyond political or ethical redemption. This legitimized and normalized 
military operations aimed at eliminating as many enemies as possible. Side-effects of this 
warfare, such as civilian casualties, were not considered relevant for victory. What COIN did 
was to recognize the relationship between Self and Other: how the Self could actually 
strengthen the Other by following such a conventional mind-set in waging the war. COIN 
prescribed a more careful and sensitive approach, seeking to win over the people instead of 
alienating them. The more marginal stabilization approach went even further in hinting at an 
identity resembling police or even development workers.  
Since COIN was launched from the top, from the US military leadership in the Pentagon, we 
might have expected the changes to be introduced and implemented swiftly. But the COIN 
approach apparently encountered substantial resistance when it came to operationalization on 
the ground. According to many soldiers, it focused too much on the transformation of local 
forces and civilian confidence-building, at the expense of fighting the war and direct 
engagement with the enemy.498 Marginalizing the Taliban may have appeared less appealing 
for soldiers in the field than killing and capture. For a military identity, the enemy Other 
naturally becomes the focus of attention, particularly during deployment in the theatre. When 
the concept of the enemy Other becomes blurred, so does the military Self-identity. As a result, 
there were signs of a return to the conventional military approach in the last years of ISAF. It 
seems that even General Petraeus himself lost faith in COIN when he assumed command of 
ISAF in 2010 and returned to more conventional operations such as night raids and 
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bombings.499 The military ‘surge’ resulted largely in conventional military operations (rooting 
out the Taliban): any attempts at ‘building’ were flawed.500  
These variations in the military identity formations, how they have ascribed different meanings 
to the Others and themselves, can help us to understand shifts in the behaviour and operational 
approaches of the military. They also show how the definition of success and victory and the 
purpose of the operations changed in time and space. Was the purpose to defeat the enemy 
through combat, to marginalize him and make him irrelevant – or, as indicated in the 
stabilization approach, to transform him? The military identity in Afghanistan seemed to be a 
combination of all these, with a highly mixed-up representation of the Other. The prescribed 
outreach to civilian ‘Lines of Operations’ in COIN and the inclusion of civilians in the PRTs 
represented something relatively new for most military organizations and for the military 
identity – and their limited success may indicate that the conventional enemy-centric identity 
prevailed after all. 
Thus far, the enemy Other had been only part of the identity through his violent responses to 
the intervention, and Western readings of these. If the aim of the intervention was indeed to 
change the Other in some way, one might perhaps expect a more interactive presence of the 
Other in the identification process. There was, for example, no political/diplomatic dimension 
in the war operating in parallel to the military dimension and offering alternative solutions. 
Perhaps the definition of the Other as ‘unlawful combatants’ or as criminals made it impossible 
for the military identity to envisage a political leadership of the enemy that was worth engaging 
with.501 Such exclusion of the Other from a more prominent or direct presence in the identity is 
evident in the two other identities as well. 
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3. The Humanitarian Identification Process 
 
The differences between the military and the humanitarian identities are striking. Humanitarian 
actors typically operate in small NGOs; they have a strong humanitarian ideology and personal 
engagement in relieving civilian suffering, live close to the people they help, and have limited 
resources.502  Traditionally they have also operated very independently of the military and 
political actors. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, this begun to change from the 1990s 
onwards. More and more humanitarian actors became engaged in human rights advocacy in 
addition to humanitarian relief; some even advocated military ‘humanitarian interventions’ in 
crisis areas such as Kosovo and Darfur. Thus began the era of ‘political humanitarianism’, 
where the same actors could be engaged in promoting universal values and human rights, 
advocating the ‘responsibility to act’, initiating development projects, and in addition doing 
traditional humanitarian work.503 The conflation and proliferation of these roles coincided with 
the rapid expansion of UN peacekeeping missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
establishment of international criminal tribunals, and the general trend in international crisis 
management which emphasized human rights at the expense of state sovereignty.  
The humanitarian identification process in Afghanistan – as defined here – therefore came to 
involve a whole range of actors, from traditional humanitarians to development agencies, 
human rights activists, and policy advocates. In practice, most actors did some of all of these 
activities. The group included nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), governmental agencies 
(GOs), and intergovernmental agencies (IGOs). There were obvious tensions within this group 
and among NGOs, GOs, and IGOs about the identity and meaning of civilian engagement in 
Afghanistan. Classical (or orthodox) humanitarians continued to resist politicization, but found 
themselves challenged from many sides. 
As discussed above, the analytical categorization of all these actors into one group, is largely 
empirical. Actors that have a similar representation of the Other, and a similar Self-identity, can 
be analytically grouped together. Furthermore, by observing the internal differences between 
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them, we can get a feel for the power struggles over who the Other is or should be, what policies 
that are acceptable, and ultimately what the humanitarian identity ought to be.  
 
3.1. The spatial dimension 
The spatial dimension of the humanitarian identification process is not about the control of 
territory, but concerns a conceptual space: the humanitarian space. This is based on the idea 
that humanitarian values transcend sovereignty. In this way, ‘humanitarian action seeks to 
reconfigure space to accommodate a new human rights-based borderless global vision.’504 The 
‘borderlessness’ (clearly expressed in the name Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) is defined as 
a sphere devoid of politics, where humanitarian actors have a duty to intervene and where they 
define themselves as the sole legitimate actors.  
The entry of security actors into the humanitarian and development sector in Afghanistan 
disturbed many humanitarian actors, who feared that humanitarian assistance and development 
could become a subset of a security strategy rather than a humanitarian needs-driven effort.505 
Tensions rose when military forces also begun distributing humanitarian aid to win ‘hearts and 
minds’ and to obtain intelligence, as discussed in Chapter 4.506  
The PRTs were a particular target of this criticism, as they had a range of civilian development 
personnel embedded in a predominantly military unit. As noted in Chapter 4, it was argued that 
the PRTs blurred the distinction between the humanitarian actors and the military, and that this 
represented a politicization of aid. As a result, neutrality was severely undermined, it was 
claimed, and thereby also the security of civilian aid agencies which relied on the trust of the 
population to be able to work in volatile areas.507 The humanitarians were demanding that this 
‘humanitarian space’ be left unpoliticized, for ethical reasons and for the security of aid workers.  
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Certain humanitarian actors went quite far in accusing the military of being the main challenge 
encountered in the theatres where they operated. They accused the military of creating more 
problems than they resolved, due to collateral damage and insensitive behaviour, while 
simultaneously endangering others (the humanitarians). In this respect the military became not 
only an Other, but indeed a dangerous or threatening Other for the humanitarian Self.  
Humanitarian actors also resisted being seen as part of the UN integrated mission concept. They 
fought to keep the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) physically 
separate from United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), arguing that 
OCHA and thereby the humanitarian community would be politicized by being co-located with 
the more political UNAMA mission.508 While the military represented a threat because of its 
military activities, the UN did so by politicizing aid. In this view, UNAMA and other non-
humanitarian UN organizations were also Others – actors to be literally kept at (at least) arm’s 
length to affirm the humanitarian identity. In this sense, the humanitarian space was also 
physical: simply being observed in the vicinity of troops or other political actors (Others) could 
undermine the humanitarian Self, as the borderlines became blurred. 
But the humanitarian space was also threatened from within the humanitarian identity. It was 
not uncommon for actors to seek to stretch this space to include development projects or human 
rights advocacy as well. Some, like MSF, deliberately reported on human rights violations, 
arguing that neutrality cannot be equated with silence.509 Others engaged in development, such 
as construction, reconstruction, capacity-building and education projects. In this way 
humanitarian work became conflated partly with development aid, partly with human rights 
advocacy. 510  Both these approaches were attempts at addressing the root causes of the 
humanitarian suffering, or even the root causes of war. In both cases this represented a 
politicization of their work and their identity, as discussed above. 511  However, this 
politicization was not always recognized among the humanitarian/development actors, who 
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continued to demand respect for their humanitarian space. What then in effect became an ‘NGO 
space’ has no foundation in international law or the ‘humanitarian imperative’, but was 
nonetheless defended in certain NGO circles.512  
 
3.2. The ethical dimension 
The ethical dimension is very significant for the humanitarian identity formation. A basic 
reference point in this identity is International Humanitarian Law (IHL), primarily the Geneva 
and Hague Conventions on warfare. A further foundation, as discussed in Chapter 4, is the 
‘humanitarian imperative’ (independence, impartiality, neutrality), codified in the Red Cross 
Code of Conduct. 513 These are the four first Principle Commitments:  
1. The humanitarian imperative comes first. 
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without 
adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need 
alone. 
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. 
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. 
 
The identity of the humanitarian worker is deeply embedded in these principles. Independence, 
impartiality, neutrality – this triad stands as the common denominator for a whole range of 
humanitarian actors from which they define a common Self. 
Obviously, the existence of people in need – victims – is a precondition for the existence of 
such humanitarian actors, and thus their Self-identity. The suffering population was therefore 
the Other of the humanitarian identity in Afghanistan. However, the humanitarian identity 
typically sees itself as closely connected to these Others, particularly if they are victims of war 
or of atrocities. The closeness with the victims and the voluntary and altruistic element of the 
work supported this ethical dimension of the self-identity for humanitarians.  
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The ethics of independence, impartiality and neutrality also drew a line of demarcation between 
the humanitarian actors and those engaged in development, reconstruction, political institution-
building, or security activity. ‘Politics’ in general was typically treated as an Other by orthodox 
humanitarians, as an ‘ideological marker against which the constituents of true humanitarian 
action are to be measured’.514 In this sense, most other actors, local and international, were 
Others as well – and the more explicitly political they were (i.e. not independent, impartial, or 
neutral), the firmer was the line drawn between the humanitarian Self and these Others.  
However, the ethical identity is premised on respect for and recognition of neutrality from the 
warring parties. The ethics of neutrality and impartiality presupposes that the belligerents 
recognize this: that they share some basic ethical-political positions which respect neutrality. 
What became more evident in Afghanistan (and in Iraq) than in more benign security 
environments was the ‘diminishing consensus on the political value of humanitarian 
independence.’515 The increase in the targeting and killing of humanitarian workers by the 
Taliban showed that also humanitarianism was seen as a political ideology – aimed at 
redistribution of resources and empowering the weakest in society. The claim of universalism 
in IHL was not always recognized. 
 
3.3. The temporal dimension 
This is illustrated even more clearly in the temporal dimension. Traditional humanitarian relief 
focuses on alleviating suffering, not addressing its original causes. Humanitarians can therefore 
be said to work in a conflict, but not on it.516 They are not meant to engage in resolving the 
political reasons for a conflict. Their Others – the recipients of aid – will therefore be so only 
as long as there is a need to fill. When there is no longer a humanitarian need, these will cease 
to be the Other, and the humanitarians will go elsewhere. Seen in that way, classical 
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humanitarianism can be said to victimize the recipients of aid and deprive them agency.517 It is 
precisely the lack of agency, the lack of capacity to escape the social and physical situation in 
which they found themselves, that made the recipients the Other of the humanitarian identity in 
Afghanistan. Here the humanitarian identity shared the static view of the Other with the 
conventional military identity: the Other was seen as unable to reform itself, remaining fixed in 
the temporal dimension. 
In practice, however, most humanitarian actors did see the potential for human progress and 
agency, and were seeking to engage in development assistance as well. In Afghanistan they 
were deeply embedded in a temporal dimension of human progress, ‘focusing on health, 
education, food security, school reconstruction and educational programming, livelihoods and 
economic development, agriculture and capacity building and the government’s community 
development effort, the National Solidarity Programme.’ 518  The National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP) and the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) were key reference 
documents for many humanitarians – but they were also official documents of the Afghan 
government. Engaging in these meant, in effect, supporting the Kabul government.  
Many NGOs carried out activities defined and funded by international donors – some aimed at 
traditional development, others as a part of an overarching security agenda. By being engaged 
in these programmes, they were part of the foreign-supported political reform process aimed at 
strengthening the government of Afghanistan. This Other was no longer victimized but was 
seen as a rather passive recipient, dependent on outside assistance in order to progress and 
‘mature.’519 Some government-funded development agencies like the United States Agency for 
International Aid (USAID) went one step further, explicitly stating that they were working 
together with the armed forces to promote stability and human security to curb insurgencies: 
‘Long-term development thrives best in stable conditions and USAID works as a partner to the 
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joint Afghan-U.S. Government counter-insurgency strategy to implement programmes that 
improve lives throughout the country.’520 
These and other government aid agencies saw themselves as part of the overarching political 
process in Afghanistan, and were more likely to view the military as partners and the Taliban 
as the Other.521 Their engagement was meant to contribute to the political struggle for a stable 
Afghanistan – and the main challenger to the order represented by the elected government in 
Kabul was the Taliban. Being explicitly political also indicates a self-awareness of one’s own 
power, influence and role, which may be lacking among humanitarian NGOs. Development 
and neutrality have never been compatible, especially not in the politically strained environment 
in Afghanistan. This made the temporal dimension highly problematic for the humanitarian 
identity, which extended beyond its initial platform. In principle, concepts of development and 
progress should be relatively irrelevant for the humanitarian identity, but in practice they were 
very much present – and could undermine the other dimensions as well.  
 
3.4. Conclusions: the humanitarian identification process 
Despite some developments toward politicization, the humanitarian identity was very much 
present and was fiercely defended in Afghanistan. NGOs in particular were active in protecting 
the core principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality when the humanitarian space 
came under pressure from the military and political actors; and the temporal dimension was 
challenged by those who were seeking to work on the conflict, not merely in it. The 
humanitarian identity attempted to keep politics as an Other – but this was difficult, as the 
Afghan theatre exposed the underlying political/ideological nature of this identity.  
To some extent, the tensions in the humanitarian identity were a result of the extremely 
politicized Afghan theatre, but they also reveal how Western principles may not necessarily be 
universally transferrable. Remaining a non-political intervener in a foreign country while 
simultaneously denying any agency to the Afghan Other became particularly unattainable in 
practice. The humanitarian principles assume that the intervention not will change the Other, 
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only save him – but this represented a denial of humanitarian Self’s own political power and 
influence, and also ignored the potential resistance or opinion of the Afghan Other.  
That being said, if politics were allowed to flow into the humanitarian space, the humanitarian 
identity would collapse, and the differentiation between Self and Other would vanish. The 
humanitarian actors’ political campaign in the West and in the UN to remain apolitical may 
have been flawed, but it was nonetheless a question of survival of the humanitarian identity as 
its practitioners saw it.  
 
4. The State-building Identification Process 
 
The state-building identity in Afghanistan was made up of the group of actors engaged in 
establishing a political system and institutions after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. With the UN 
and its mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in front, a range of international organizations and 
states engaged in the state-building process. Through international diplomatic conferences, new 
institutions for Afghanistan and the political direction were designed and formulated. An 
underlying assumption was that weak states are more prone to civil war or to harbour terrorists 
(as experienced in Afghanistan), whereas having stable state institutions is a precondition for 
avoiding economic and political collapse once the fighting is over. 522  The state-building 
identity was based upon a set of ‘best practices’ or principles of good governance held to be 
applicable worldwide: this ‘liberal peacebuilding’ principle was the very core of the state-
building identity. This identification was driven primarily by Western governments, with 
support from several UN agencies embedded in a similar identity. There was an important 
distinction, however. State-building, as it has become known and institutionalized in the UN, 
is a post-conflict contribution to peace-building.523 In Afghanistan, however, at least for the 
USA and many other Western governments, state-building was an attempt to win the war by 
strengthening the legitimate (in the eyes of these international actors) government. Despite 
these differences, the state-building identity in Afghanistan appeared to operate largely as if the 
situation were indeed a post-conflict one. Progress was measured not in terms of a weakened 
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Taliban, but more in terms of technical criteria – the passage of laws, the establishment of 
institutions, and the like. UNAMA, which was a key state-builder, distanced itself from US war 
terminology and foreign policy, and defined itself as ‘established at the request of the [Afghan] 
Government to assist it and the people of Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable 
peace and development.’ 524  The state-building identity in Afghanistan thus bore several 
similarities to state-building identities in UN-led operations.  
 
4.1. The spatial dimension 
The spatial dimension of the state-building identity formation can be described as the process 
of first providing Afghanistan with an international identity, and then transforming the Afghan 
state into a proper one, with all the formal institutions and trappings (president, parliament, etc.). 
The establishment of formal external sovereignty – a demarcation toward other states – has in 
Western political thinking traditionally been regarded as a precondition for internal sovereignty 
– the government’s monopoly of power and social contract with the citizenry. 525  Hence, 
establishing a physical and formal presence of the state institutions of a certain kind was a basic 
starting point for the foreign state-builders in Afghanistan, as this would provide the 
international community with official partners with whom to engage.526 The focus was to return 
the Other, the former Afghan pariah-state, back into the international family of nations. Less 
concern was directed to the quality of this state: it was the formal/physical presence that 
mattered the most.  
The state-building identification process was initiated by the Bonn Conference in December 
2001, shortly after the fall of the Taliban.527 Ambitions were high: ‘to end the tragic conflict in 
Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human 
rights.’ In practice the aim of the Bonn process was to establish or re-establish the basic state 
institutions and get a legitimate central government in place. The Bonn document itself makes 
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for sober reading, with clear and achievable objectives. It created a road map for establishing 
an Emergency Loya Jirga, Interim Authority, Transitional Authority, Constitutional Loya Jirga, 
and later on, the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005.  
The initial instinct on the part of the UN and the West was not to set up massive international 
state-building missions in Afghanistan similar to those of the 1990s in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
East Timor. Criticism had emerged that these missions had succeeded in building neither peace 
nor local commitment and ownership.528 This time the recipe for the UN was a ‘light footprint’, 
a relatively limited physical presence. The international community should engage mainly 
through ‘facilitation, advice and subtle interventions’, while most reconstruction tasks were to 
be taken care of by the Afghans themselves.529 In this identity, the Others were the Afghans, 
located in Afghanistan, whereas the Self was the wider international community who meet them 
in international conferences, and through the limited institutional presence in Kabul, but who 
otherwise maintained physical distance. 
However, the Western actors also wanted to make sure that Afghanistan got off on the right 
track. As a result, the ‘entire government functions were … being assumed by international 
actors during the Bonn Process, including the arrangement of presidential and parliamentary 
elections.’530 Whereas international actors stressed the importance of the ‘light footprint’, they 
also had deep interests in how Afghanistan should develop politically, and they made sure to 
have at least one hand on the steering wheel. Nevertheless, at this stage, progress had clearly 
been made: the constitution was adopted, elections held, and many institutions had been 
formally established. A new Afghan state (a potential Self, resembling the Western one) was 
legally established, and the institutional presence of Afghanistan in international politics was 
achieved. The fact remained, however, that all this had been done with limited involvement of 
the Other in question, and the government institutions remained very weak. 
This spatial dimension was hardly challenged: nobody was proposing a different constitutional 
setup, different institutions, tribal rule, new borders, or federalization of the country. The state-
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building identity remained largely an imposed, outside–in, external identity within international 
UN and diplomatic circles.531 It was largely absent among the Afghan populace, and would 
collapse if the international community ceased to support it. The Afghan space was thus quasi-
sovereign, or ‘simulated’, to borrow a term from Cynthia Weber, where a façade of external 
sovereignty provides the international community with a platform from which to ‘help build’ 
internal sovereignty.532 We find this further borne out in the ethical and temporal dimensions. 
 
4.2.  The ethical dimension 
The ethical dimension of the humanitarian identity formation can be seen through how the state-
building was based on what were assumed to be universal values, as represented by the UN and 
other international state-building actors. Beginning with the second step in the state-building 
process, which was initiated by Berlin Conference in 2004, prior to the first elections, the plan 
of the state-builders was for Afghanistan was to develop toward a liberal democracy. The Berlin 
document included a ‘Workplan of the Afghan Government’ which focussed on holding ‘free 
and fair elections’, and institution-building based upon values such as ’good governance’, ‘the 
rule of law and human rights’, and ‘gender’, to mention some.533  
In this process the ethical Other of the state-builders was not only the non-liberal former Taliban 
rule, but also the old Afghan institutions, legislation, and value system, all of which were 
expected to become liberated and liberalized into a new ethical Self. The language in all the 
declarations put huge emphasis on the importance of liberal values such as human rights, gender 
issues and women’s rights, anti-corruption, and good governance – with hardly any reference 
to Afghan traditions, culture, religion, or values. Furthermore, if the Afghans passed laws that 
happened to run counter to the liberal values of the state-building identity, Western political 
actors were quick to interfere.534  
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For many Europeans, the entire engagement in Afghanistan was legitimized on moral-ethical 
grounds. With distrust of the Bush-era War on Terror, the European focus was more on helping 
the victims of Taliban rule: children, women, the uneducated. ‘Success’ in Afghanistan was 
typically referred to in terms of all the children – girls in particular – who had begun to attend 
school, or who now had access to healthcare.535 
Individual political and economic freedoms were the ethical foundations of the state-building 
identification process. However, as Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh has shown, the liberal model 
ignored the fact that any social contract between the state and the people must stem from the 
latter.536 State-building without legitimacy was bound to fail. Many Afghans considered the 
individualism and personal freedoms that underpinned the Western-sponsored economic and 
political institutions (free market, freedom of speech, elections, etc.) to be in conflict with local 
Muslim value systems. While they could support the rule of law, participation, social justice 
and morality, they also gave priority to collectivism over unlimited individual freedom, for the 
sake of societal harmony and well-being. Many preferred ‘Islamic peace’ to the individualism 
of the liberal peace. When the state-building identity promoted a set of values not immediately 
recognized or appreciated, the social contract between the people and the state institutions was 
bound to be fragile. Arguably, the people of Afghanistan were treated as recipients of 
democracy, not the driving force behind it.537 
The ethical dimension of the state-building identification process was perhaps the most 
problematic one, and also the most sensitive. It entailed deep dilemmas about universalism 
versus relativism and the role of the external promoter and the internal recipient of a value 
system, which on paper is universalized through various UN declarations. The ethical 
dimension of the state-building identity was about transforming (or liberating) a non-liberal 
Other into a liberal Self – but without any deeper analysis of the potential conflicts, how it 
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might negatively affect the larger conflict resolution process, or backfire into resistance against 
democracy and the free-market as the foundation of the future Afghan identity.538  
 
4.3. The temporal dimension 
The temporal dimension of the Afghan state-building identity was clearly evident in the Berlin 
Conference in 2004. Until then, while there were clear international developmental ambitions 
in the process, it had also been largely about building basic institutions with at least a flavour 
of Afghan identity and culture (Loya Jirga, etc.). After this, the state-building ambitions were 
accelerated: Afghanistan was to develop much further toward a liberal democracy, and the 
identity of the Western state-builders was reaffirmed. It was thus a matter of building a ‘liberal’ 
state – but in line with international templates, not local needs. The Other – through which the 
identity of the Self is contrasted – became defined as the past, with its traditional (and partly 
communist) forms of governance. 
Where the 2001 Bonn document was narrow in scope, the 2004 Berlin document extended into 
several other areas, as mentioned: ‘good governance and public administration’ (including 
reform of the ministries, retraining of staff, civil service law, etc), ‘fiscal management’, ‘private 
sector development’, ‘economic and social development’, ‘rule of law and human rights’, 
‘gender’, disarmament and security’, and ‘drugs’.539 Under each of these headlines several 
concrete steps were listed, some of which represented major reform and development efforts. 
This trend was continued in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact,540 which covered almost all aspects 
of comprehensive state-building: security forces, counter-narcotics, public administration, 
statistics, gender, rule of law, and more. It also set benchmarks and timetables for all these 
sectors – but they appeared to be based on a generic list of things to do to achieve good 
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governance and human rights, with scant reference to the specific needs and challenges of 
Afghanistan. This was also the case with the 2004 document Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 
which laid the basis for the subsequent strategies, even if it was written under the auspices of 
Ashraf Ghani, an Afghan politician. Historical, contextual, and cultural challenges received 
scant mention.541  
Due to the ‘light footprint’ approach, the discrepancies between these ambitions and delivery 
in the field were considerable. Neither UNAMA nor the Afghan government was ever provided 
with enough resources to implement the plans, nor were these resources delivered through third 
parties. In the words of a former UNAMA SRSG: ‘Much of it has been said and written – and 
even agreed solemnly at international conferences over and over again. But it has not been 
implemented.’542  
It is generally acknowledged that international assistance constituted around 90% of the public 
expenditure in Afghanistan during the intervention. And yet, some two-thirds of the foreign aid 
bypassed the Afghan government, thus undermining efforts to build strong state institutions. 
This applied particularly to regional government institutions outside Kabul.543 There was also 
minimal transparency in procurement and tendering; moreover, none of the benchmarks in the 
Afghan Compact applied to donors, only to the Afghan government.544  
A study of the local perceptions of the economic liberalization enforced by the 2006 Compact, 
the ANDS and IMF/WB (deregulation and liberalization of markets and trade, cuts in public 
spending, etc.), found that the experiences were largely negative.545 The process had not only 
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exacerbated differences between rich and poor, but also led to the emergence of mafia, 
corruption and rising prices. Again, the identification process launched a generic model of a 
liberal progressive economy and imposed it to replace the old dysfunctional and centralized 
economy (the Other), but failed to take local conditions and side-effects into account. The result 
was local scepticism to the liberal economic agenda, and hence less impact. The economic 
Other was not transformed to a Self as prescribed in the state-building identity.  
Ironically, this failure of the Afghans to meet the high expectations, to transform the country 
from an underdeveloped to a modern/liberal state, served to reinforce and confirm the Western 
Self and its perceptions of the need to continue to assist Afghanistan. The temporal dimension 
was constantly present, as a vicious circle where outsiders define certain artificially high targets, 
fail to provide the Afghans with resources to deliver them, and thereby legitimize their own 
presence and the continued need for development programmes.  
As with the spatial dimension, the temporal dimension of the identity was hardly challenged 
from within the group of involved actors. There was no alternative approach, or even any 
questioning of the distinction between ‘progress’ as defined by the state-building identity 
(Western-like institutions) and what it would mean for Afghans. The temporal dimension of the 
state-building identity was thus primarily challenged from outside, from forces like the Taliban, 
representing less progressive values according to the identity. These were defined as Others and 
hence threats to the temporal dimension of the state-building identity.  
 
4.4. Conclusions: the state-building identification process 
The state-building identity implied that, by developing liberal state institutions, the Afghan 
Other could gradually become more like the Western Self. For some countries, such as the USA, 
this may have been a deliberate attempt to win the war through state-building, but that was not 
the case for the UN and other voices dominant in the identification process. The role of the Self 
was to assist the Afghan government in modernizing and democratizing the country. The state-
building identity appeared to be one of an outsider with limited own interests – a well-
intentioned assistant seeking to modernize and develop Afghanistan. It was, to borrow a term 




its own power and influence and with no accountability toward the Afghan population.546 In 
practice, what the state-building identity seems to have delivered was a façade without much 
content. The social contract between the people and the state remained elusive, and a sustainable 
political and economic model was far from being implemented. It was an inside–out attempt at 
liberalization, with few voices questioning whether state-building was possible if it was not 
anchored in Afghan culture and tradition. Indeed, did that make sense at all in the midst of war, 
before a political peace agreement had been established? 
Some of these findings resemble the arguments of the ‘post-development’ literature, which 
holds that Western development discourses have produced post-colonial subjects and ordered 
knowledge and truths about the poor in developing countries in ways that have served to 
facilitate intervention. 547  Furthermore, it is argued that development projects are typically 
depoliticized and made into technical projects that the developer can deliver. The developer 
‘Self’ is seen as a ‘facilitator’, not a political actor. There are obvious similarities between the 
identities of the Western development agent and the state-builder in Afghanistan. They share 
the same patterns of organizing facts, truths, and categories of the Other in a way that can enable 
the Self to operate. This is a Self with limited contextual understanding, often ignorant of 
indigenous counterparts and reluctant to acknowledge its own political power. These identities 
serve to keep the Self relevant, as technical facilitators of development or state-building. 
Maintaining this identity is crucial – it allows the professions to continue to exist, future 
interventions to take place, and universal standards and best practices to be promoted.  
On the other hand, post-development research has been criticized for ignoring the power, 
agency, and influence of the recipients of development activities. Recent studies – often based 
on anthropological fieldwork – have revealed significant influence from local elites in 
influencing the scope and design of development aid.548 The identity that development actors 
ascribe to Other and Self, to their own role as developers, can become altered and negotiated in 
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the meeting with the Other. This is highly relevant in the case of Afghanistan. As we have seen, 
the Other had significant power to resist and block the Self from realizing its liberal state-
building project. I return to this in the concluding chapter. 
Lastly, the state-building identity formation did not relate much with other intervening actors. 
In contrast to the humanitarian identity, it saw no need to delimit its space from other interveners. 
While sharing the perception of the ‘Progressive Afghan’ Other with the COIN-influenced part 
of the military identity, it seemed to operate relatively separate from the military. Relations 
between ISAF and UNAMA were sometimes strained, often due to poor communications and 
information exchange.549 The state-builders certainly represented the military as an Other – but 




This chapter has analysed the identity formations of the three main groups of international 
interveners in Afghanistan, how they regarded themselves and those intervened upon. We have 
seen how the very purpose of the intervention has differed significantly between the groups – 
and in some cases within these groups. In focus has been the ongoing constitution of identity, 
with the differentiation between the Other and the Self by the latter. This identity formation in 
turn provided the basis for certain practices and policies, while precluding others. The analysis 
has also revealed power-relations associated with identity formation, and how identities change 
and evolve, impacting on what policies are regarded the best or most appropriate. Although this 
can by no means be regarded as a fully developed analysis, it offers insights for better 
understanding how these policies are formed, altered, and challenged.  
The findings are summarized in Table 6.  
The analysis has showed that the conventional military identity regarded the Other as evil and 
unchangeable, beyond political or ethical redemption. This was used to legitimize and 
naturalize military operations aimed at eradicating the Taliban from the Afghanistan: taking 
territorial control and eliminating or pacifying as many as possible. The problem was that this 
approach did not succeed in removing the Taliban, and civilian sufferings created animosity 
                                                 




among the wider Afghan population. A challenge came with the COIN approach and its 
recognition of how conventional warfare had served to strengthen the Other. A more cautious 
approach was then adopted, with the focus shifting from the enemy Other to the allied Other 
(the local security forces) and the civilian Other (the local population). In temporal and ethical 
terms, this meant that priority was now given to building Afghan civilian legitimacy and 
security forces. Despite various COIN setbacks, this element remained a priority and an exit 
strategy for the military. The stabilization approach never fully challenged the dominant 
military identity, but it represented Afghanistan as a weak state in need of stabilization and 
assistance. It defined the Taliban Other as ‘criminals’ and therefore in theory redeemable – in 
contrast to the conventional representation of the ‘totally evil Other’. These various military 
identities co-existed in Afghanistan, but their relative strength also evolved over time. As a 




Table 6: Summary of findings, Chapter 6 
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The traditional humanitarian identity claimed absolute neutrality and thus regarded all political 
actors as its Other. This identity – summarized in the keywords ‘independence, impartiality and 
neutrality’ – differentiated the humanitarians from literally everyone else. The idea of a 
humanitarian space exclusively for humanitarian actors followed the same logic. The aid 
recipient (in principle, the main Other for this Self), was represented as without agency or 
capacity for self-help, and reliant on external interveners for its survival. However, our analysis 
has also showed that many humanitarian actors expanded their portfolio beyond emergency 
relief. Seeking to address the ‘root causes’ of the conflict, they became engaged in development 
aid, human rights advocacy and human capacity-building. This approach legitimized a far 
broader range of programmes and activities, but also served to undermine the foundations of 
the traditional non-political humanitarian identity.  
Lastly, the state-building identity sought to transform the Afghan state in its own image, so it 
focused on establishing formal institutions based on predominantly Western best practices. In 
spatial terms it re-established Afghanistan in the international system of states, according it 
formal external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty was formally established, but never achieved 
in practice. The ‘light footprint’ approach, combined with high ambitions, created a huge gap 
between expectations and resources, reinforced by massive bypassing of the Afghan authorities 
by foreign donors. In ethical and temporal terms Afghanistan was regarded as extremely weak 
and backward, in need of massive assistance – and of firm foreign involvement in governance. 
Since the Afghan Other remained basically excluded from the identification processes, it was 
denied the chance to define the parameters of this liberalization. The on-going war certainly 
made state-building difficult as well. 
In the previous chapter I outlined two conditions to be met if coherence could be expected. The 
first was that the intervening Selves consider military–civilian coherence to be of some 
relevance; the second, the existence of a certain amount of shared or overlapping representation 
of the Other among the Selves. As we have seen, these conditions were not met, or at best only 
partly, in Afghanistan.  
On the first condition, the military said that it relied on civilians to achieve its objectives, but 
the latter had their own reasons for being in Afghanistan. There was no force strong enough to 
enforce coherence against the will of the intervening actors themselves. The military outreach 




achieving its own objectives, not civilian ones. The three identities came to evolve in parallel, 
independent of each other, with no overarching strategy or prioritization among them. 
As to the second condition, there was not one unified ‘Western approach’ to Afghanistan, but 
at least three, each associated with numerous conflicting representations of the Afghans along 
all three dimensions. If we can recognize how these three sets of actors had such fundamentally 
different reasons for existing and for being in Afghanistan, we can also understand why a 
comprehensive approach never was achieved. 
However, there were also some shared features. Specifically, all three identities shared some 
forms of modernization and state-building approaches towards their respective Others. There 
were forces in each identification process pushing for this. But they appeared to have very 
different ideas about what kind of state they were attempting to build. Was it a secure state, 
capable of fighting insurgents and protecting vital infrastructure without outside help? Was it a 
developed state, with the focus on relieving poverty, building up education and health? Or was 
it a liberal state, with formal government institutions established to secure the political 
freedoms and human rights of the populace? The absence of any overarching shared vision 
made even state-building challenging. All in all, the intervening actors hardly developed 
coherence – not in their purpose for being in Afghanistan, nor in terms of coordinating activities 
towards a shared goal.  
Given the space limitations of this dissertation, some aspects and nuances to the picture have 
probably been overlooked here. There might, for instance, have been more power-struggles and 
competing representations of Other and Self within the state-building identity than identified in 
this study. But my intention was not to offer an exhaustive analysis of Afghanistan: it was to 
look specifically at the challenges related to coherence and the comprehensive approach. This 
chapter has shed light on the foundations of these challenges.  
That being said, the absence of coherence among the intervening parties in Afghanistan can at 
best be a part-answer to why the overall intervention was unsuccessful. As mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, others have analysed this thoroughly, and the full answers are likely 
to involve factors and actors not included in the analysis here – such as internal US politics, 
Afghan politics and culture, and the total amount of resources spent.  
The main objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the utility of the analytical framework 




deductively to various different cases. Furthermore, the aim was to be able to analyse all the 
main actors in an intervention – to theorize an intervention comprehensively, not only bits and 
pieces of it. This has – to my knowledge – never been done before.  
Two questions then arise. Firstly, has this analysis offered any value added compared to other 
studies of the Afghanistan intervention? Secondly, is the model applicable also to other cases, 
other interventions? I turn to this second question in the next chapter, and will remain in the 
Afghanistan context here. 
Given the fact that all empirical materials used in this chapter are secondary sources, nothing 
new as such has been revealed. But that was not to be expected either. The question is whether 
the comprehensive analytical approach has offered us new perspectives on the known facts 
about the intervention in Afghanistan. I will argue it has. 
Firstly, the comprehensiveness is unique. The application of the same three dimensions in all 
three identities has allowed for comparison and a more systematic understanding of the 
intervention as a whole. This chapter has shown that such an analysis is indeed possible, 
offering new comparative perspectives on the groups of intervening actors.  
Secondly, the focus on the core of identity processes, the Self/Other representations, has 
allowed glimpses into some basic pillars of the intervening actors. While many studies have 
noted how mandates, resources and politics impacted on the intervention, this focus on 
Self/Other relations offers insights into how practices and policies were affected also by the 
identity representations of Other and Self.  
Thirdly, the analysis has revealed competing representations within each identification process, 
as well as between and among them. It has demonstrated evolution and change, while avoiding 
deterministic explanations referring to, e.g., the prejudices of the interveners. This approach has 
made it possible to see the evolution of identities over time, and how the dominant identity 
representation could be challenged from within. 
Fourthly, the analysis has offered a systematic understanding as to why civilian and military 
intervening actors never managed to work together smoothly in Afghanistan. It has pointed to 
something more fundamental than mandates, personalities or organizational cultures. Although 
coherence in and of itself would probably not have been the golden key to a successful 




that a comprehensive approach had limited chances of success, due to the significant differences 
between civilian and military actors regarding their basic visions for transformation of the Other.  
In the next and final chapter, I build on these points, asking how this analytical model could be 
further developed and applied to other cases. What are its strengths and weaknesses? What 












This dissertation opened with an empirical observation: in today’s interventions, the military 
and civilian actors are expected to develop coherence and coordination while in the field. This, 
I argued, is a relatively new feature of post-Cold War interventions, compared to interventions 
further back in history. The call for coherence among the actors in an intervention may be driven 
by what many see as new characteristics of conflicts today (with the blurring of distinctions 
such as warrior–civilian, war–peace, military–police), and the subsequent need for new 
approaches to dealing with these kinds of conflicts. Also, the end of the Cold War paved the 
way for higher international ambitions as regards UN interventions and peacebuilding; and the 
9/11 terrorist attacks against the USA brought greater Western deployment of troops. 
Humanitarian relief work has also expanded in these decades.  
However, despite fairly broad recognition of the interdependencies between security and 
development, efforts at building coherence among and between the various types of intervening 
actors still face significant difficulties. Interventions continue to be complex and messy. 
Coherence and coordination are far from optimal: power struggles, competition, disagreements, 
turf battles and conflicting mandates are but some of the difficulties observed.  
In order to understand these challenges beyond a case-by-case basis, I have argued, we must 
develop an analytical framework for interventions. We need to find a way to approach 
interventions that can be applied to various sets of actors across contemporary interventions. 
This led me to formulate the following research question:  
• How can we theorize and analyse the challenges facing intervening actors to achieve 





The ‘how’ question hints at the constitutive theoretical approach of this dissertation. My aim 
has not been to single out the most common impediments to coherence in interventions. If that 
had been the case, I could have analysed a broad range of interventions and looked for 
commonalities likely to be applicable also to other cases. The problem with such an inductive 
approach, however, is that if circumstances change in future interventions, the relevance of 
findings about earlier interventions may be reduced correspondingly. Conclusions based on 
empirical findings of the past will sooner or later become outdated, or at least lose some of their 
analytical value. Therefore, I opted to develop an analytical framework that could be applicable 
across cases and intervening actors.  
Before reaching this conclusion in Chapter 5, it was necessary to offer a broader assessment of 
military–civilian coherence in interventions. I did this in Chapters 2 to 4. This served partly to 
develop a deeper understanding of the challenges and how they tend to play out, partly to 
determine that the obstacles were of social and political by nature and therefore could evolve. 
All this prepared the way for the deductive approach proposed in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 2 discussed how governments and international organizations have attempted to 
operationalize coherence into a comprehensive approach (or similar concepts). For a better 
understanding of these comprehensive approaches, I then developed a taxonomy of various 
relationships. This showed that interventions may vary significantly in terms of the actors 
engaged and how they relate to each other. From this, I chose to focus on inter-agency 
coherence. The chapter also discussed some of the obstacles that tend to impede the prospects 
of coherence: output vs. impact; conflicting mandates and values; and internal/external 
imbalance. Coherence emerged as highly context-specific: the level of coherence achievable in 
one situation will not necessarily be achievable in the next one. This in turn implies that our 
approach to studying and understanding the challenges related to coherence must be able to 
account for contextual variation. In other words, we need an approach that can be applied to all 
interventions, but which may yield different answers in each case, depending on the 
circumstances. Furthermore, the discussion demonstrated the highly political nature of 
relationships in an intervention, showing that coherence needs to be assessed with this in mind, 
with attention to resistance and conflict as well as cooperation.  
Chapter 3 then looked more closely at the intervening actor which often is the most dominant, 
powerful and intrusive: the military. Comparison of the UN Peacekeeping Doctrine and the US 




share important features along six dimensions: civilian primacy, protection of civilians, 
coherence, local ownership, intelligence support, and the use of force. They also share some 
shortcomings, especially as regards relations with civilian actors. Both concepts rely on 
civilians to succeed, but have been vague on how to go about achieving this in practice. 
Importantly though, both the kinds of operations are deeply political. The degree of 
politicization depends on context, but these are sliding scales, not fixed positions. UN 
peacekeepers may be as political as the US Marines. The nature of each mission will determine 
how political a UN or a COIN operation will appear to the host population and other interveners. 
That in turn implies that challenges related to achieving coherence between military and civilian 
actors cannot be understood without a taking the political circumstances of the intervention into 
account.  
Chapter 4 focused on the most heated type of military–civilian conflict in interventions: 
between military and humanitarian actors. The humanitarians represent a special case because 
of their insistence on being apolitical. If this were in fact the case, it would probably warrant a 
different analytical approach from that applied to other civilian actors. In other words, we found 
certain constant differences between humanitarians and military actors, differences that are 
always present across interventions, we could develop generic explanations of the challenges 
to coherence. To assess this, I first discussed if and how international humanitarian law gave 
the humanitarians a special status in interventions. Finding the law to be deliberately vague, 
allowing for interpretations, pragmatism and therefore also politics, I developed a taxonomy of 
various military operations and the associated challenges with humanitarians.  The core of the 
challenge lies in the humanitarians’ fear of becoming politicized: that their basic values of 
independence, impartiality and neutrality may be undermined. This is particularly likely in the 
context of offensive military operations or when troops are tasked with engaging the civilian 
population, as with PoC or COIN. However, we also noted that humanitarians frequently 
cooperate with the military in less heated situations, and that they often politicize themselves 
by expanding beyond their humanitarian core-tasks. Hence, politicization depends on context 
and what the actors do – not who they are. That implies that humanitarians can be studied 
through the same analytical framework as other civilians. 
Chapters 2 through 4 offered analytical categorizations of crucial aspects of interventions today- 
Coherence was shown to be more than a technical approximation of actors: it is a deeply 




operational practice matter more than formal mandates. The next step was to find out, more 
concretely, how all this can be theorized.  
Chapter 5 focused on developing an appropriate theoretical framework for analysing coherence 
in interventions. I began with an assessment of the most ambitious attempt at theorizing an 
intervention to date, Séverine Autesserre’s study of the intervention into the DRC. Her 
theorizing was found to be largely inductive: tailor-made for her specific study-case, and not 
very applicable elsewhere. I then proposed a deductive approach concentrated on collective 
identity: how the intervening actors ascribe meaning to themselves and Others. After all, the 
very existence of these actors is built largely on interventions. Much of their legitimacy and 
reason for being there is based on their role or expertise in engaging other people, usually in 
expeditionary operations. If we want to get to the heart of an intervention, we need to understand 
how the intervening actors regard their tasks and the reason for their presence. I developed a 
framework for studying the identification processes along three dimensions (spatial, temporal 
and ethical), emphasizing that the Other need not be radically different from the Self. What the 
researcher needs to capture is the ongoing process of defining the Other, and in particular 
conflicting representations within the Self group. Here, I argued that the proposed analytical 
framework can grasp these representations, how they differ among various groups of 
interveners, and also how they evolve and change. This approach can be applied on any 
intervention, on any group of actors. And finally, this analysis of how the various intervening 
actors perceive their own role and identity can help us understand the challenges they face in 
seeking to achieve coherence. If the representations of themselves and those they intervene 
upon differ significantly among interveners, coherence becomes more challenging. If for 
instance, the military consider their Other to be an enemy insurgency group or a terrorist that 
must be neutralized, whereas the civilian peacebuilders consider the central government to be 
their Other, there is little common ground on which to build coherence.  
In Chapter 6 this analytical framework was applied to the case of Afghanistan. I singled out 
three groups of intervening actors: the military, humanitarians and the state-builders, and 
analysed the identities within these groups. There emerged significantly different 
representations of Self and Other – between the groups of interveners, but also internally, within 
the various camps. In turn, these various representations of the Other and the Self led to different 
and often conflicting policy priorities – while precluding alternative approaches. We saw, for 




significantly as to the kind of ‘state’ envisaged. This was one reason why coherence was not 
achieved in Afghanistan. The intervening Selves need a certain degree of shared perception of 
the Other along the three dimensions, if coherence is to be expected. However, the three Selves 
in Afghanistan appear to have been largely ignorant of one another, operating in parallel but 
not in conjunction. The chapter also identified certain commonalities with insights from other 
academic fields, such as the ‘post-development’ literature.  
What, then, is the potential for further refinement of the analytical framework? Drawing on 
insights from other bodies of literature, in the following I discuss to what extent the analytical 
framework is applicable to other cases. Arguing that it is indeed applicable, I then examine how 
it could be expanded upon, specifically as regards interrelationships between certain groups of 
intervening actors. Here I briefly discuss the utility of borrowing from theories of ontological 
security, before moving on to the crucial relationship between the intervener and those 
intervened upon. Here I highlight the power relations involved in these relations, not least the 
resistance of those on the receiving end of the intervention. Drawing on insights from social 
anthropology and theories of relational power, I then turn to potential applications to 
interventions, not least for analysing power interactions at the micro-level. 
  
2. Identification Theory and Interventions: Further Explorations  
2.1. The utility of the analytical framework 
What of the utility of applying the analytical framework, the identification theory, to other cases? 
Can the approach proposed in this dissertation be applied fruitfully to other interventions? Even 
if Afghanistan is a unique case – as in fact all cases are – there is reason to believe that the 
identities and representations of the Other as described here will resemble identities and 
representations in other theatres as well, not least since many of the international actors are the 
same. The representation of the Other is obviously context-dependent. Intervening actors will 
generally try to get at least a basic knowledge of the history, culture, politics and economy of 
the place where they are deployed. Nevertheless, as the critical literature of the ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’ paradigm has shown, we can note the remarkable similarity in approaches. 
Professional interveners, such as UN field staff, naturally bring with them experience and what 




institutionalized in UN documents and lessons learned for peacebuilding. 550  Similarly, 
international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
have constructed their reform packages around several relatively specific economic policy 
prescriptions. Hence, even if the interveners conduct a thorough contextual analysis of each 
specific place of intervention, they are also likely to bring with them certain similar approaches 
(called ‘luggage’ in Chapter 1), on the individual, organizational and higher levels. 
The representation of the Other in an intervention will usually begin with a representation of 
the Self based on previous interventions. This representation of the Other will be coloured by 
what the intervening actors already consider to be their own role: the military will tend to look 
for adversaries, the humanitarians for victims, etc. A study of identities of the intervening actors 
in another intervention – in the three dimensions as applied here to the Afghanistan intervention 
– is thus likely to reveal some similarities with those found here. But, in contrast to a theoretical 
model that relies solely on this kind of ‘luggage’ (such as ‘frames’), the approach I propose can 
account for change and development also during the period of intervention. Representations of 
the Other are likely to change or be challenged, and thereby also the Self-identity of the 
interveners and what they see as appropriate or legitimate policies. The ability to capture change 
is – as argued in Chapter 1 – crucial to any analytical approach that seeks to avoid the pitfalls 
of historical determination or tautology.  
Although the analytical categories chosen always will impact on the final analysis (e.g., one 
frame, or three identities), the approach I have offered looks specifically at how these 
boundaries are constituted and challenged. A more thorough analysis along the lines sketched 
here might make it logical, for instance, to single out yet another identity (say, international 
police). Similarly, in other cases, different identities than the three discussed here might be 
identified – perhaps the private sector, such as foreign investors, could be of importance.  
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2.2. Interrelationship between intervening actors: ontological security 
If we conclude that the approach presented in this dissertation is suited for application to other 
cases – with some case-specific adjustments – the next question is whether studies of identity 
formation could be utilized for closer examination of cases of dynamic interrelationship 
between certain groups of actors. In Afghanistan the main actors seemed to operate in relative 
isolation from each other – with a few exceptions – but that might not be the case in other 
interventions. We might then expect more frequent contact, interaction or conflict between them. 
Capturing this analytically will require an approach that focuses more specifically on this 
interrelationship between the intervening actors than the one indicated here.  
As we saw in Chapter 6, when the military violated the humanitarian space, the humanitarians 
felt threatened, feeling that their identity of neutrality and impartiality was undermined. For 
them, all political actors became their Others, not only the Afghan civilians whom they were 
assisting. These relationships among humanitarians, military, peacebuilders, police, diplomats 
and others could certainly be explored further. Such studies could be used for better 
understanding conflicts among and between intervening actors – for instance, between a 
multinational Force Commander and a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. 
How do they interact, where are the meeting points, and what policies and practices have 
impacts on the others? That would entail a more dynamic intersubjective process than what 
often has been associated with identity studies, which sometimes cover decades or whole 
centuries. In any specific intervention, however, the time-span is shorter, and the interaction 
between Self and Others more frequent. We therefore need an analytical approach of 
identification that can capture these dynamics better.  
One strand of IR theorizing that might be relevant here could be the concept of ontological 
security.551 It explicitly combines identity formation with agency and a routinized relationship 
with others. Here I will simply indicate certain features which might be utilized to study 
interventions – as well as noting some shortcomings of this approach. 
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Ontological security, writes Jennifer Mitzen, ‘is security not of the body but of the self, the 
subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice’.552 It is, in other 
words, about identity: ‘Individuals need to feel secure in who they are, as identities or selves.’553 
Furthermore, she writes, ‘armed with ontological security, the individual will know how to act 
and therefore how to be herself’.554 Action is thus directly linked to identity: ‘The consequences 
of action will always either reproduce or contradict identities, and since identity motivates 
action its stability over time depends on it being supported in practice.’555 In short, this line of 
theorizing focuses more on action than on representation, more on active relationships than on 
distant observation. As such, it seems well-suited for our purposes here. 
Mitzen elevates these theoretical insights from individuals to the state level. In principle, there 
should be no reason for not applying them to other higher-level or collective identities, such as 
groups of intervening actors.556 The actions themselves create a dynamic where ‘actors achieve 
ontological security especially by routinizing their relations with significant others’.557 These 
routinized actions create the desired predictability which again secures the desired ontological 
security. Mitzen applies this to the ‘security dilemma’ in IR theory, and holds that ‘irrational’ 
or ‘dysfunctional’ state behaviour may be a result of such ‘in-between’ state routinized action 
– rather than stemming from internal affairs in states: ‘conflict can be caused not by uncertainty 
but by the certainty such relationships offer their participants’, she notes.558 Applied to groups 
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of organizations this could mean that observations of certain (‘irrational’ or ‘sub-optimal’) 
behaviours observed were a result of routines established when relating to other groups of actors. 
Could it be, for instance, that humanitarian actors maintain a strained relationship to military 
actors even when this is not particularly necessary (e.g. a less dangerous environment), because 
this is has become a routinized framework that offers stability and predictability?  
In a similar argument, Brent Steele emphasizes the shame and anxiety that states (or their 
representatives) can feel if they fail to live up to the expectations of their own identities (as e.g. 
protectors of humanitarian principles).559 This can compel states to conduct certain policies 
(such as humanitarian interventions) to protect their ontological security. As for groups of 
intervening actors, these may feel compelled to act in certain ways in order to maintain their 
identity – as failure to do so would undermine that identify and cause ontological insecurity. 
Perhaps this approach could be applied to examine more closely how armed forces act in an 
intervention, how they may engage in exchanges of fire with limited strategic impact – for the 
purpose of upholding their own identity and self-narrative as professional and capable soldiers. 
For instance, it has been argued that, in Afghanistan, German and some Nordic troops were 
trying to compensate for the political caveats emplaced on them by their political masters, by 
being more offensive in their operations than e.g. the British troops – possibly in order to defend 
their own identity as professional soldiers.560 
These are theoretical pathways that could be explored further in seeking to explain and 
understand actor behaviour in interventions. However, ontological security may also prove to 
be of limited utility, as most of the literature on ontological security has focused on the identity 
of states. How applicable is this theory to the case of interventions, where there are clusters of 
like-minded organizations with a more-or-less shared identity?  
For one thing, states are legal units, and arguably represent a more coherent unit of analysis 
than a group of organizations like, say, humanitarians, consisting of numerous actors with their 
own internal identities, organizational structures and hierarchies. Although states are neither 
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billiard balls nor unitary rational actors, they are nonetheless arguably closer to those 
descriptions than would be a group of humanitarian NGOs, or the multinational deployment of 
armed forces in an intervention. This could make it challenging to apply the theory of 
ontological security to empirical studies of interventions. Which interactions, by which 
organizations, and involving which other actors, should be regarded as worth studying? The 
answer could be empirical: those that seem to uphold an ontological security and a coherent 
identity of the Self in question. But it would probably be more difficult to define or single out 
these patterns than it would be when dealing with states. 
Secondly, ontological security is limited to the study of security relations, and that may be a 
challenge. With the occasional exception of humanitarian actors, intervening actors rarely feel 
threatened by other intervening actors. Strange bedfellows they may be, but bedfellows 
nonetheless.561 The theorizing on ontological security is intended to complement traditional 
territorial state security and is therefore less interested in aspects of international relations that 
are less affiliated with security concerns. However, as noted in Chapters 5 and 6, the Other need 
not be hostile or dangerous for them to function as a constituting contrast to the Self: there are 
degrees of Other-ness. Ontological security may be applied also to cooperative security 
relations, as with security communities, but it is still security that binds them together. However, 
‘security community’ is hardly a relevant descriptor of the conglomerate of actors in an 
intervention. They may have routinized interaction with each other, but the absence of such 
interaction will not necessarily threaten their ontological security. Changes in the routinized 
interaction will not necessarily threaten the identity of the Self in question.  
It is wise to be cautious about placing too much analytical emphasis on the interrelationship 
between the various groups of intervening actors. That may not be the most relevant relation in 
an intervention. In some instances it may be crucial, and then ontological security can provide 
tools for scrutinizing these relations – but in other cases it will not be. Interveners may have 
little to do with each other besides their physical proximity. Nonetheless, this discussion has 
indicated one possible path of theoretical explorations for cases where these interrelationships 
are indeed of importance to the research inquiry. This fits with and builds on the analytical 
framework as explored in previous chapters, and can add the dimension of routinized actions. 
                                                 





2.3. Power and Resistance: Interveners and Internal Actors 
As argued in Chapters 5 and 6, in the majority of cases the most important Self–Other 
relationship is that between interveners and those intervened upon. The purpose of intervention 
– and indeed the raison d’être of many of the intervening actors – is to engage with and impact 
on the people, organizations, structures, culture or economy in the area of intervention. The 
intervening Self is doing this so as to alter the Other somehow (whether this means surrender, 
survival, reform, or whatever), but the Self also needs the Other in order to constitute its own 
identity. In this dissertation I have examined the various representations of the Other in three 
dimensions – but the power-relationships and interactions between the Self and Other could be 
explored further.  
Much of the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ literature has focused on the subtle dominance of the 
intervener over the internal actors. There are tendencies towards exploitation, domination and 
ignorance, as the intervening Self is usually the stronger party, without really recognizing this 
hierarchy. However, we saw in Chapter 6 how the Other may also resist and significantly impact 
on the policies of the Self. Insurgents as well as less-hostile or non-hostile Others may generally 
be weaker than the intervening Self, but they may well have enough power to obstruct 
successful completion of the mission of the Self. It is therefore overly simplistic to restrict an 
analysis to the more or less overt dominance of the Self over the Other. 
In Chapter 6 I also briefly indicated the existence of an ethnographic literature which puts 
emphasis on local resistance towards dominating actors or hegemons. An early classic on local 
resistance is James C. Scott’s Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, 
from 1985.562 His point is that peasants may employ many forms for resisting a hegemon – 
through everyday practices of foot-dragging and false compliance, to sabotage and more. In the 
long run, such techniques are more effective than rebellions, Scott argues, and are well suited 
to the social structure of the peasantry. Furthermore, he criticizes his contemporary neo-Marxist 
and Gramscian scholars who emphasized the idea of ideological dominance by the ruling class 
over the weaker classes. The peasant class, Scott argues, is in fact capable of penetrating and 
resisting this attempted ideological hegemony. In his more recent work, he has shown how local 
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communities have resisted attempts at incorporating them into state structures. They have 
developed ‘shutter zones’ and cultures of refuge from the state: from taxation, slavery, war and 
epidemics: ‘Virtually everything about these people’s livelihoods, social organization, 
ideologies and […] oral cultures, can be read as strategic positionings designed to keep the state 
at arm’s length.’563 In other words, they are not mere remnants of some pre-civilizational past: 
they have deliberately chosen to stay away from the state. Although these studies are not about 
interventions, they do show the resolve that local communities can exhibit in resisting a force 
that is presumably stronger in terms of material and ideological resources. Several of these 
insights are therefore likely to be relevant also for students of interventions. 
Other writers have focused on development – as practice, discourse and ideology. 564 
Development aid may be described as a kind of intervention, but the circumstances of the entry 
into another country differ from what we have defined as an ‘intervention’ here, which includes 
a military dimension. Developmental organizations usually engage in more permissive security 
environments than the intervening actors discussed in this dissertation – but that does not mean 
that there are no relevant parallels. As we have seen, the post-conflict state-builders are often 
development agencies, and their underlying logic is the idea of a mutually reinforcing security–
development nexus. The rich academic (primarily anthropological) body of research on 
development has much to offer the study of interventions. As noted in Chapter 6, the ‘post-
development’ literature has criticized the inherent power in the development discourse. The 
knowledge, techniques and truths contained in the Western development discourse have served 
as instruments of dominance over the ‘Third World’, it was argued.565 Later work has criticized 
these studies for, among other things, failure to recognize agency on the part of the aid 
recipients. 566  These recent studies have focused on, for instance, powerful ‘aid brokers’ 
operating between local populations and external donors, or on the forms of power inherent in 
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‘development’s routines, practices, and subjectivities’.567 One such argument is that, instead of 
regarding ‘aid givers’ and ‘aid recipients’ as separate groups with separate logics, one should 
recognize the interaction between aid rationales and recipient strategies. Aid workers may 
reflect critically on their own efforts, and recipients may actively engage to bend the 
development rationale to their own ends.568 Such an approach to power relations does not see 
this as a matter of black-and-white, of power and resistance, but as an interaction where both 
sides adjust and adapt.  
These insights seem highly relevant for studies of interventions as well. The external interveners 
need the internal actors to govern themselves in a way that can satisfy the needs of the 
interveners – but the internal actors may also resist, for instance by rejecting the gender balance 
that the intervening actors promote in a parliament. Further study of the power relations 
between external interveners and internal recipients could prove fruitful – and applicable to all 
groups of intervening actors and their recipients. 
However, our discussion has moved away from identification theory. If we wish to maintain 
the focus on how identity evolves and creates the bandwidth or conditions of possible action, 
could the above-mentioned power modes be utilized? Yes, but that would probably entail 
shifting the focus away from representations and towards practices and techniques. It would 
require focusing less on how the Self reads, interprets and re-presents the Other in the three 
dimensions, and more on how the Self and Other encounter each other. That might be the mode 
of battle and violence, the mode of communication, propaganda, political debate, or the mode 
of exchange of values, religion and ethics. Researchers could establish in greater detail how 
power and resistance lead both Self and Other to adapt, adjust and change over time, by studying 
their action, behaviour, or policies towards one another. Such an approach might also illuminate 
policy changes on the micro-level. 
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Identification theory as I have applied it here is dynamic: it is about identification as a process, 
not as a description of a condition. However, identification theory is arguably less suited for 
explaining sudden or minor policy changes. Studies of how Self and Other interact in day-to-
day encounters in an intervention may be better positioned to account for such changes than the 
approach chosen in this dissertation. Understanding the power relations at play in these 
situations may also shed light on lesser conflicts, say between an external and an internal force 
commander, between a UN SRSCG and a president, or an NGO representative and a village 
leader. A focus on identity and power in these situations may reveal more than an analysis that 
examines the embedded mandates, cultures and traditions of the various actors. It is precisely 
the dynamics and fluidity of these actors’ ‘luggage’ that can provide for interesting analyses. 
A word of caution: it is important to bear in mind what distinguishes a military intervention 
from much of the theorizing discussed here. When armed force is used, this is often in non-
permissive security environments characterized by violence, or the risk of violence, and with 
people on the move, uprooted and frustrated, frightened and terrified. Warlords, bandits and 
traffickers may flourish, forcing other actors or voices to the margins. Foreign interveners may 
further complicate the picture. Power is likely to be predominantly in the hands of the strong 
and dominant. We should take care when applying theoretical concepts from, for instance, post-
development theorizing or anthropology. They may provide valuable analytical tools, but will 
need to be adjusted to an environment quite different from that of most anthropological studies. 
Nonetheless, identification theorizing could be explored further – in studying relations between 
intervening actors, as well as between these actors and those intervened upon. The latter aspect 
may appear most promising, and is arguably also the most important in an intervention. Studies 
of the various forms of power and resistance seem particularly fruitful. Ultimately, of course, 




In the first chapter I pointed out that interventions have become an important arena for the 
conduct of global politics, and should be studied as a phenomenon in international relations. 
However, I also noted that most theoretical attention has been concerned with the prelude to 




interventions, and similar. Studies of the actual interventions have tended to be empirical, with 
a case-by-case focus. Except for the work of some critics of the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm, there 
have been surprisingly few theoretically informed studies of actual interventions in today’s 
world. This is surprising, not only because the high number of interventions makes it a relevant 
topic to study, but also because what goes on in interventions may have repercussions far 
beyond the theatre of operations itself. Developments and events in interventions may have 
global political effects, or hugely impact a state’s foreign policy. The current reluctance on the 
part of the United States – after Iraq and Afghanistan – to deploy significant numbers of ground 
troops anywhere in the world, or at times even engage politically, bears witness to this.  
This dissertation has looked at one aspect of interventions: the expectation that coherence 
between military and civilian intervening actors is necessary and desirable. I developed an 
analytical framework to study the impediments facing this policy in the field. The framework 
was developed for this, but, as discussed in this chapter, it could be revised and refined to 
address other research questions as well. Furthermore, there are numerous other aspects of 
interventions that could and should be studied, understood and explained in a comprehensive 
and theoretically informed fashion: the violence, the day-to-day politics, the political economy, 
the modality of the regional implications, to mention some. Perhaps entirely different analytical 
approaches would be more suitable, but the important thing is to free such studies from the 
current narrow and empirical emphasis, to enable a more general and theoretical understanding. 
Only then can we get a grasp of the meaning of interventions in today’s global politics.  
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This dissertation focuses on the military–civilian relationship in today’s international 
interventions. It is frequently claimed that success in interventions hinges largely on military–
civilian coherence. Concepts such as ‘comprehensive approach’ and ‘integrated missions’ have 
been launched by NATO, the EU and the UN to implement these ambitions. Nevertheless, 
despite high ambitions among politicians and organizations, coherence among intervening 
actors has proven challenging to achieve in practice. Why is this so? More precisely, this 
dissertation asks: 
• How can we theorize and analyse the challenges facing intervening actors to achieve 
military–civilian coherence in post-Cold War interventions? 
To answer this, this thesis approaches these challenges from a range of angles. Chapter 1 offer 
background and context, discusses extant theorizing of interventions, and theory and 
methodology more generally. Chapter 2 develops a holistic understanding of the various actors 
present in an intervention and their inter-relationships, asking why international actors seem to 
find it necessary to assign such high importance to coherence, and why coherence has become 
a key ingredient for success. It offers a taxonomy of various forms of relationships between 
intervening actors, and of various degrees of coherence. It is argued that the level of coherence 
achievable in one situation will not necessarily be achievable in the next one. As a result, our 
approach to studying and understanding the challenges related to coherence needs to be able to 
account for contextual and political variation.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the military actors. Their role in an intervention is generally a dominant 
one. They often have significant resources at their disposal, in terms of personnel and equipment. 
However, they differ significantly in terms of mandates, resources and doctrines: from 
conventional peacekeeping to robust counter-insurgencies. The chapter compares the 
peacekeeping and counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrines, noting their striking similarities. 
However, the nature of each mission will determine how political a UN or a COIN operation 
will be regarded as being, in the eyes of the host population. As a result, an understanding of 
the challenges related to achieving coherence between military and civilian actors cannot be 





In Chapter 4 the focus is narrowed down to the relations between military and humanitarian 
actors. Are there certain constant differences between humanitarians and the military actors that 
always are present across interventions? The chapter offers a taxonomy of military operations 
and the associated challenges with humanitarian issues which reveals it is not merely the 
intensity of warfare that impacts on the relationship – there appear to be fewer conflicts in 
heated combat such as conventional warfare and other enemy-centric approaches. Hence, 
politicization depends on context and what the actors do, not who they are. This implies that 
humanitarians can be approached through the same analytical framework as other civilians.  
Together, Chapter 2-4 offer a nuanced picture and taxonomies of the nature of military–civilian 
relations in interventions but do not explain how these came about, how they are articulated or 
how they play out in practice. To explore the challenges facing military and civilian actors 
beyond a case-by-case basis, Chapter 5 develops an analytical framework for analysing the 
tensions between intervening actors. It starts with a thorough discussion of Séverine 
Autesserre’s theoretical model, applied on the intervention in the DRC, but finds that her 
theoretical approach is primarily inductive and therefore not directly transferrable to other cases. 
Instead, an analytical framework that takes the identity of the intervening actors as its starting 
point, is developed. It is argued that analysis of the identity formation (or identification) of the 
main sets of actors can provide insights into deeper questions of how they ascribe meaning to 
their mission: how they regard their role and how they regard the other actors, international as 
well as local, in the field of intervention.  
In Chapter 6 this analytical framework is applied to the case of Afghanistan, using it to help 
in understanding the limited military–civilian coherence there. A similar set of analytical frames 
are applied to analyse the identities of three sets of actors – the military, the humanitarians and 
the state-builders – so that we can compare them, noting their differences and similarities. It 
finds that the three entities appeared largely ignorant of each other, operating in parallel but not 
in conjunction. If the three sets of actors had such fundamentally different reasons for being in 
Afghanistan, that may help us understand why a comprehensive approach was never achieved. 
The concluding Chapter 7 indicates some avenues for further expanding the theoretical 
approach developed in this dissertation. It examines how we can better theorize the 
interrelationships among groups of intervening actors. Drawing on theories of ontological 
security, it indicates how micro-level interactions could be scrutinized in more detail than in 
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